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ABSTRACT
In a world of perfect markets without transaction costs, firms would like to finance
themselves with 100 per cent debt because the interest has tax deduction benefits
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963). When there are bankruptcy costs or other costs, firms
have optimal capital structures that trade off the costs and benefits of debt (Wu and
Yue, 2009; Graham, 2003). In the real world the supply of financial resources is
usually limited, especially in developing countries (Dinc, 2005; Bai et al., 2006).
Research on developing nations and economic growth strongly suggests that their
high growth rates cannot be maintained indefinitely without a significant reform of
the banking system and the legal/financial Infrastructure (Berger et al., 2009).
China‘s economy has been growing at high speed even though it has an under
developed legal system and financial market (Allen et al., 2005; Zheng and Zhu,
2009). China‘s banking sector has been the primary source of finance for their
Economy (Bailey et al., 2011). The financial system is dominated by a large but
under developed banking system controlled mainly by the four largest state-owned
banks (Big Four)1, which dominate about three-fourths of the assets of the banking
industry. The newly established Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange have been expanding very fast since their inception in 1990 and 1991
respectively, but their scale and importance are still not comparable to other channels
of finance for the entire economy, especially the banking sector (Allen et al., 2005;
Berger et al., 2009).

During the first few years after the markets opened, most listed companies came
1

Bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank
(CCB), and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC).
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from state-owned enterprises, but later on some non-state-owned companies were
also listed on the market. Even with the introduction of stock markets, debt financing
is still the predominant source of external funds for China‘s corporations, including
listed companies. But the Chinese debt market is saddled with an undeveloped
corporate bond market and dominated by the state-owned banking sector. Under this
state owned bank lending environment (Firth et al., 2008), Brandt and Li (2003)
empirically examined the bank discrimination problem (this refers to state-owned
banks discriminating against private firms in their lending decisions), but with the
pronounced economic expansion and increasing competition for funds, financing
Chinese companies has now become an extrusive issue.

Except for investigating the determinants of the basic leverage ratio, which refers to
the tradeoff between debt liability and equity financing, this study explores the
detailed financing decisions ranging from debt maturity structure and bank loan
financing from different types of banks, to the intermediate role of leverage ratio
between managerial incentive and firm valuation in Chinese listed companies.
Therefore, this thesis will consist of a three part study.

Firstly, this study examines the methods by which Chinese listed companies raised
debt during a period when the bond market was under developed and the majority of
commercial banks were owned by the state. The findings indicate that the type of
ownership control has an impact on the debt maturity structure. Compared to
privately controlled companies, state-controlled companies had greater access to
long-term debt and used less short-term debt during the sample period 2001–08. The
empirical results also showed that company profitability was an important concern
when banks allocated loans. I found that banks were willing to offer long-term loans
vi

to companies with higher profitability, indicating that they became one more party of
de facto monitors of listed companies during China‘s transition process. However,
although the financial reform process has increased the motivation of banks to
consider company profitability in their lending decisions, the effect of profitability on
debt maturity structure was weakened when the type of ownership control was
considered.

Secondly, this study investigated the determinants of financial contract from a
sample of bank loans to Chinese listed firms from 1996 to 2009. The empirical
results showed that political connection and institution development were the
significant determinants of bank loan financing. I also found that companies‘
channels of bank loans were different when I classified the banks into the Big Four,
other commercial banks, policy banks, and foreign banks. Under a state-owned bank
lending environment, firms controlled by the state can easily get loans from
state-owned commercial banks and policy banks, while privately controlled
companies get a significantly better access to loans from foreign banks.

Thirdly, in the context that capital structure can be an intermediate role, this study
examined the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance through the
choice of capital structures, using a sample of China‘s privately controlled firms
listed on the Chinese stock market from 2002 to 2007. The empirical results of the
random effect model show a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership
and firm value. Managerial ownership drives the capital structure into a non-linear
shape, but in an opposite direction to the effect that managerial ownership has on
firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial
ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. These findings
vii

imply that the ―interest convergence‖ and ―entrenchment‖ effects of managers‘
behaviour in terms of managerial ownership can also explain the agency-relevant
situation of China‘s privately controlled firms.

Overall, this study contributes new evidences obtained in the transformation
economy of China to the literatures of capital structure, agency problem and political
intervention. The traditional trade off theory (Modigliani and Miller; 1958, 1963) and
Pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) cannot explicitly observe in the new
emerging market of China due to the domination of state ownership in many
companies and banking sector. State ownership and political connection play an
important role in determination of firms‘ debt maturity structure. The relationship
between firm value and managerial ownership has been detected, which shows that
the agency problem is still prevalent in a country with the emphasis of state
ownership and political control.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction

A firms‘ financial situation such as leverage ratio is not relevant to other financial
decisions in a world of perfect and complete capital markets (Modigliani and Miller,
1958). However, in the real world there are various factors that prevent this theory
from functioning perfectly. In contemporary finance research areas, the association
between firms financing decisions with corporate governance attracts scholars‘
interests and receives abundant research production.

Just as Denis and McConnell (2003) showed, issues such as board structure,
compensation, and changes in control rights have been studied extensively in the US
but not so much in many other economies in the world. By analysing a completely
different market, the function and determination of regulation and corporate
governance could be studied very deeply. China is the largest transitional economy in
the world; its economic development and improved financial system plays an
increasingly important role on the world stage. There is a widespread adoption of
western corporate governance practices in modern Chinese companies but any
theoretical and empirical evidence from this market only appeared in recent years and
the effectiveness of corporate governance has yet to be fully evaluated. Meanwhile,
China has a relatively under developed legal environment compared to America, so a
study of the Chinese market sheds light on the relevant financial issues of a
developing economy and inspires us to improve the efficiency of this emerging
transition market.

Second, during the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, China
1

achieved impressive economic growth, especially the privatisation and corporatisation
of state owned enterprises (SOEs) which gave managers unprecedented discretion
over funding, pricing, and labour practices (Firth, Fung and Rui, 2006). After
introducing managerial ownership, managers had more incentive to choose financial
policies similar to those in other developed countries. Meanwhile, in developing
countries such as China the supply of financial sources was still limited.

Third, the Chinese stock market with Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange has been growing very fast since their inception in the1990s, although the
scale and importance of equity financing is still not comparable with other channels of
financing such as loans from the bank sector (Allen et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2009).
China‘s banking sector is still the primary source of finance for China‘s growing
Economy (Bailey et al., 2010).

Fourth, although the state remains the largest shareholder in most firms, China has
been experiencing rapid economic growth and reforms such as re-modelling former
state-controlled firms towards the Modern Corporation model. As a country with a
predominantly state-owned banking system, one prominent feature is that financial
resources are mostly controlled by the government and services for state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). In this situation private sector development has been hampered by
limited access to external finance (Bai et al., 2006).

These four types of phenomena make the choice of financing Chinese listed
companies more complex for financial scholars and practitioners. Although the
outstanding amount of bank loans are significantly greater than that of equity or
corporate bonds, most research in the financing area focuses on the equity issue of
Chinese listed companies because the emerging stock market in this country is
2

extraordinary because of the motivation to transfer from a planned economy to a
market oriented economy. However, any investigation of more detailed aspects of
liabilities, such as the internal composition of liabilities, debt maturity structure, and
access to bank loans, etc. are scarce.

With a specific Chinese institutional background, the economic and financial theories
applied in this research are the modern financial theory of capital structure, agency
theories and its branch managerial entrenchment hypothesis; information asymmetries,
and political economics.

1) Modern finance theory of capital structure, such as the static trade-off model and
pecking order hypothesis, which is broadly used in financial decision making.
According to the static trade off models, a firm is regarded as setting a target debt
level and increasing adjustment towards it. A firm‘s optimal capital structure will
involve a tradeoff between the effects of corporate and personal taxes, bankruptcy
costs, and agency costs, etc. (Huang and Song, 2006). Myers and Majluf (1984)
inaugurated a pecking order hypothesis and proved that there is no well-defined target
debt ratio. Firms are said to prefer to use retained earnings to mainly feed their
investment funding.

In China the significant institutional differences and financial constraints in the
banking sector are the factors influencing firms‘ leverage decision and they are at least
as important as the firm-specific factors (Chen, 2004; Huang and Song, 2006).
Therefore, the capital decisions of Chinese firms can be examined to verify whether
or not Western models are valid in China.

2) Agency theories that have risen from the separation of management and ownership.
3

The fundamental/initial agency problem found in most employer/employee
relationships, which refers to the conflict between outside investors and inside
managers, is often talked of as Agency Problem Level One2. In the real world of
incomplete markets when the owners of companies hire management, the problem of
potential moral hazards and conflict of interests inevitably induce an agency problem.
On this premise that managers‘ and shareholders‘ interests are not fully aligned, the
conflict of interest between management and shareholders produces an agency
problem which in turn, reduces firm value.

It is recognised that the problem of insider control often becomes serious after
privatisation. During the process of corporatisation, the biggest concern that managers
in China have, as elsewhere, is the possible loss of control and rents. Specifically, they
don't like concentrated investors and large controlling blocks, they want outside
investors to be sufficiently diffused (Qian, 1996). Lots of economists recommend
relying on the development of relational banking that can selectively intervene in
management controlled enterprises at a time of financial distress (Aoki 1995; Qian,
1996; Allen et al., 2005).

3) Managerial entrenchment hypothesis branched into agency theories where
management are appropriately disciplined and effectively monitored, remains an open
question. Managerial ownership is one way to mitigate the conflict of interest between
managers and shareholders. An increase in managerial ownership from a low level can
2

Another prevalence conflict is between minority investors and controlling shareholders who
frequently possess control rights in excess of their cash flow rights and enjoy almost total control over
mangers. This is often talked of Agency Problem Level Two. Control–cash flow rights divergence
(alternatively, control divergence) provides insiders (i.e., controlling owners and top executives) with
incentives and the ability to derive private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders
(Haw et al., 2004).
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increase the connection of interests between insiders and shareholders and also lead to
better decisions which produce higher firm value. However, when the equity owned
by management reaches a certain level, this increase in managerial ownership may
give managers greater freedom to pursue their own interests without considering any
possible decrease in firm value as a result. Only when managerial ownership
approaches a considerably high level can the agency problem be mitigated and firm
value maximised.

This study follows the results of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), and McConnell
and Servaes (1990), which showed there are two different motivations reflected by the
Convergence of Interest Effect and Entrenchment Effect rising from managerial
shareholding. Their results indicate that firm value increases as inside equity
ownership rises from zero to a proportional value and then decreases as inside
ownership increases to another value point. Finally, corporate valuation again
increases slightly for inside ownership levels above the second value point.

Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between the strength of the convergence of interest
and entrenchment effects, and managerial ownership. The lateral axis represents
managerial ownership P, and the longitudinal axis represents the convergence of
interest effect C and entrenchment effect E. The strength of these two effects reflects
the motivation of managers and what influences their financing policy. In the end the
value of the enterprises would be different. C=  (P)；E= (P).

[Insert Figure 1.1 here]

The lateral axis of figure 1.2 is managerial ownership P and the longitudinal axis is
the firm value V. V=  (P).
5

[Insert Figure 1.2 here]

As for figure 1.1, before P1, I suppose the function of the convergence of interest
effect passes over the entrenchment effect. Actually, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1988) found a positive relationship between ownership and Q in the 0 – 5 per cent
board ownership range, which was dominated by the convergence of interest effect of
management.
At point A, when P=P1,  ′ (P1) =0,  ′ (P1)>0,  ″ (P1)>0,  ′ (P1)>0,  ″ (P1) <0,
the convergence of interest effect reached its maximum value. Afterwards, before
management ownership reached P2, the convergence of interest effect decreased
gradually and the scope of decrease accelerated, namely  ′ (P) <0,  ″ (P) <0, and
the entrenchment effect increased gradually and the scope of increase accelerated,
namely ′ (P)>0,  ″ (P)>0, because in this section  (P)>  (P),  ′ (P)>0.
At Point B, when P=P2,  (P2) <0,  ″ (P2) =0,  ′ (P2)>0,  ″ (P2) =0,  (P2) =

 (P2), and  ′ (P2) =0, the entrenchment effect equals the convergence of interest
effect and firm value reached its maximum. Afterwards, before management
ownership reached P3, the extent of the convergence of interest decreased, namely  ′
(P) <0,  ″ (P) >0, the entrenchment effect increased gradually and the scope of
increase decelerated, namely ′ (P)>0,  ″ (P) <0, because in this section  (P) <

 (P),  ′ (P) <0.
At point J when P=P3,  ′ (P3) =0,  ′ (P3) =0,  ′ (P3) <0,  ″ (P3) =0. Both the
entrenchment effect and convergence of interest effect reached their maximum and
the extent of firm value decreased the most. As management ownership increased
6

further,  ′ (P) >0,  ″ (P) >0, ′

(P) <0, ″ (P) <0, because in this section  (P) <

 (P),  ′ (P) <0. When management ownership arrives at P4 (at point K),  ′
(P4) >0,  ″ (P4) >0, ′

(P4) <0, ″ (P4) <0,  (P4) =  (P4) and  (P4) =0, the

entrenchment effect equals the convergence of interest effect and firm value is the
lowest. Afterwards, as management ownership increased because  (P)>  (P), the
convergence of interest effect exceeded the entrenchment effect and firm value
gradually increased to  ′ (P) >0.

4) Information asymmetries between suppliers and the recipients of finance implies
that in transactions of incomplete economy and contract context, one party has more
or better information than the other. When banks function as independent corporations
governed by shareholders, they are pursuing value maximisation, but in China where
banks are mainly state owned, they are obliged to support state owned companies in
order to maintain employment and social stability (Bailey et al., 2010). Therefore,
asymmetric information between lending banks and outsiders about the quality of
specific firms does not make it easy to disguise political motivations behind a loan,
whereas a non-bank, government owned enterprise operating in a defined industry can
limit the ability of politicians to transfer resources (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).

5) Political connection is a significant issue in developing markets. A considerable
amount of research on political connection in enterprises has emerged in recent years,
beginning with Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006) etc. Extant and decomposed studies
mainly focus on two directions, the origin of political connection and the influence of
political connection on corporate financing decision making. Research about the
origins of political connection means sources of political connection such as the
measurement and valuation of political connections (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Wu
7

et al., 2010). Research into the effect of political connections consists of its influence
on financing and firm performance (Dinc, 2005; Goldman et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008),
on firm performance and corporate governance (Fan et al., 2007), and on investment
(Xu et al., 2011) etc. But the common argument of all these literatures is, the political
connection of enterprises in developed and developing countries, by which firms are
assisted to overcome market and institutional barriers and seek favourable treatment
from the government, is quite an impressive phenomenon.

Banks operate across the whole economy, providing politicians with more opportunity
to channel funds. Finally, the political elite can maintain and increase its power
through the control of financial resources more easily than open entry barriers in other
sectors (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). As predicted by Faccio et al. (2005), Political
connections may have a favourable effect on bank lending decisions. Firth et al. (2009)
suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance for
Chinese firms.
Right now, China‘s financial system is dominated by a large but under developed and
inefficient banking system mainly controlled by the four largest state-owned banks
(Allen et al., 2005), the China Industry and Commercial Bank, the China Agriculture
Bank, the China Construction Bank, and the Bank of China. These ―Big Four‖
state-owned banks account for about three quarters of all the banking industries assets
(Berger et al., 2009). The ―Big Four‖ banks dominate the Chinese banking system
because they are ultimately controlled by central or local government, and
consequently government has a determinate influence on bank operations, including
the lending mechanisms (Zheng and Zhu, 2009). Thus a bank discrimination problem
inevitably exists, which means the state-owned banks prefer to lend to state-owned
8

companies which means that finance for development of the private sector becomes a
more critical problem.

This study has laid some groundwork upon which a more detailed and practical
evaluation of the financing decisions of Chinese firms, ranging from capital structure,
debt maturity, and bank loans, to the relationship between financing decisions and
firm valuation, on the discussion and application of the above theories.

1.2 Research questions and motivations

On the interpretation of the institutional background of the Chinese capital market,
there are three key research questions and motivations in this study. First, what are
main concerns of the debt maturity structure decisions in Chinese listed companies?

Second, although the outstanding number of bank loans is significantly higher than
that of equity or corporate bonds, most research in the area of corporate finance focus
on the equity issue of listed companies because the emerging stock market is
extraordinary in this targeted country with the watch word of ―socialism with Chinese
characteristics‖. After exploring the determinants of the leverage ratio in Chinese
listed companies (Chen, 2004; Huang and Song, 2006), it‘s time to investigate more
detailed aspects of the internal composition of liabilities. Therefore another rearch
problem of this thesis is: what are the main determinants of bank loan decisions of
Chinese listed companies?

The third research question is: in terms of interest conflict between managers and
shareholders, what is the relationship among managerial ownership, capital structure
and firm valuation? The three sub-research questions are: What is the relationship
between firm value, capital structure, and managerial ownership? What is the function
9

of the entrenchment effect induced by managerial ownership to corporate leverage
choice and firm performance? What is the difference between a developed market and
an emerging market from the above two questions?

1.3 Key research findings

This dissertation examines the main determinants of several financing related
decisions of listed firms in China. It finds support to the role of Chinese unique
institutional factors in financing deciding like debt maturity structure, bank loan
amount and firms value. The issues under investigation are critical to a developing
economy like China, where a significant portion of the ownership of the public listed
firms is non-floating and owned by the state.
In chapter 3 I develop the structure of debt maturity of China‘s listed firms. I found
that the type of ownership control influenced listed companies debt maturity structure.
Firms controlled by the government have a larger leverage ratio, get more access to
long term debt and issue less short term debt, whereas firms controlled by individuals
have much less access to long term debt so short term debt is an economically
important source of finance for them. In chapter 4 the empirical evidence strongly
supports the fact that firms with political connections are easily able to access bank
loans from the Big Four and other State-owned commercial banks. I found that access
to bank loans by enterprises in developing and transitional economies are not only
plagued by the standard information asymmetry problem (Bai et al., 2006), but more
importantly, by institutional development.

The last findings are in Chapter 5: the inter-relationship between managerial
ownership, firm value, and capital structure, means that capital structure plays an
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intermediate role. The non-linear relationship between Tobin‘s Q and the fraction of
shares owned by boards of directors, as well as the non-monotonic association
between managerial ownership and capital structure, arose from the intermediate
function of leverage ratio.

1.4 Contributions

This study extends the previous research by examining more detailed financing
decisions, in the context of the developing market of China. I first found the main
determinants of the leverage ratio of Chinese listed companies and then decomposed
the leverage ratio to the debt maturity structure and distinguish firms‘ preference of
debt maturity motivated by the type of ownership control. For instance, compared to
privately controlled companies (―min ying qi ye‖ in Chinese), state-owned enterprises
have a greater access to long term debt and use less short term loans. Second, I
investigated how bank loans are allocated because they are the main resource for
Chinese listed companies‘ debt. I found that political connection and institutional
development across different provinces are the main factors behind other fundamental
company variables. Third, following the literature about the intermediate role of
investment, I extend the literature by introducing leverage ratio as an intermediate
variable between managerial ownership and corporate value.

Concerning contemporary finance research, the subject of how managerial behaviour
in accordance with shareholder ownership influences a firms‘ financing actions and
valuation, is of enormous practical importance to the American and Chinese market
and complements the present literature. A comparison between these primary
developed and emerging markets would inspire many ideas in the area of corporate
finance. The results of this research are a supplement to the modern finance theory of
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capital structure and agency theory between managers and shareholders. These
findings and conclusions verify the information asymmetry in China‘s capital markets,
and extend the managerial entrenchment and political connection hypothesis in
Chinese listed companies.

I believe this research and findings are of interest to a variety of academics, policy
makers, and practitioners, and contribute to problems ranging from improving
banking laws and regulations to further reform of state-owned enterprises.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2 I present a detailed summary of the
institutional background of the Chinese capital market, the type of ownership control
associated with political connections, the agency issue and the effects of managerial
entrenchment and alignment of interest with shareholders in Chinese listed firms, as
well as the institutional development dispersed across different provinces.

I expound the study of detailed aspects of the internal composition of liabilities in
chapters 3 and 4. In chapter 3 I develop the structure of debt maturity of China‘s listed
firms. In chapter 4 the empirical evidence strongly supports the fact that firms with
political connections are easily able to access bank loans from the Big Four and other
State-owned commercial banks.

The inter-relationship between managerial ownership, firm value, and capital structure
is investigated in Chapter 5. The whole thesis is concluded in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER TWO: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Since the beginning of economic reform in China in 1978, the average annual growth
rate has been around 9 per cent and GDP has quadrupled. It is commonly accepted
that China‘s rapid economic growth is consistent with and accompanied by its capital
market reform, such as the bond market development, the establishment of stock
exchanges, and banking sector reform.

The privatisation and corporatisation of Chinese firms from SOEs to privately
controlled firms were implemented over almost three decades. One of the unique
characteristics current to the Chinese market is the rapidly growing number of
privately controlled firms predominantly owned and run by civilians rather than
central or local governments. However, even the state does not directly wield power
over the allocation of resources in the transition process from a planned economy to a
market oriented economy; the government often indirectly shed its light over the tax
policy, industrial policy, anti-trust policy, and capital regulations. Therefore, a lot of
companies still keep or even pursue their connections with the government.

In this transition process, different areas experienced different development models
and speeds. For example, the economic and assorted institutional profiles such as
government intervention, protection of intellectual property and regulation of the law,
developed faster in the east and coastal regions than in the west. The extent of
institutional development varied from province to province, which ultimately
influenced each firms‘ financing decisions.
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2.1 Chinese capital market
Since the implementation of China‘s Reform and Open Policy from 1978, the Chinese
financial market is on a journey of transformation from a planned format to a market
oriented format. There are two dimensions to this transformation of the capital market,
reform of the banking sector and the establishment of stock markets. However, the
corporate bond market is still under developed.
2.1.1 Undeveloped corporate bond market
In the early years of economic reform, an upsurge of collective enterprises occurred in
both rural and urban areas. Some of those enterprises were partially financed by
employee funds, which were specified by ―using capital to replace labor‖ (―yi zi dai
lao‖ in Chinese). This attribute of the funds was ambiguous because they were neither
equities nor debts, as the fund suppliers had no voting rights and interest agreement,
and the returns could be labelled as dividends, bonuses, or interest up to the
contingent decisions by the managers.

Sometime later other enterprises were allowed to raise funds from external non-bank
long term debts that were initially characterised as corporate bonds but of a
non-tradable nature. The scale of the non-tradable corporate bond reached 68 billion
yuan by 1992, but in 1993 the publication of Corporate Bond Management
Regulations issued by the central government restricted the amount of corporate
bonds and adoption of an administrative approval system, so the scale of this sort of
corporate bond market began to shrink.

China began to allow firms to issue corporate bonds from 1998 but for a long time
since then, corporate bonds were not allowed to circulate or float publicly, which
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negatively affected investment and market development. During the past two decades
the equity market has made great progress, but the actual amount from firms financed
by the bond market was still much lower. Compared to equity, the use of corporate
bonds as a financing tool developed more slowly. Indeed, until the beginning of this
new century, corporate bonds only account for 2.2 per cent of China‘s total bond
amount3, which is much lower than in the US (14 per cent), Argentina (45.7 per cent)
and even Thailand (32 per cent)4. Moreover, firms in China prefer to finance from the
equity market rather than the bond market because it also restricts any development of
the corporate bond market. In addition, due to heavy restrictions and resistance from
the government, innovations and incentives normally produced by participants of a
corporate bond market are desperately lacking.

In 2007 the Central government proposed to accelerate the development of the bond
market, enlarge the scale of bond issue of enterprises, and undertake a large scale
development of fixed interest products such as company bonds. On the 14th of August
2007, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) promulgated The Pilot
Rules on the Issuance of Corporate Bonds. On the 16th of August the CSRC
publicised listed memoranda and the application documents concerning publicly
issued corporate bonds, as part of the operational guidelines for the Pilot Rules. The
Pilot Rules signalled the beginning of the formal issuance of company bonds in China,
which play an important role in balancing the capital market. On the 26th of August
the CRSC enacted the Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating
Business Regarding the Securities Market (Effective), which promotes the healthy
development of a rating service in the capital market. On the 24the of September the

3
4

Other amounts mainly belong to government bond such as Treasury bond.
Article from http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-XDSM200811108.htm (in Chinese).
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first publicly available enterprise bond (Great Wall Electricity) was approved and
successfully issued.

Because of such an under developed bond market, Chinese firms, including listed
firms, mainly get loans from banks. A bank loan is quite an important composition of
a firm‘s liabilities. Next we summarise the evolution of China‘s banking sector.
2.1.2 Evolution of the banking sector
High economic growth in developing nations cannot continue indefinitely without
significant reform of the banking system and the legal/financial infrastructure (Berger
et al., 2009). There are four phases to the Chinese banking industry. The first is before
the 1980s when the banks were administered by the Ministry of Finance to ensure that
national production plans would be fulfilled, with no incentive to compete with one
another. In 1983 the State Council designated the People‘s Bank as the central bank.
And then the Big Four began to expand the scope of their services and were allowed
to compete for depositors and lending services, although competition between them
was very limited until the mid-1990s because they mainly served as policy lending
‗‗conduits‖ for the government, and therefore lacked any incentive to compete with
one another (Cull and Xu, 2000; Berger et al., 2009).

The second phase is from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. From 1987 to 1995 a
number of regional banks opened, particularly smaller national banks (Everbright
Bank, Hua Xia Bank and Min Sheng Bank) and several new types of non-bank
financial intermediaries such as urban credit cooperatives, trust and investment
companies, finance companies associated with enterprise groups, financial leasing
companies, securities companies, and credit-rating companies. The 1995 Commercial
Bank Law of China officially termed the major state-owned banks as ‗‗commercial
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banks,‖ and directed them more towards commercial business based on market
principles instead of policy lending.
The third phase is after the mid-1990s until China‘s entry into the WTO in December
2001. The Chinese government has been very conservative in allowing any entry of
foreign banks (Berger et al., 2009). In 1998 the People‘s Bank of China permitted
eight foreign licensee banks to obtain local currency funding in 1998. In 1999, foreign
banks were further allowed to conduct local currency business in neighboring regions.
By the end of 1999, 25 foreign banks had permission to conduct local currency
business with Chinese enterprises. The entrance of foreign investors into the banking
industry only increases competition between the financial enterprises.

The fourth stage was from 2003 when the China Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC) was established. Monitoring the lending behaviour of commercial banks is
one of the main responsibilities of the CBRC. With the launch of an Accounting
System for Financial Enterprises and Regulations on Information Disclosure by the
Commercial Bank, as well as the establishment of the CBRC, the information
disclosure system for banking became increasingly mature. At the end of 2003, the
Law of the People‘s Republic of China on Commercial Banks was revised. The Law
and Guidelines stipulates that banks must evaluate each customer‘s level of credit risk
and collateral ability in their lending decisions. In this situation, banks are more prone
to lend funds to better performing companies, which means that profitability must be
a key determinant for each company‘s access to loans.

In 2004 the National Congress approved a constitutional amendment to protect private
property rights by granting ‗‗private property‖ an equal legal status to ‗‗public
property‖ (Firth et al., 2009). The four major banks competed for depositors and
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lending services, and expanded their range of services to include ‗‗private property‖.
In late 2006 China began opening its banking sector to foreign competition as
mandated by the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the same year the CBRC
obliged all urban commercial banks to disclose their annual reports according to the
related regulations of 2007.
In 2010, with the IPO of the China Agriculture Bank, on July 15th in the Shanghai
Stock Exchange and July 16th in the Hongkong Stock Exchange, each of the Big Four
became publicly listed companies, with the government being the largest shareholder
and retaining control. Except for the Big Four, a lot of local/ municipal commercial
banks received the inducement of foreign capital and tended to be publicly traded.
The Bank of Ningbo, established in 1997, is a joint-stock bank with independent legal
person qualification. In May 2006, it induced a foreign strategic investor, the OCBC
bank of Singapore (Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited). Since July 2007
the Bank of Ningbo has been listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (stock code:
002142).
Currently the most popular category for China‘s commercial banks are the policy
bank, the Big Four, the Joint stock commercial bank, the Urban/Rural commercial
bank, and the Foreign-owned bank. Although some banks transfer their type, for
example, the Bank of China became the Bank of China LTD., which is a joint stock
commercial bank from 2004. However, I still take its nature as part of the Big Four.
Although there are a lot of reforms in the banking industry, such as public listing, it is
still quite inefficient, particularly the Big Four banks. For example, China‘s banks
continue to be plagued with substantial amounts of non-performing loans (Firth et al.,
2008). Table 2.1 summarises the non-performing loan ratio of banks and their amount
18

of loans and scale of assets in 2006. The data are sorted according to raw data in the
China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) database: bank
information.xlx.

[Insert Table 2.1 here]

An official estimation of the amount of non-performing loans of the Big Four at the
end of 2003 amounted to 2.4 trillion yuan (US$290 billion) or 23 per cent of the total
loans outstanding (the Economist, Dec. 4, 2003, from Firth et al., 2008). According to
Table 2.1, through the banking reform, by the end of 2006 their non-performing loans
decreased to 11.77 billion yuan (about US$1.5 billion) and the average Year-end
Non-performing loan ratio decreased to 9 per cent of the total loans outstanding. This
big decline may have arisen from a real increase in their performance, but government
assistance, particularly the injection of assets into the Big Four plays quite an
important role. Therefore, just as Firth et al. (2008) predicted, the unofficial amount of
non-performing loans may be higher because state owned banks have an additional
incentive to bail out poorly performing listed firms.

The total assets of each Chinese bank gained a considerable extension from 1995 to
2006 (in comparison with the data of Cull and Xu, 2000; 2003). For example, in 1995
the total assets of the Bank of China were 1837.9 billion yuan, which skyrocketed to
5330 billion yuan in 2006. In 1995 the total assets of the Shanghai Pudong
Development Bank was 17.8, which expanded 37 times until 2006. This profile
reflects the scale at which China‘s banks have expanding by geometric progression
during recent decades.
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2.1.3 Emerging of the stock market
The Chinese securities market emerged with the establishment of the Shanghai Stock
Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991. During the first few
years after the markets opened, most listed companies came from state-owned
enterprises; later, many non-state-owned companies were also listed on the market.
Generally, China‘s firms are categorised according to their dominant ownership, for
example, a ―state-owned firm‖ means that the company is predominantly owned by
the state; a ―privately controlled firm‖ is predominantly owned and run by civilians,
rather than by the central or local governments.

One of the unique characteristics of the present Chinese market is the rapidly growing
number of privately controlled firms. Listed companies from non-government back
ground enterprises began to appear on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (the first, Shen
Huayuan A, stockcode 000014) from 1992. An average of only six privately
controlled companies acquired listing qualifications each year between 1992 and 1997,
but after 1998 the listing of privately controlled companies has accelerated. The
proportion of privately controlled companies listed through initial public offerings
(IPOs) was 6.97 per cent by the end of 2003, and this increased to 15.38 per cent by
the end of 2005. Until 2007 the total number of privately controlled listed companies
was 410, representing 26.53 per cent of a total of 1,545 firms on the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges.5 These data provide evidence that privately controlled
firms may represent the future trend and shape of public firms in the continuing
economic reform of China.

5

See: http://www.chinareform.org.cn/ (in Chinese)

20

2.2 Ownership and political connection in Chinese listed firms

Most firms around the world are controlled by a large shareholder (La Porta et al.,
1999). After more than three decades of privatisation and corporatisation, one of the
significant features of Chinese listed companies is that current ownership is highly
concentrated and companies often have an ultimate controller. The most widely
recognised categories of equity ownership in China‘s current listed firms, which are
quite different from those in developed countries, include state-owned ownership,
legal-person ownership, civilian ownership, foreign investor ownership, collective
ownership, social groups ownership, employee ownership, and others. Generally,
Chinese firms are named according to the type of ownership controller, for example, a
state-owned enterprise means that the company is ultimately owned by the state; a
―privately controlled company‖ (―min ying qi ye‖ in Chinese) is ultimately owned and
run by civilians rather than by the central or local governments of China. During
China‘s transition from centrally planned economies to market-oriented economies,
firms controlled by individuals have played an essential role.

Firms with different types of ownership controller have different objectives and
motivations and this will affect how they exercise the control rights over their
financial decisions (Chen et al., 2009). With the support of state owned banks, SOEs
often devour long-term debt because being connected with bureaucrats can provide
them with a comparative advantage of access to debt (Firth et al., 2009; Zheng and
Zhu, 2009). Meanwhile, because of the difficulty in gaining access to bank loans and
the under development of the public bond market, financing problems are always a
development bottleneck for companies with insufficient connections to government.
Therefore, due to state control of key resources, businessmen have an incentive to
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establish political connections (Xu et al., 2011). The connection of firms with
government would act as a role in their financial decisions.
2.3 Chinese listed privately controlled companies

One of the unique characteristics of the Chinese market is the rapidly growing number
of private firms6. Many private corporations have become publically listed firms (via
the IPO process or via takeover of a listed firm). Compared to SOEs, they have much
more autonomy and profit retention because their corporate governance is more
general and effective and managers are appointed on merit and ability rather than
political patronage. This gives management enough discretion to make self-interest
from financial policies, and the entrenchment and interest convergence introduced by
managerial ownership more important. The changes in financial behaviour following
managerial ownership would inevitably change the value of the firm, and while
resolving the agency problem between managers and shareholders might not protect
the interest of stockholders, it would definitely help reform the Chinese economic
system.

Although managerial ownership is one way that Chinese companies adopt Western
corporate governance, the proportion between the context of state-owned enterprises
and privately controlled firms is quite different.

According to my statistics about Chinese listed companies, managerial ownership is
quite a small proportion among state-owned companies. The mean value of
managerial ownership in state-owned companies during 2002–2007 was just
0.0929 per cent, while the mean value of managerial ownership of privately controlled

6

As Firth, Fung and Rui (2006) noted firms that are not controlled by the State or a SOE.
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companies was 9.31 per cent. Privately controlled firms have much more autonomy
and profit retention than state owned enterprise, and managers are more often
appointed on merit and ability, rather than political patronage. Most privately
controlled firms adopt a managerial ownership governance approach where their
managers have more power to choose financial policies than those in many other
developed countries. This situation gives managers of privately controlled firms more
discretion over funding, pricing, and labor practices (Firth et al., 2006).

2.4 Institutional development across different provinces

China provides a good research laboratory because it combines greater heterogeneity
in institutional development across provinces with homogeneity in cultural norms, and
in laws and regulation (Amit et al., 2009).

The rapid growth of the coastal regions and lagged development in Western China
over the past 25 years has widened regional disparity within the country (Jian et al.,
1996). According to the World Bank‘s (2006) survey of the investment climate in 120
Chinese cities, ―the average per-capita GDP in Southeast China is more than 50
percent higher than the Northeast, and 150 percent above average for Central and
Southwest China. Similarly, per-capita foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
Southeast provinces is 130 percent above per capita FDI for the Northeast, which is
more than 7 times the average for Central China, and more than 25 times the average
for Western China‖ (Amit et al., 2009. p7).

Fan et al. (2010) National Economic Research Institute Index (NERI) of
Marketization of China‘s Provinces 2009 reported on the extent of institutional
development across regions in China. The institutional profile from five dimensions:
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the relationship between government and market; economic development of non-state
sector, the growth of production markets, the growth of production element markets,
the development of intermediary organisation and environment of the legal system7,
in which the marketization index is the combined index of these five institutional
profiles.

Better regional institutional efficiency is often associated with a better investment
climate and higher productivity, but on the other hand, listed companies often play a
very significant role in local employment and economic growth. The central and local
government usually provides favorable tax incentives in various areas, for example,
local governments in different regions compete with each other to attract listed firms.
One way that local governments attracted listed firms was to reimburse their tax (Wu
and Yue, 2009), although different rates of tax and development of other areas may
create alternative financing preference across firms.

I consider that the unique inter-regional differences in development are one of the
important determinants of Chinese firms‘ financing decisions and I will portray this in
the following empirical studies.

7

China has a centralized legal system where corporate law and security regulations are the same across
all provinces; however, the implementation and development of law firms are different.
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CHAPTER THREE: DEBT MATURITY STRUCTURE IN
CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES
3.1 Introduction

Significant progress has been made in researching corporate financing policies by
examining the basic leverage choices undertaken in some of the more detailed aspects
of financing decision making (Barclay and Smith, 1995). Myers‘ (1977) model on the
determinants of corporate borrowing emphasises the importance of congruence
between shorter and longer debt maturities. Short-term debt matures before cash flows
arrive from a firm‘s investments and must be refinanced at terms; whereas the
maturity of long-term debt matches the timing of the cash flows and does not need
frequent rolling over (see Diamond, 1991). The cost of rolling over short-term debt is
greater than the cost of issuing long-term debt because the operational activities
relevant to profitability must be rated more frequently when issuing short-term debt.
Thus, an appropriate maturity structure should exist regarding debt that takes into
account companies‘ risk and profitability.

On the subject of agency cost and debt maturity choice, Myers (1977) concludes that
debt maturity was often used as the tool of choice by firms that wished to control
conflicts of interest between equity holders and debt holders. Another pioneer in
empirical study concerning the determinants of debt maturity structure, Diamond
(1991) discussed the trade-off between short- and long-term debt and concluded that
these are the preference of corporations with high and low credit ratings respectively.
Another milestone in this area was set by Barclay and Smith (1995), who explained
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the maturity structure of corporate debt using three hypotheses: contracting-cost,
signaling, and tax. Rajan and Winton (1995) argued that short-term debt is a tool for
lenders to monitor managers flexibly and effectively without much effort. Just one
year later, Stohs and Mauer (1996) investigated several aspects of the determinants of
corporate debt maturity structure, including agency cost, signaling and liquidity risk,
matching principle and so on, and found strong empirical support for these theoretical
predictions.

Denis and Mihov (2003) used a sample of new debt financings to examine
corporations‘ choice between bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt, and
found that the most important determinant of the debt choice was the issuer‘s credit
quality. Jiménez and Saurina (2004) used Spanish companies as a sample to discuss
the role of bank–borrower relationships in companies‘ loan decisions and risk
attitudes. Datta et al. (2005) found that managers with weak interest alignment with
shareholders would prefer to entrench themselves by choosing long-term debt to
reduce the potential discipline of external monitoring. The authors conclude that debt
maturity structure can be an extremely powerful tool for monitoring management.

In contrast to most developed countries, China has not yet established sophisticated
and mature capital markets to support the funding requirements of companies and
entrepreneurs. According to the data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China,
the average ratio of total bank loan to GDP is more than 100 times higher than the
proportions of stocks and corporate bonds (Cai et al., 2008), which suggests that the
main source of corporate financing is bank loans. Although China‘s banking system is
large, it is underdeveloped, and being mainly controlled by the four largest
state-owned banks: Bank of China (BOC), Industry and Commercial Bank of China
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(ICBC), Construction Bank of China (CBC), and Agriculture Bank of China (ABC).
These four banks assets account for about three-fourths of the nation‘s banking
industry assets (Allen et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2009). Without parallel development
of other financing channels (such as bond companies), Chinese firms will continue to
source loans (both long- and short-term) mainly from banks, especially the Big Four.
The widely recognised categories of equity ownership in China‘s firms, which are
quite different from those in developed countries, include: state-owned ownership,
legal-person ownership, civilian ownership, foreign investor ownership, collective
ownership, social group ownership, employee ownership and others. Generally, a
Chinese firm is named after the ownership controller, for example, a state-owned
enterprise (hereafter SOE) means that the company is ultimately owned by the state; a
privately controlled company (―min ying qi ye‖ in Chinese) is ultimately owned and
run by civilians, rather than by the central or local government.

Because of the differences in ownership type, firms ultimately controlled by the
government can take advantage of long-term debt because most banks are state owned
and the government is predisposed to assisting such enterprises. However, the external
financial channels for privately controlled enterprises are quite different. Without
sufficient connections to government, most privately controlled firms depend on
informal financing channels; for example, financing from private credit agencies
(instead of banks) is the most important channel during their establishment and
growth period (Allen et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2009).

The Chinese Government has introduced a succession of reforms to the banking
sector since the beginning of their Reform and Opening Policy. Since then
commercial banks have started to promote private firms‘ accessibility to bank loans.
27

However, systematic evidence on how bank loans are allocated to private firms in
China remains inadequate (Firth et al., 2009). Li et al. (2009) used a sample of
non-publicly traded Chinese firms to explore the role of ownership structure and
institutional development in debt financing, and found that state ownership was
positively associated with leverage and firms‘ access to long-term debt.

While listed companies do not constitute an entirely random sample of the total
population of firms in China, using these for research is the best and largest sample
for obtaining reliable control ownership data (Amit et al., 2009), which is crucial to
my research objective. Compared with non-publicly traded firms, publicly traded
firms face more external constraints from both the public and the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Chinese listed companies are also pioneers of
corporatisation, which represents the driving industrial force in China. These
characteristics combine to legitimate using the sample of publicly traded firms as the
most suitable way to capture the debt financing issue in China. Thus, this study
examines determinants of firms‘ debt maturity structure choice using two types of
China‘s listed companies: SOEs and privately controlled firms.

My main findings are as follows. First, I found that ownership control type is the main
factor affecting listed companies‘ debt maturity structure. Enterprises ultimately
controlled by the state preferred long- over short-term debt in their debt structure
decisions in the sample period 2001–08 in a financial environment dominated by the
four largest state-owned banks. Second, empirical results show that profitability is a
significant determinant in banks‘ lending decisions to listed companies in China.
China‘s financing system is underdeveloped and the threat of takeover is too weak to
provide effective discipline of controlling shareholders. However, banks have acted,
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to some extent, as monitors during the sample period 2001–08, and they identified and
loaned to relatively productive enterprises. Third, the influence of profitability on debt
maturity structure is weakened when the ownership control type is taken into
consideration.

The reminder of this chapter is organised as: section 3.2 introduces the institutional
background and hypothesis development on the basis of literature review. Section 3.3
talks about the variable definition and data collection. The methodology and empirical
results are showed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 is the robustness test from different
dimensions. This whole research is concluded in Section 3.6.

3.2 Literature reviews and hypotheses development

In an ideal world with perfect markets and no transaction costs, firms would like to
finance their operations with 100 per cent debt because the interest paid has a tax
deduction advantage (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Compared to long-term debt,
short-maturity debt has the additional benefit of reducing agency costs of managerial
discretion by subjecting managers to more frequent monitoring by underwriters,
investors, and rating agencies at issuance (Datta et al., 2005). For Chinese
corporations, the state monopoly of the financial sector has hitherto hindered the
development of China‘s capital markets and the growth of non-state financial
institutions, particularly the bond market (Chen, 2004; Allen et al., 2005; Cull and Xu,
2005).

Firth et al. (2009) suggest that political connections play a role in gaining access to
bank finance. Firms with different types of controlling ownerships have different
objectives and motivations, and this will affect how they exercise their control rights
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over the firm‘s financial decisions (Chen et al., 2009). Therefore, the choices
regarding the debt maturity structure of Chinese privately controlled firms and SOEs
have been largely different from that of companies in other developed countries.

With the support of state-owned banks, SOEs often devour long-term debt because
being connected with bureaucrats can provide them with a comparative advantage of
access to debt (Firth et al., 2009; Zheng and Zhu, 2009). Meanwhile, because of the
difficulty in bank loan access and the underdevelopment of the public bond market,
financing has been a development bottleneck for companies without sufficient
connection to government. For example, Firth et al. (2009) used stylised facts of bank
statistics to show that although privately controlled firms made up 50 per cent of the
Chinese economy, their loans accounted for just 7 per cent of bank lending.
On the other hand, Datta et al. (2005, p. 2333) claimed that ―the conflict between
managers and shareholders over the maturity structure of debt arises from the inherent
preference of self-interested managers for less monitoring.‖ Due to the dearth of
unfeigned owners, managers of companies controlled by the state have more
discretion over financing. Meanwhile, managers in state-controlled firms find it easier
to get long-term loans because the financial market is dominated by the Big Four
banks. Therefore, the managerial discretion characteristics of SOEs make they reject
the company to be rated therefore monitored by the lenders frequently, so they are
expected to use less short-term debt and try to get access of the long-term debt in the
loan financing decisions.

Thus my first hypothesis is:
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H3.1: Compared to privately controlled firms, SOEs have better access to
long-term debt and use less short-term debt.

To ameliorate loan risks, creditor institutions usually use earnings information on
enterprises to lessen the information asymmetry between creditor and debtor. Li et al.
(2009) found that banks have gradually begun to apply economic criteria in their
lending decisions under current banking reforms. Cull and Xu (2000) found that in
China the links between bank finance and subsequent productivity suggest that banks
are somehow able to identify and lend to relatively productive enterprises. Firth et al.
(2009) found that Chinese banks extend loans to financially healthier and
better-governed firms, which also implies that the banks use commercial judgments in
this segment of the market.

Short-term debt is usually assumed to be more expensive than long-term debt;
therefore firms with higher profitability may be better candidates for getting
short-term debt because of their affordability. However, in the real world firms with
lower profitability may be more active participants in the short-term credit market
because their lower rating often means that their qualification may not satisfy the
requirement of long-term debt. Accordingly, the acquisition of short-term debt from
banks may also show that the firm has a low credit rating and uncertain prospects (Cai
et al., 2008). Therefore, better performing firms with higher profitability will find it
easier to access long-term debt, especially when competition between banks in China
increases. Meanwhile, the longer the debt takes to mature, the weaker the monitoring
from banks and the lower the risk of refinancing. Chinese listed companies may also
have a tendency to avoid short-term debt to minimise the risk of re-financing. Thus I
submit this hypothesis:
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H3.2: Firms with better profitability raise less short-term debt and more long-term
debt.
During China‘s transition period, banks have also been certified as potential advisers
because many have established business relationships with SOEs, and they usually
have a major stake in restructuring outcomes (Cull and Xu, 2000). However, close
borrower–lender relationships might increase incentives for banks to lend to riskier
firms without considering profitability, especially in a banking system with low
competition (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004), as in China. These issues raise questions
regarding the relationship between the types of firms‘ control ownership and their
profitability, and whether the monitoring role of banks is still effective when firms‘
control ownership types are considered. As Li et al. (2009) demonstrate, a controlling
government stakeholder is expected to use SOEs and state banks to achieve other
policy goals, even though they may conflict with banks‘ own interests. My third
hypothesis is:

H3.3: Being an SOE decreases the influence of firm profitability on debt maturity
structure.

3.3 Variable definition and data collection
3.3.1 Sample selection
The sample pool consisted of all publicly traded Chinese firms on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). The sample time
commenced in 2001when Chinese companies implemented the New Accounting
Standards and Policies. The selected data ended in 2008, when the global financial
crisis occurred and the Chinese stock market fell sharply. I chose the 2001–08 sample
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periods to help mitigate the influences of both accounting policies changing and
financial crises happening.
I excluded firms with ST and PT 8 status, firms in the financial and insurance
industries, and firms with incomplete datasets from my modeling. I defined the
ownership control type in terms of the nature of ultimate controlling shareholder. If
the ultimate controller was the state for all of the observation period (2001–08), this
firm was defined as a state-owned enterprise (SOE); if the controller was civilian (a
natural or legal person, with the firm totally belonging to individuals) for all of the
observation period, it was defined as a privately controlled enterprise9. Other types of
ownership, such as collective ownership, social group ownership, employee
ownership, and so on were somewhat ambiguous — somewhere between state and
private ownership, where the ultimate ownership could have been either private
entities or the government (Allen et al., 2005; Li et al., 2009). I eliminated these firms
with mixed kinds of ownership from the study.

All of the raw data related to corporate finance and governance were extracted from
the CCER (China Center for Economic Research) database, which is developed by the
Beijing Sinofin Information Service Limited Company. I made some necessary
supplements using the data from the annual report from both the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange websites. I excluded observations with negative values of
total assets, total liabilities, and sales, following Li et al. (2009). I also excluded some
8

Chinese listed firms have been classified by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as
―special treatment‖ (ST) or ―particular transfer‖ (PT) firms for the purpose of protecting investors‘
benefits. If a listed firm has negative profits for two consecutive years, it will be designated as an ST
firm. If it continues to produce losses for another year, it will be designated as a PT firm. A PT firm
will be delisted if it does not become profitable within another year (Bai et al., 2002).
9
We dropped the companies that transferred from SOEs into privately controlled firms or from
privately controlled firms in SOEs during 2001–08, which guarantees the cleanness of the sample.
However, we made the test robust by focussing on the firms that changed their ownership control type
during 2001–08 in Section 5.2.
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observations consisting of outliers, such as where a leverage ratio greater than 1
existed, or when Tobin‘s Q was greater than 10 and so on. The final sample consisted
of 4,646 SOEs and 1,278 privately controlled firms of publicly listed firms during
2001–08; an unbalanced panel dataset with 5,924 firm-year observations in total.
3.3.2 Variable constructions

1) Dependant and independent variables

I used two variables to measure debt maturity structure: long-term debt dummy (LTD
dummy, following Li et al., 2009), which was set as equal to 1 if the firm had
long-term debt due in more than one year in a specific year, and zero otherwise;
short-term debt ratio (STD), which is the sum of the short- and long-term borrowings
due in one year divided by the total debt. In this analysis, total long-term debt was
defined as long-term debt due in more than one year. Short-term debt was defined as
borrowings from banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, 10 not including the
notes payable, accounts payable, employee benefits payable and small amounts of
bonds payable.

A discussion on the debt–equity constitution of listed companies is necessary before
introducing hypotheses regarding internal debt maturity structure. Chinese listed
companies have a large preference for equity financing, so I used leverage ratio (LEV),
which measures the proportion of a firm‘s total debt divided by the total assets as the
supplementary dependant variable.
10

Due to the underdeveloped bond markets in China, banks are the main sources of debt financing for
firms (Cai et al., 2008). Amongst our sample companies, only a few received a small proportion of
their loans from non-bank financial intermediaries. For example, Da Tang Fa Dian (stock code 601991)
in 2007 borrowed a total of 1,978,501,000 yuan in short-term loans from three non-bank financial
intermediaries, which accounted for 8.75% of total short-term loans in 2007. We believe the loans from
non-bank financial intermediaries do not bias our conclusions.

34

I used STATE as a dummy variable of ownership control type of listed companies. It
was set to 1 if the company‘s controlling shareholder was the state during 2001–08;
and 0 (zero) if it was a legal or natural person without government involvement
during 2001–08. I used three variables to measure the firms‘ profitability following
Chen et al. (2009): return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and cash flow
return on assets (CFOA). ROA and CFOA measure profitability in accounting income
and cash flow income, respectively; ROS was used as an alternative measure of
profitability.

2) Control variables
Many studies identify the determinants of corporations‘ financial choices. The main
determinants of debt selection in China‘s listed companies tested theoretically and
empirically include size, tax shield effects, asset structure, and growth (Chen, 2004).
This study also controlled for these variables in addition certain other variables
according to some of the latest literature and the Chinese-specific institutional
background. The following variables merit further explanation.

Managerial ownership (MANA)

The choice of debt maturity structure is one way to expose monitoring and reduce
agency costs between shareholders and managers. Datta et al. (2005) showed that
managerial stock ownership helps to determine corporate debt maturity. Financing
decisions (such as the choice of leverage and debt maturity) are important
mechanisms for monitoring managers when there is separation of ownership and
control. ―However, these crucial financing decisions are at the discretion of top
managers who, previous studies assume, choose optimal debt maturity and
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self-imposed monitoring‖ (Datta et al., 2005, p. 2348). This study used the ownership
stake of all board members as a proxy for managerial ownership, following Cho
(1998), Davies et al. (2005) and others.

Growth (Q)
A firm‘s growth options influence its debt maturity choice because of underinvestment
problems (Myers, 1977). Wu and Yue (2009) used China‘s listed companies to make
empirical analyses and conclude that the trade-off hypothesis of capital structure
suggests that high-growth firms will be more likely to go bankrupt, and therefore they
will use less debt. On the other hand, business expansion requires a large amount of
funds, which may not be sufficiently supported by internal operations. Therefore,
high-growth firms may have larger leverage changes, and firms with greater growth
opportunities should issue more debt of shorter maturity. This study used Tobin‘s Q as
a measurement of growth opportunity, following Barclay and Smith (1995); Guedes
and Opler (1996); Stohs and Mauer (1996); and Cai et al. (2008).

Asset structure (TANG)

Exploiting growth opportunities requires a corporation to raise funds for investment in
new projects. However, a firm must also consider existing funds‘ maturity and then
decide how to refinance new funds. A firm can reduce agency costs if the maturity of
its debt is matched to the life of its assets (Myers, 1977). If debt has a shorter maturity
than assets, there may not be enough cash on hand to repay the principal when it is
due. Alternatively, if debt has a longer maturity, then cash flows from assets cease,
while debt payments remain due. Maturity matching can reduce these risks, and is
therefore a form of corporate hedging that reduces expected costs of financial distress
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(Stohs and Mauer, 1996). On the other hand, tangible assets are easy to collateralize
for debt to reduce lender‘s risk. So a positive relationship between a firm‘s leverage,
particularly long-term debt, and the tangibility of its asset is expected. I used
tangibility (TANG) to measure the company‘s asset structure, which is the sum of
fixed asset and inventories scaled by total asset.

Institutional efficiency (MARK)

A socially maximising government wants to channel funds to depressed areas of the
country (Sapienza, 2004). In China there are massive differences in economic
development across different regions. Better regional institution efficiency is
associated with a better investment climate and higher productivity. On the other hand,
listed companies often play significant roles in local employment and economic
growth. The central and local government provides favorable tax incentives in various
areas. For example, Chinese local governments in different regions compete with each
other to attract listed firms. One way that local governments attract listed firms is
through the reimbursement of tax (Wu and Yue, 2009).

The difference between tax rates and in the development of areas may also cause
differences in debt maturity preference. This means that significant institutional
differences and financial constraints in the banking sector in China are some of the
factors influencing firms‘ financing choice, and they are at least as important as the
firm-specific factors (Chen, 2004).

The marketization index is a popular measurement of the level of institutional
efficiency. It was developed by Fan et al. (2010), and affiliated to the National
Economic Research of China, designed to measure the extent of institutional
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development across different regions in China. Higher scores on the index suggest
better marketisaton level and greater institutional efficiency. Li et al. (2009), Firth et
al. (2009), Amit et al. (2010), and many others found that marketization was an
important determinant of firms‘ debt financing constitution in China, as well as
ownership structure. I also used the marketization index (MARK) as one of the
control variables. The report by Fan et al. (2010) on the marketization of China‘s
provinces only contains data until 2007. I extrapolated that the marketization data of
2008 is the arithmetic average of numbers in 2005, 2006, and 2007, and then explored
the relationship between the regions‘ institution and firms‘ debt maturity variables.

The definitions of all of variables are summarized in Table 3.1.

[Insert Table 3.1 here]
3.3.3 Summary statistics

The summary statistics of all of the main variables, including mean, standard
deviation, 25 and 75 percentile, minimum and maximum for 5,924 observations are
reported in Table 3.2, Panel A. This table shows that the probability of holding
long-term debt (the mean value of the LTD dummy) is 80.9 per cent, which is much
larger than the 35.4 per cent for non-publicly traded firms investigated by Li et al.
(2009). The mean proportion of short-term debt in total liabilities is 0.337. The mean
value of STATE reflects that 78.4 per cent of my sample observations were ultimately
controlled by the government.

[Insert Table 3.2 here]

The average leverage ratio for my sample listed firms is 44.9 per cent, which is
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consistent with that investigated by Wu and Yue (2009) from 1999 to 2003, but is less
than the 56.7 per cent of unlisted companies found by Li et al. (2009). The small
proportion of debt in listed firms is consistent with Chen (2004). Listed firms are also
attracted by equity finance due to substantial capital gains in secondary markets.

The mean of managerial ownership is 0.025, which largely depends on the
observations above the 75th percentile value, because even the value of the 25th
percentile is still zero. The maximized value of managerial ownership in my data set
is 0.779. This observation concerns the privately controlled listed company Hai De
Kong Zhi (stock code 002184) in 2007. Until 2010, the top two individual
shareholders (Xu Hong and Guo Mengrong) still held 45.10 per cent of the
companies‘ ownership.

The statistics of firm size shows that listed companies are not dispersed by scale, a
finding which is quite different from that of unlisted companies investigated by Li et
al. (2009). Compared with non-listed companies, listed companies are often the
political achievement of local officials, and therefore have better quality and larger
scale compared with non-listed companies. For example, the standard deviation of
size for my sample firms is only 0.469; but it is 511.4 for unlisted companies in Li et
al. (2009). According to the statistic of marketization index, the worst score was Tibet
in 2001 (0.33), while the highest level of was Shanghai in 2007 (11.71).

The Pearson correlation matrix of variables is presented in Table 3.2, Panel B. STATE,
the dummy variable measuring whether the company is ultimately controlled by the
state, is significantly correlated with debt structure variables. Its positive connection
with the long-term debt dummy and its negative connection with short-term debt may
support Hypothesis 3.1, that ownership control type influences debt maturity structure.
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Compared with privately controlled firms, SOEs have greater access to long-term debt
and use less short-term debt.

Three profitability variables are highly correlated with the leverage ratio and
short-term debt ratio. They are negatively correlated with short-term debt, but
positively correlated with the long-term debt dummy, which may support 3.2, that
profitability influences debt maturity structure, and firms with better profitability raise
less short-term debt and more long-term debt. Firm size is significantly and highly
correlated with almost all of the other variables, which means that company scale is
always one of the most important factors in studying corporate finance.

3.4 Empirical results
3.4.1 Uni-variate analysis

First, I compared the mean and median of debt characteristic variables to test whether
there were significant differences between SOEs and privately controlled firms. The
number of observations each year, the means and medians of the long-term debt
dummy, short-term debt ratio, and leverage ratio are reported in Table 3.3. From the
figures I can see that with the expansion of China‘s stock market and the growth of
the economy, more companies are going public each year. The number of listed
privately controlled firms has increased quicker than that of SOEs. From 2001 to 2008
the number of SOEs increased by approximately 25 per cent (from 484 to 604), while
privately controlled firms increased approximately three times (from 73 to 289). Of
particular note is that the numbers of both SOEs and privately controlled firms
increased by 72 (from 622 to 694 firms) and 92 (from 182 to 270 firms) from 2006 to
2007, respectively.
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[Insert Table 3.3 here]

Table 3.3, Panel A (Panel B) displays the means (medians) and significant differences
from the t-test in means (Mann-Whitney U-test in medians) in different years for
firms ultimately controlled by the state or individuals. The results show that both the
long-term debt dummy and short-term debt ratio differ significantly for firms with
different controlling types each year.

For a summary and comparison over eight years, the means of the LTD dummy are
significantly larger for SOEs than privately controlled firms. For example, the mean
LTD dummy in SOEs in 2001 is 81.2 per cent, which is significantly higher than 65.8
per cent of privately controlled firms in the same year because the value of the
t-statistic is 3.049. Simultaneously, the median value of the LTD dummy for SOEs is
significantly different from that for privately controlled firms each year according to
the value of the Z-statistic (although all of the median values are 1). The probability
of holding long-term debt over eight years by SOEs is 84.0 per cent, which is much
larger than 69.4 per cent by privately controlled firms from 2001 to 2008. Both these
figures are larger than the 35.4 per cent for non-publicly traded firms‘ as found by Li
et al. (2009). I can conclude that compared with unlisted companies, the listed
companies have better access to long-term debt, which supports the contention by
Allen et al. (2005): that listed companies are often the political achievement of local
officials; they are supported by government; and they have greater access to long-term
loans.

In comparison with privately controlled firms, both the means and medians of the
STD statistic show that SOEs used significant less short-term debt each year. For
example, the mean (median) STD for SOEs in 2002 is 0.332 (0.330), which is much
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less than for privately controlled firms, at 0.413 (0.425). Considering the weak
interest alignment between shareholders and managers in SOEs (Ruan et al., 2009),
the difference between means and medians support the notion that managers in
Chinese listed SOEs preferred long-term debt to reduce the potential discipline of
external monitoring, such as from banks. This might be attributable to the managerial
entrenchment effect in debt maturity structure choice (Datta et al., 2005). Therefore,
Hypothesis 3.1 is proved: listed firms ultimately controlled by the state have
significantly better access to long-term debt, and use less short-term debt compared
with that used by firms controlled by individuals. I may also conclude that political
connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance, which is consistent with
Firth et al. (2009).

Although the total values of mean and median leverage ratios from 2001 to 2008 are
significantly different, from 2001 to 2005 the leverage ratios for SOEs and privately
controlled firms each year do not show significant difference — except in 2004.
However, from 2006 both the means and medians of leverage ratios differ
significantly between SOEs and privately controlled firms each year, which is
consistent with Zheng and Zhu (2009), who argue that being connected with
bureaucrats provides SOEs with a comparative noneconomic advantage of access to
debt in China.
The time departure of the LEV statistics‘ difference between SOEs and privately
controlled firms accurately reflects the timing of the most recent approach to reform
stock markets in China, the reform of non-tradable shares. Because listed companies
first emerged from state-owned enterprises (SOEs), non-tradable shares (NTS) of the
ownership structure of Chinese listed companies exist. In 2005 the China Securities
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Regulatory Commission (CSRS), the national capital market regulator, launched a
reform of non-tradable shares which aimed to eliminate non-tradable shares. However,
the NTS still accounts for the majority of shares in the listed companies. I investigated
the mean percentage of tradable shares in listed companies, and found that it increased
from 41.53 per cent in 2005 to 47.61 per cent, 52.88 per cent, and 59.01 per cent in
2006, 2007, and 2008 respectively. However, further empirical tests are needed to
determine whether this reform was the main factor influencing leverage ratio.

To further investigate the effect of ownership control type on debt maturity structure
interacted by profitability, I employed sub-samples grouped by profitability variables
to cast more light on this issue. Table 3.4, Panels A, B and C show the mean/median
comparison of LEV, LTD dummy and STD grouped by profitability.

[Insert Table 3.4 here]

I sorted my sample by the 25 per cent lowest and largest profitability. There are
approximately 1,481 observations in each pair of the 25th percentile sub-sample. The
t/Z tests for LEV in all three panels reflect that firms with higher profitability have
significantly lower leverage ratios, which accords with the findings of Mayers (1977)
and Chen (2004): that firms tend to raise loans first through internal earnings. The t/Z
tests for STD are significant in all three panels, shown by the mean and median
comparison, where firms with the lowest profitability had significantly larger
short-term debt. This echoes the findings of Cai et al. (2008): that the ability to
borrow long-term debt may signal a Chinese firm‘s good quality. Firms with poorer
performance tend to pursue more short-term debt. The results lend support to
Hypothesis 3.2: that listed companies with better profitability raise less short-term
debt. However, the t/Z test for the likelihood of having long-term debt that reports the
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difference of means and medians is only significant if firms are grouped by ROS.
3.4.2 Regression analysis
To further examine about the influence of ownership control type and probability on
Chinese firms‘ debt structure decisions, I use panel regression analysis. Equation (3.1)
is the interpretation about determinants of debt maturity structure in Chinese listed
companies.
Debtmaturityit    1STATEi   2 Profitabilityit  3 STATEi * Profitabilityit
  4 Pr eLEVi  5 MOit  6Qit  7 DEPRit  8TANGit  9 MARKit  10 SIZEit

(3.1)

 11REFORM it   ' (Yeardummiesi )   ' ( Industrydummiesi )   it

For firm i in year t, the debt maturity measure can be the short-term debt ratio (STD),
the likelihood of having long-term debt (LTD dummy), or the supplementary variable
total leverage ratio (LEV). Industry dummies are included in all specifications to
capture industry effects. I also controlled for financial risk by using a previous year‘s
leverage ratio (PreLEV), which can help to mitigate the endogenous problem of debt
maturity structure and leverage ratio. According to the results of the uni-variate test in
Table 3.3, the differences of LEV are only significant between 2006 and 2008. This
time period coincides with the Chinese Non-tradable Shares Reform, which started in
2005 but was prevalently implemented from 2006. Therefore I added REFORM to the
regressions of LEV, which is a dummy variable set to 1 if the time period is 2006,
2007, or 2008; and 0 (zero) otherwise, to control for temporal effect. The results of
Equation 3.1 are shown in Table 3.5. In Panels A, B, and C, the dependant variables
are LEV, LTD dummy, and STD respectively.

[Insert Table 3.5 here]
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According to the results of Table 3.5, R2 and pseudo R2 for the alternative
specifications indicate that the ownership control type and profitability variables
explain approximately 10 per cent, 2 per cent, and 6 per cent respectively of the
leverage ratio, long-term debt dummy and short-term debt ratio. The combination of
independent factors and control variables contributes to approximately 60 per cent, 16
per cent, and 14 per cent of the explanatory power of my full model specifications for
leverage ratio, long-term debt dummy and short-term debt ratio.

In Panel A, STATE positively influence leverage ratio in the regression without
control variables. My results suggestion that compared with privately controlled firms,
firms ultimately controlled by the state raise significantly more debt, which is
consistent with Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and Li et al. (2009): that the Chinese
Government holding the dual roles as owner of SOEs and of the four largest domestic
banks results in investments of SOEs being supported by the government through
heavily subsidized bank loans, leading to excessive leverage in SOEs (Li et al., 2009).

In Panels B and C, the STATE dummy is significant in affecting the debt maturity
measures in all of the specifications. Moreover, the coefficients do not change
directions between specification with and without control variables. The significance
of the coefficient of the STATE dummy on debt maturity variables provides strong
evidence for Hypothesis 3.1, that ownership control type influences debt maturity
structure; and compared with privately controlled firms, SOEs have better access to
long-term debt and use less short-term debt. This concurs with my earlier discussion,
regarding how the government still plays an important role in firms‘ borrowing and
banks‘ lending decisions, given its dual capacities as owners of both the debtor (SOEs)
and the creditor (the state banks) (Li et al., 2009).
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According to the pecking order theory, firms with higher profitability are more likely
to be financed by internal retained earnings first, and they therefore have a lower
leverage ratio (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Compared with new equity issuance,
retained profit is the quickest and easiest source of finance for most companies, due to
the transaction costs associated with share issuance and the restrictions on firms‘
operating performance when applying for new equity issuance. Therefore, retained
earnings are often the preferred primary method of raising additional capital. In Table
3.5, Panel A all three profitability variables negatively influence leverage ratio at the 1
per cent significance level, which accords with my prediction and is consistent with
Chen (2004): that Chinese firms‘ behavior is in line with the pecking order theory.
Firms with higher profitability may be more prone to seeking finance via internal
earnings first, and therefore have a smaller leverage ratio.

In Panel B, both ROA and ROS have a significant, positive influence on the access to
long-term debt. Therefore, firms with better profitability have greater access to
long-term debt, which is consistent with Firth et al. (2009). In Panel C, all three
profitability variables negatively influence the short-term debt ratio, among which, the
coefficients of ROA and CFOA are significant. These are also consistent with
Hypothesis 3.2: that profitability influences debt maturity structure, and that firms
with better profitability raise less short-term debt and more long-term debt. I can
conclude that short-term debt is not the main tool used in monitoring management in
SOEs. As Li et al. (2009) point out; banks prefer to provide short-term loans to
privately controlled firms so that they can control any opportunistic behavior by the
individual owners.

According to the interactive items of STATE and the profitability variables in Panel C,
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where a firm‘s ownership control type is concerned, the function of profitability to
debt maturity structure weakens the variables, which is reflected in the decreased
coefficient of the interactive items. In particular, the influences of profitability on the
LTD dummy change the directions if interacted by STATE, which is shown in Panel B.
Therefore, Hypothesis 3.3 is proved: that being an SOE decreases the influence of
firm profitability on debt maturity structure. I can also conclude that, regarding the
situation of China‘s listed companies, although bank reform has been effective in
giving the bank the ability to supervise companies‘ profitability, government
involvement in the financial markets can still effect a misallocation of financial
resources.

Despite the differences in ownership type and access to bank loans, I found that some
determinants of debt maturity for Chinese firms are similar to those in developed
markets. Leverage ratio is a popular measurement of financial risk. According to the
regression results of Panels B and C, leverage ratio of previous year (PreLEV)
significantly influences both the LTD dummy and STD at the 1 per cent significance
level. Listed companies with larger leverage ratios have greater access to long-term
debt, and they use less short-term debt.

The likelihood of securing long-term borrowing was not expected to be affected by
managerial ownership. However, managerial ownership appears to play an important
role in a firm‘s short-term debt decisions, according to the results in Panel C, and this
is consistent with Datta et al. (2005). The significant negative effect of MANA on
STD perfectly supports the notion that short-term debt is always a tool for reducing
the agency cost between shareholders and managers. When managers are given more
share ownership of a firm, interest alignment dominate managers‘ behavior; therefore,
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they issue less short-term debt to avoid being rated frequently by lenders.
Deciding between long-term and short-term debt also might be affected by a firm‘s
taxability, since the timing of repurchasing and reissuing debt attracts different taxes.
Depreciation scaled by assets (DEPR) is a non-debt tax shield, which positively
influences the LTD dummy and negatively influences STD. Chinese listed firms
choose to increase LTD and decrease STD by utilizing the non-debt tax shield in the
term of the change of tax rate, which is consistent with Wu and Yue (2009).

The positive influence of tangibility on leverage ratio and the long-term debt dummy
confirms the findings of Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Chen (2004): that asset
tangibility is an important criterion in banks‘ credit policy. The empirical results of the
effect of growth opportunities (Q) reflect that Chinese firms with greater growth
opportunities issue less debt, which is consistent with Wu and Yue (2009). However,
the results of growth opportunities on short-term debt vary substantially between the
specifications in this study.

Size and area are always the main criteria in the credit policy of lenders (which are
mostly banks in China). Sapienza (2004) found that state-owned banks mostly favor
large-sized firms and those located in under-developed areas. My results suggest that
firms with larger-scale operations tend to use more long-term debt and less short-term
debt, which is consistent with Titman and Wessels (1988), Cai et al. (2008), and
Berger et al. (2009). Listed firms located in areas with better institutional efficiencies
also use more short-term debt; while firms in areas with lower marketization
efficiencies have more access to long-term debt, which is consistent with Firth et al.
(2009) and Li et al. (2009). I can conclude that banks are becoming more
market-oriented as the reforms of the liberalised banking sector take effect, and
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because of the significant influence of the marketization index on debt maturity
structure.

Reform of non-tradable shares does not feature as a major influence in capital
structure decisions for Chinese listed firms, according to the results in Panel A. The
time effect of the leverage ratio difference between SOEs and privately controlled
firms and the reform of non-tradable shares may be just a coincidence.

3.5 Robustness test
3.5.1 split-sample analysis according to control ownership

Firth et al. (2009) found that banks are extending loans to financially healthier firms
and better-governed firms. To further investigate the effect of profitability on the debt
maturity structure by different ownership control type, I split the sample into two
groups for regression analysis: SOEs and privately controlled firms. In order to
control for the effects of industry, I used the proxy of industry-adjusted profitability
(IAROA: industry-adjusted return on assets; IAROS: industry-adjusted return on sales;
and IACFOA: industry-adjusted cash flow on assets). The regression equation is
shown as:
Debtmaturityit    1 IA Pr ofitability it   2 Pr eLEVi   3 MOit   4 Qit
  5 DEPRit   6TANGit   7 MARK it   8 SIZEit   it

(3.2)

IAProfitability 11 in Equation (3.2) refers three profitability variables: IAROA,
IAROS, and IACFOA. Panel A, B and C in Table 3.6 show the regression results and

11

We also use profitability variables without being adjusted by industry: ROA, ROS and CFOA. There
is no big difference from IAProfitability variables; the results are even more significant.
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the coefficient difference according to chow test of equality12.

[Insert Table 3.6 here]
From the quite large values of the adjusted R2 of the regressions for equality of
coefficients in Panel A (approximately 98 per cent in each specification) and Panel C
(approximately 74 per cent in each specification), the split of sample by control
ownership made sense in this study. Although the need to split the sample in Panel B
is minimal, the results nevertheless show some interesting findings.

Panels A, B, and C show that the influences of industry-adjusted profitability on the
debt character variables in privately controlled firms are larger than those in SOEs in
almost all the specifications. For example, in Panel B, the difference of coefficient of
IAROA between privately controlled firms and SOEs is significant at the 10 per cent
level. In Panel C, the difference of coefficient of IAROS between privately controlled
firms and SOEs is significant at the 1 per cent level. As a complement to the
conclusions in Firth et al. (2009) regarding the importance of commercial judgments
in banks‘ lending decisions, I present evidence that the banking sector uses
profitability as a main consideration in loan allocations to privately controlled firms.
Banks tend to lend more long-term debt to better performing privately controlled
firms that use less short-term debt. However, this allocation criterion does not seem to
be effective in SOEs. Therefore, Hypothesis 3.3 is again proved: that state control
ownership decreases the influence of firm profitability on debt maturity structure.

The coefficients of managerial ownership are quite interesting. As shown in of Table
3.6, Panel C, significant negative relations exist between managerial ownership and
12

In Table 3.6, all of the constant in the separate regressions ahead of chow test are omitted to report
for the sake of brevity.
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the short-term debt ratio in both SOEs and privately controlled firms. Firms with
higher managerial ownership use less short-term debt. When the interest of
shareholders and managers is better aligned, using a powerful tool such as short-term
debt to monitor managers‘ behavior is not necessary, and this confirms the evidence in
Datta et al. (2005). As the results of Panel B show, managerial ownership has a
significant positive influence on the LTD dummy in SOEs; however, this influence is
not significant in privately controlled firms. Thus, a larger management shareholding
helps SOEs to access more long-term loans.

The significant coefficients of SIZE on both the LTD dummy and STD are consistent
with the findings in Cai et al. (2008): that Chinese firms tend to issue longer maturity
debts if they are larger. The institutional development variable (MARK) has a
significant influence on the debt characteristic variable in nearly all the specifications
in all three panels. In Panel A, generally, listed SOEs located in underdeveloped areas
have a significantly larger amount of debt. In Panel B, the negative relationship
between institutional development and access to long-term debt is more significant for
SOEs than privately controlled firms, which supports Li et al. (2009): that institutional
development is significantly associated with access to long-term debt in firms
ultimately controlled by the state. In Panel C, the function of the marketization extent
on short-term debt is reversed: the marketization index significantly influences STD
for privately controlled firms, but does not for SOEs. This is consistent with Amit et al.
(2010): that the function of marketization works well with short-term debt in
companies not assisted by the state.
3.5.2 Change of ownership control
To further distinguish the effect of the type of ownership control on listed companies‘
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debt raising behaviour; I gathered statistics about the methods the firms used to
transfer their ownership control type during the period 2001–08. I counted the number
of that firms change their debt characteristic values (shown in Table 3.7, Panel A), and
calculated the mean values of the percentage change of each variables shown in Panel
B. The LTD shown in Table 3.7 is the ratio of long-term debt due in more than one
year divided by the total assets of the firm, which is different from the LTD dummy
discussed above.

[Insert Table 3.7 here]

According to my measurements, 136 listed firms transferred their ownership control
type from SOEs into privately controlled firms during 2001–08, while 25 privately
controlled firms transferred into SOEs during 2001–08 shown in Panel A of Table 3.7.
Row ―0–1‖ depicts in the first year of transferring of ownership control type, how
many firms change their debt maturity characteristics and how many firms do not
change these values. Row ―0–2‖, ―0–3‖, and ―0–4‖ depicts the number of firms with
and without change of debt variables in the second, third, and fourth year of
ownership control type transformation. The numbers outside (inside) the parenthesis
are the numbers of firms from SOEs to privately controlled firms (from privately
controlled firms to SOEs).

Panel A of Table 3.7 shows that among the 136 firms that transferred from SOEs into
privately controlled firms, 83 increased their leverage ratio in the first year; while 52
firms decreased their leverage ratio. In the first year of transferring the type of
ownership control, more firms (54) decreased their long-term debt than those (44) that
increased this ratio. The number of separations between firms increasing and
decreasing short-term debt was larger: 70 firms increased their short-term debt in the
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first year of transferring from SOEs into privately controlled firms, but only 58 firms
decreased their short-term debt ratio. For the 25 firms that transferred from privately
controlled firms into SOEs during 2001–08 the number that changed their debt
variables are shown in the parenthesis.

Panel B of Table 3.7 shows the mean value of the percentage changes in leverage ratio,
long-term debt and short-term debt for firms that changed from SOEs into privately
controlled firms (from privately controlled firms into SOEs) outside (inside)
parenthesis. The row ―0–1‖ shows the percentage change of debt variables in the first
year of transferring of ownership control type, while the rows ―0–2‖, ―0–3‖, and ―0-4‖
depict the cumulative change of the value of debt variables from the beginning to the
second, third, and fourth year of transformation. For example, if the listed company
named ABC Co. Ltd was controlled by the state in the year 2001 and 2002 but
changed to be controlled by individuals through some privatization process in 2003,
row ―0-1‖ summarizes and displays the changes of ABC‘s debt characteristics from
2003 to 2004, row ―0–2‖, ―0–3‖, and ―0–4‖ summarises and displays the
accumulative change of ABC‘s debt characteristics from 2003 to 2005, to 2006 and to
2007.

For firms that changed from SOEs to privately controlled firms, the percentage
increase of LEV is getting larger than the percentage decrease of the value of this
variable. If we compare the values between firms from SOEs to privately controlled
firms and firms from privately controlled firms to SOEs, for example, the percentage
increase of LTD is accumulated slowly in firms from SOEs to privately controlled
firms while the accumulated increase ratio is getting larger more quickly in firms from
privately controlled firms to SOEs. For the percentage increase of STD, the value of
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firms from SOEs to privately controlled firms is getting larger, while the value of
firms from privately controlled firms to SOEs is getting smaller. These are further
proof that change of ownership control type has had some effects on listed companies‘
debt maturity structure choices. Different borrowers appear to have different maturity
preferences. When the firms ultimately controlled by the government transferred to be
controlled by individuals, the government gradually withdrew its intervention, firms‘
increase use of LTD is getting slower while the increase use of STD is getting quicker.
When firms transferred from privately controlled firms into SOEs (values are shown
in parenthesis), the increase use of LTD is getting more quicker while the decrease of
STD is getting less slower. The results of Table 3.7 further prove that in the Chinese
situation of bond market underdevelopment and bank funds shortage, the state
controlling background has helped companies to access more debt, as well as more
long-term debt in their financing decisions, which is consistent with Allen et al. (2005)
and Zheng and Zhu (2009).
3.5.3 Alternative variables

In the tests in Section 3.4 I used the after-tax return to calculate profitability variables.
If operating earnings are calculated before interest payments, the effect of leverage on
earnings number may be reduced. Therefore I used operating earnings (before tax) on
equity (hereafter ROE) as an alternative variable for profitability. I also used earnings
per share (EPS), which is the profitability variable affecting the market aspects of
listed companies. According to my test, no major difference is observable from the
results of ROA, ROS, and CFOA. For the purpose of conciseness, the results are not
reported. I also used the equity ownership of firms‘ controlling interests, following Li
et al. (2009), but those results do not alter this study‘s conclusions. I also separated
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companies‘ AREA into two groups: one if the company was located in relatively
poorly developed western China and zero if the company was situated in relatively
highly developed eastern China.13 The results are just as robust as those that used the
marketization index.

3.6 Conclusions
Despite its under developed legal systems and a financial market, China‘s economy
has been growing at speed (Allen et al., 2005; Zheng and Zhu, 2009). However,
research on developing nations and on the finance growth nexus strongly suggests that
the observed high growth rates cannot continue indefinitely without significant reform
of the banking system and the countries legal and financial infrastructure (Berger et
al., 2009). Debt financing is the predominant source of external funds for China‘s
corporations, but the Chinese debt market is comprised of an undeveloped corporate
bond market and dominated by a state-owned banking sector.

I focused on how listed firms raised loan funds and arranged their debt maturity
structure under China‘s unique financial system, which is mainly controlled by the
four largest state-owned banks, who oversee approximately three-fourths of the
nation‘s banking industry assets.

This paper mainly discusses two specific determinants of debt maturity structure in
China‘s listed companies: first, whether the ownership control type influenced firms‘
debt maturity choice, and I found that it did. In developing countries, many banks are
state owned and a large share of their credit goes to other state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), but the influence of SOEs on credit allocation in China is even more
13

The policy basis behind this kind of classification is China‘s Western Development Policy, which
started in the early 21st century.
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pronounced (Cull and Xu, 2000). I found that ownership control type is an important
factor influencing listed companies‘ debt maturity structure. Firms controlled by the
government have larger leverage ratios, have more access to long-term debt and issue
less short-term debt. However, firms controlled by individuals have much less access
to long-term debt; while short-term debt remains an economically important financing
source for them. Second, I examined whether the commercial banks considered
companies‘ profitability when lending to them, and found that they did. The results of
this study show that firms with better profitability use significantly less debt,
including more long-term debt and less short-term debt. After 30 years of reform,
China‘s banks have begun to follow some of the behaviour of commercial corporate
banks in the developed world (Firth et al., 2009).

I also used the interactive item of STATE dummy and profitability variables to further
investigate the influence of profitability in association with concerning of government
background. According to the coefficients of interaction between ownership type and
profitability, state-control ownership reduced the coefficient significance of
profitability on firms‘ access to long-term debt. This finding supports the contention
that although the banks are effective in monitoring companies‘ profitability and risk
level, government involvement in financial markets can still effect the misallocation
of financial resources.
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CHAPTER FOUR: BANK LOAN DECISIONS OF
CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES
4.1 Introduction

In developing countries the supply of financing sources is usually limited to demand
(Dinc, 2005; Bai et al., 2006). Bank loans have been the primary source of corporate
debt in China. China‘s financial system is dominated by a large banking sector that is
mainly controlled by the four largest state-owned banks (Big Four) that control about
three-fourths of China‘s banking industry assets. The equity capital gathered from the
stock market has been growing rapidly since the inception of the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the 1990s. However, the scale and
importance of finance from stock exchanges is still not comparable with other
channels of financing, particularly from the banking sector, for the entire economy
(Allen et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2009).

Although outstanding bank loans are larger than equity or corporate bonds, most
research focuses on the equity issue of Chinese listed companies because the
emerging stock market is extraordinary in its transition from a planned economy to a
market oriented economy. Chen (2004) developed a preliminary study to explore the
capital structure determinants of Chinese-listed companies, and laid some groundwork
upon which a more detailed evaluation of their capital structure could be based. She
concluded that significant institutional differences and financial constraints in the
banking sector are factors that influence firms‘ leverage decision, and are at least as
important as the firm-specific factors (Chen, 2004). Huang and Song (2006)
documented the determinants of capital structure in Chinese listed companies and
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investigated whether firms in the largest developing and transition economy in the
world entertained any unique features. They concluded that leverage ratio in Chinese
firms increased with their size and fixed assets, and decreased with profitability,
non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, managerial shareholdings and correlates
with industries, as in other countries, but both state ownership and institutional
ownership impact on the decisions of long term debt financing in Chinese companies.

However, an investigation of more detailed aspects such as the internal composition
of liabilities and bank loan issues are insufficient. Cull and Xu (2000; 2003)
investigated the efficiency of credit allocation by state banks. Banks imposed harder
budget constraints on SOEs than bureaucrats, but those constraints softened as the
1990s progressed. As a result, increased bank finance did not flow to relatively
productive SOEs later in the period. Brandt and Li (2003) used ―matching bank-firm
data‖ from China and empirically examined the bank discrimination problem, a
reference to state-owned banks that have discriminated against private firms for
non-profit reasons, which in turn diminished with the incentive and human capital of
bank managers. Berger et al. (2009) were motivated to test the efficiency of Chinese
banks and categorised them by their ownership type14 into five groups. Their results
clearly suggest that with regard to majority ownership, foreign banks are the most
efficient, followed by private domestic banks, non-Big Four majority state-owned
institutions, with the Big Four being measured as the least profit efficient.

Apart from bank discrimination and dispersive efficiency across different types of
banks, the political connection of enterprises is another quite interesting phenomenon
14

They define majority state-owned banks as those banks whose state ownership is greater than 50 per
cent of total ownership; majority private domestic banks are defined as those banks whose private
domestic ownership is greater than 50 per cent of total ownership; majority foreign banks are defined
as those banks whose foreign ownership is greater than 50 per cent of total ownership, and no majority
ownership banks are those without any majority ownership.
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in China. Under a predominantly state-owned bank lending environment (Firth et al.,
2008), companies controlled by the government have the privilege of acquiring a bank
loan from state owned commercial banks. Meanwhile, external financial channels for
privately controlled enterprises are quite different from state-owned enterprises.
Without enough connections to government, most privately controlled firms depend
on the informal financing channels, for example, private credit agencies are the most
important non-banking channel 15 during their establishment and growth period
(Brandt and Li , 2003; Allen et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2009). However, while a lot of
literature suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank
finance, there is very little research done to explore the direct relationship between
political connection and detailed aspects of bank loan characteristics in China. I
believe my study, which focuses on political connection and bank loan financing of
China‘s listed companies, will fill this research void.
Another distinct characteristic of China‘s economy is the geographic variation in
regard to its institutional environment. Compared to developed countries that have
broad territories, such as the United States, Australia, et al., China provides a good
research laboratory because it combines great heterogeneity in institutional
development across the provinces with homogeneity in cultural norms, laws, and
regulations (Amit et al., 2009). Better regional institutional efficiency is associated
with a better investment climate and higher productivity. In line with the survey data,
Cull and Xu (2005) found that institutional developments such as secure property
rights are a significant determinant of a firms‘ access to external finance in the form of

15

However, Ayyagari et al. (2008)‘s empirical evidence argue against that despite the formal bank
finance is weakness, the formal financial system is associated with faster firm growth in China,
whereas fund raising from informal channels is not. However, either formal or informal finance drives
China‘s economic growth is not the concern of this paper.

59

bank loans. Bai et al. (2006) took the lack of formal protection of private property as
the key reason for the private sector‘s difficulty of access to bank loans. Li et al. (2009)
used a sample of non-publicly traded Chinese firms to explore the role of ownership
structure and institutional development in debt financing. They found that the levels
of institutional development of firms‘ located provinces are positively associated with
leverage and their access to long term debt.

Other than non-public firms, this study used listed companies as a research focus.
Chinese listed firms are the best part of the country‘s economy in terms of corporate
governance, and they follow the fundamental rules of market economy (Huang and
Song, 2006). Being listed is also an important method for Chinese companies to
become corporatised and privatised. Moreover, the companies to be listed are often an
assessment of political achievement by local government officers in China. Therefore
the bank loan issue and bank-firm relationship may be a better way to to explore the
workings of government involvement in corporate financing. Furthermore, the listed
firms are the best and largest sample that offers reliable ownership data, especially
data of the type of ownership control (Amit et al., 2009), which are critical to my
research.
First, I categorised the sample observations of China‘s listed companies according to
their type of ownership control, and then defined the firms as SOEs if their ownership
was the government, and privately controlled if their ownership control was civilian.
Then I compared the bank loan resource, and the amounts and proportions between
SOEs and privately controlled firms. The empirical results provided evidence to
support Brandt and Li (2003) regarding bank discrimination. Under a state-owned
bank lending environment, firms controlled by the state can easily get loans from
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state-owned commercial banks and policy banks, while privately controlled
companies get significant larger bank from foreign banks.
Second, I used China‘s listed privately controlled firms as research observations to
investigate the influence of political connectedness on firms‘ access to bank loans. I
followed Firth et al. (2009) to define the extent of the political connectedness of
privately controlled firms as a percentage of state ownership. The empirical results
showed that in China, political connectedness and institutional development across
areas are the important determinants of privately controlled firms to access bank loans.
According to the fundamental variables of access to bank loans, I concluded that
political connectedness distorted the allocation of bank loans in China.
On the basis of pre-research into the capital structure of Chinese listed companies‘
decisions, as well as emerging research into China‘s institutional background and
political attributes in enterprises, this study adds further evidence to the implications
of political connections, ownership structure, and institutional development on firms‘
financing profile. Compared to Berger et al. (2009)‘s ranking the efficiency of
different type of banks using an empirical study from the bank‘s perspective, my
empirical study investigated the allocation of bank loans from the debtor‘s experience.
I believe this study contributes to the assessment and comparison of bank efficiency in
China.

The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 proposes the key
determinants of bank loans and corresponding predictions on the basis of a literature
review. Section 4.3 describes the data and variables as well as a relevant summary of
the statistics. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results and their interpretations
according to a uni-variate comparison and multi-variable regressions. The robustness
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tests are reported in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 presents conclusions.

4.2 Literature review and hypotheses development

Most literature focuses on bank loan decisions in developed countries but this issue in
developing countries has been emerging over the past decade. In this section I review
the main determinants of bank loan financing profile of firms in the context of China
where most banks are state-owned. On the basis of a review of the determinants of a
bank loan I developed the following predictions of listed companies‘ access to bank
loans.
4.2.1 Ownership control type

In a country where state-owned banks dominate the banking sector, one prominent
feature is that financing resources are mostly controlled by the government and are
mainly reserved for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As a relationship based economy
(Xu et al., 2011) of China, private sector development has been hampered by limited
access to external finance (Bai et al., 2006) because China provides an environment in
which skepticism, mistrust, and discrimination toward private enterprises abound
(Brandt and Li, 2003; Li et al., 2006), financing becomes a critical problem for private
sector development.

One feature of Chinese listed companies is that ownership is highly concentrated.
Firms with different types of ownership have different objectives and motivations
which influence the way they exercise their control rights over their financial
decisions (Chen et al., 2009). Under a state-owned bank lending environment as exists
in China (Firth et al., 2008), companies controlled by the government can acquire
bank loans from state owned commercial banks (Firth et al., 2009). With the support
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of state owned banks, SOEs often devour their bank loans because being connected to
bureaucrats provides better access to bank loans than privately controlled firms (Firth
et al., 2009; Zheng and Zhu, 2009). Meanwhile, external financial channels for
privately controlled enterprises are quite limited in comparison to state-owned
enterprises. For example, Firth et al. (2009) use stylised bank statistics to show that
although privately controlled firms make up 50 per cent of the Chinese economy, their
loan accounts for just 7 per cent of bank lending.
Thus on the belief that the type of ownership control influences firms‘ access to bank
loans, I present the following hypothesis:

H4.1: SOEs have better access to loans from state-owned banks than privately
controlled firms.
4.2.2 Political connection

A considerable amount of research on political connection in enterprises has emerged
in recent years, commencing with Fisman (2001) and Faccio (2006), etc. The extant
and decomposed studies mainly focus on the origin of political connection and the
influence of political connection on corporate finance issues. Both types of research
agree that political connections provide a valuable asset that can be used to attract
outside partners and negotiate more favourable terms in the transfer of technology and
finance (Jordan, 2004). A lot of emerging economies lack strong property rights
protection and face institutional under development, which forces firms to seek
political connections in order to grow.

The measurement of political connection varies substantially; some literature uses a
dummy variable to proxy political connections, for instance, if a firm‘s CEO served as
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a current or former government bureaucrat (Fan et al., 2007), if the entrepreneurs are
Party members, have work experience as a manager of a public firm or a government
cadre, and are members of the People‘s Congress (PC) or the Chinese People‘s
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (Li et al., 2008), if the state is a minority
shareholder of the private firm (Firth et al., 2009), or if the firm is a government
protected industry (Yu et al., 2010) etc. Some literature used consecutive variables to
measure the levels of connection, such as political connectedness (Jordan, 2004;
Goldman et al., 2006). No matter what the dummy or the consecutive variables, the
common argument of these literatures is that the political connection of enterprises by
which firms are assisted over come market and institutional barriers and then seek
favourable treatment from the government, is quite an impressive phenomenon in
developed and developing countries.

As predicted by Faccio et al. (2006), political connections may have a favourable
effect on bank lending decisions. Dinc (2005) provides bank-level empirical evidence
of political influence on banks across emerging countries by multi-national research.
The results suggest that a comparison of financial systems in general, and the role of
banks in those systems in particular, cannot be fully understood without considering
the political environment in which these financial systems operate.

The Chinese economy is dominated by state ownership and has an ongoing
ideological discrimination against private ownership. The best way to reduce
ideological discrimination is through political connections because it helps private
firms access external financing resources such as bank loans by providing government
guarantees (Faccio, 2006 ; Faccio et al., 2006).
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By using data from Chinese private firms, Li et al (2008) tested whether political
connections help a firm gain access to the credit market. They found that firms with
political connection do indeed have an advantage in obtaining initial capital from
banks and other state institutions. Meanwhile, because access to bank loans is difficult
and the public bond market is under developed, finance is always a development
bottleneck for companies without sufficient connections to the government. Some
empirical research also reveals that without enough connections to government, most
privately controlled firms depend on informal financing channels such as private
credit agencies during their establishment and growth period (Brandt and Li , 2003;
Allen et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2009).

Therefore, I submit this hypothesis:

H4.2: Privately controlled firms with more political connections can get more
access to loans from state-owned banks.
4.2.3 Institutional development across areas

An economy cannot develop very well without a competent institutional environment;
academic literature has long been interested in corporate finance issues influenced by
institutional development. Qian and Strahan (2007) concluded that legal and
institutional differences shape the ownership and terms of bank loans across the world.
In line with survey data, Cull and Xu (2005) found that institutional development such
as secure property rights are a significant determinant of a firms‘ access to external
finance in the form of bank loans. Bai et al. (2006) take the lack of formal protection
of private property as the key reason for the private sector‘s access to bank loans. By
using manually collected ownership data from a sample of publicly listed firms in
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China, Amit et al. (2009) argued that family control is an optimal response to
institutional development across its various regions. Li et al. (2009) used a sample of
non-publicly traded Chinese firms to explore the role of ownership structure and
institutional development in debt financing. They found that state ownership was
positively associated with leverage and a firm‘s access to long-term debt, and the
effect was interacted by institutional development.

It has long been argued that a poor institutional environment such as weak protection
of private property has restricted the access of private enterprise in developing and
transition economies to bank loans (Bai et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2010). Recent findings
also suggest that elements of the legal/financial infrastructure may have important
effects on the abilities of banks to use lending technologies such as financial
statements, credit scores, or easily-valued fixed assets pledged as collateral, to extend
credit to SMEs (small and medium enterprises) (e.g., Qian and Strahan, 2007; Berger
and Udell, 2006 etc.). More recent studies on emerging markets concluded that
institutions that can enforce contracts are important for the development of credit
markets (Li et al., 2009).

China provides a good research laboratory because it combines great heterogeneity in
institutional development across the provinces with homogeneity in cultural norms,
laws, and regulations (Amit et al., 2009). A considerable number literatures concluded
that regional differences in development mainly reflect the efforts of local government
(or lack thereof), to support and participate in the growth of private-sector firms
(Allen et al., 2005; Li et al., 2009; Amit et al., 2009). Thus I set the third hypothesis:
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H4.3: If firms are located in an area with more institutional development, the
proportion of their loans from state-owned banks is smaller than firms located in
areas with less institutional development.

The stark contrast between the heterogeneity in institutional development and the
homogeneity in the legal system across the country makes China an ideal setting
(Amit et al., 2009) to analyse the research question concerning the role of institutional
development in the prevalence of a transition process from a command economy to
market oriented economy. Under the circumstances of a lack of formal protection for
private property, Bai et al. (2006) used a dataset from Chinese private enterprises to
investigate the impact of political participation and philanthropic activities on the
access to bank loans, and concluded that institutional development will influence the
relationship between political participation and banking borrowing in Chinese firms.
Li et al. (2008; 2009) found that the effect of political connection on firm performance
is more important in regions with less developed markets and legal systems.

My fourth hypothesis is as follows:

H4.4: The positive effect of political connection on loans from state-owned banks
is reduced if it‘s interacted by institutional development across different provinces.
4.2.4 Other important determinants

1) Firm performance

To control and guard against risk, institutions as creditors usually use information on
earnings to alleviate any information asymmetry between creditor and debtor. Banks
motivated to maximise their profits will likely use better information such as financial
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statements analysis and credit scores, etc. in their lending decisions. Li et al. (2009)
found that under current banking reforms China‘s banks have gradually begun to
apply economic criteria in their lending decisions. Cull and Xu (2000) found a link
between bank loans and subsequent productivity, which suggests that banks are able
to identify and lend to relatively productive enterprises. Firth et al. (2009) found that
Chinese banks extended loans to financially healthier and better governed firms,
which implies that they use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. All
of above research is from the angle of the creditor and/or banks.

However, if the research is conducted from the angle of the debtor or firm and the
relationship between leverage and investment in China‘s listed firms is examined,
Firth et al. (2008) found that state-owned banks have an additional incentive to bail
out poorly performing listed firms because a listed firm that has experienced losses for
two consecutive years may be de-listed if it cannot return to profitability. The
obligation of state-owned banks to lend to SOEs is widely regarded as a major cause
of China‘s huge number of non-performing loans (Firth et al., 2008). Ruan et al. (2011)
found that profitability was a significant factor in a firms‘ debt maturity tradeoff.
From all the foregoing, the relationship between firm performance and bank loan is
still unclear.

2) Managerial ownership

Financing choice in alleviating agency conflict between manager and shareholder is
well recognised in the literature. The contradictory issue mainly highlights the
discretion of management who are expected to make financing decisions on behalf of
shareholders which maximise value (Datta et al., 2005). To guard against this conflict
of interest management is usually offered ownership in the firm in order to alleviate
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the divergence of benefit between managers and shareholders. A corporate board of
directors has the power to make, or at least ratify, all important financial policies, so it
is quite plausible that board members with appropriate stock ownership will have an
incentive to effectively monitor and oversee important corporate decisions (Bhagat
and Bolton, 2008). When the interests of shareholders and managers are better aligned
there is no real necessity to use a powerful tool such as short-term debt to monitor a
manager‘s behaviour. Therefore, in any discussion of loan characteristics to a firm,
managerial ownership should be controlled.

4.3 Sample and variables
4.3.1 Sample and data

The listed company sample pool started from all publicly traded Chinese firms in the
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). The raw
data of bank loans is from the sub-database of CSMAR, China‘s Listed Firm‘s Bank
Loans Research Database (GTA_CBL). The GTA_CBL database has collected
relevant information on bank loans such as starting and ending time, interest, maturity,
and creditor etc. of listed companies since 1996. From this raw data I manually sorted
and summarised information on the yearly bank loan for each listed company. If the
bank loan was nominated in foreign currencies I convert the amount of foreign
currency into Chinese yuan by the RMB exchange middle rate16 on the date that loan
was announced. If the date that the loan was announced could not be found (usually a
weekend), I used the foreign exchange rate on the date before the announcement day
instead.

16

The resource is from webpage of State Administration of Foreign
http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe/tjsj/rmb_list.jsp?id=5&ID=110200000000000000
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Exchange:

All the raw data related to corporate finance and governance are extracted from the
CSMAR database, which was developed by GTA Information Technology Company
Limited. But I did make some necessary supplements with the data from annual
reports from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange web pages, as well as from
the CCER (China Centre for Economic Research) database.
I excluded firms with ST and PT17 status, firms in the financial and insurance industry,
and firms with an incomplete dataset from my modelling. I also dropped observations
with negative values of total assets, total liabilities, and sales, following Li et al.
(2009). I also dropped some observations that consist of outliers, such as leverage
ratios greater than 1, and Tobin‘s Q greater than 10 etc. The final sample consists of
an unbalanced panel dataset with 2509 firm-year observations and the sample period
is from 2002 to 2009.
4.3.2 Variables
In the beginning, this study investigated the amount of a firms‘ loan from different
types of banks, such as the Big Four, loans from joint stock commercial banks, and
loans from policy banks and foreign banks. I also investigated the percentage of a loan,
such as the amount from the Big Four, divided by the total amount of loans, etc.

To further test these loan determinants, I introduced a dummy variable named
Big_Four as a dependant variable in the regressions. The definition is as follows, set 1
if a specific company in a specific year only has a loan from the Big Four, otherwise
set 0.
17

Chinese listed firms have been classified by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
as ―special treatment‖ (ST) or ―particular transfer‖ (PT) firms for the purpose of protecting investor‘s
benefits. If a listed firm has negative profits for two consecutive years, it will be designated as a ST
firm. If it continues to get loss for one more year, it will be designated as a PT firm. A PT firm will be
delisted if it cannot turn profitable within another year (Bai et al., 2002).
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I defined the type of ownership control in terms of the nature of the ultimate
controlling shareholder. If the ultimate controller is the state for the whole period of
observation (from 2001 to 2008), this firm is defined as a State-owned enterprise
(SOEs), if the controller is a civilian (a natural person or legal person belongs wholly
to individuals) for the whole period of observation, this firm is defined as a privately
controlled enterprise.

This study followed Firth et al. (2009) who used the percentage of state ownership,
which is calculated as the shares held by the state divided by the total shares
outstanding to measure the level of political connectedness in privately controlled
firms.

The data on the extent of institutional development across regions in China comes
from the National Economic Research Institute‘s marketization index (Fan and Wang,
2010). This index was used by Wang et al. (2008), Firth et al. (2009), Li et al. (2009)
and many others to measure the development of regional institutions. I followed Yu et
al. (2010), Bai et al. (2006) and Lin et al. (2010) etc., and constructed an institutional
profile from four dimensions, i.e., the marketisaion index, government intervention,
and protection of property rights and legal development18, where the marketization
index is a combination of all the other institutional profiles, and where higher scores
for the marketization index suggest greater institutional development. Government
intervention was measured by the allocation of economic resources according to
market, the smaller the better. Protection of property rights was measured by reducing
a firms‘ burden out of tax, the less the better. Legal development was measured by the

18

China has a centralized legal system where corporate law and security regulations are the same
across all provinces; however, the implementation and development of law firms are different.
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development of intermediary organisations and the environment of the legal system,
the larger the better.
I chose firms‘ financial ratios such as Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Sales (ROS)
and Cash Flow on Asset (CFOA) to be the variables of profitability. The definition of
institutional development and profitability is shown in Table 4.1. For the sake of
brevity, I only reported the results of ROA in the section on empirical results.

[Insert Table 4.1 here]

This study investigated the types of industries in order to control the industry effect,
following Yu et al. (2010). The definition of a protected industry is according to the
industry category of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC); if a
company‘s industry is monopolistic, or national key protected, or a highly regulated
industry such as electricity, telecommunications, petroleum, exploitation, agriculture,
construction or civil engineering, or development and operation, etc, I set the value as
1, otherwise it was 0.

Following Morck et al. (1998) and Cho (2008), I defined managerial ownership as the
ownership stake of all board members. I also adopted some firm-specific control
variables such as the leverage ratio, defined as total liabilities divided by total assets;
Tobin‘s Q was defined as the market value of an asset divided by the book value of
total assets, and size was defined as a logarithm of total assets, etc.

Table 4.2 is a descriptive statistic. Panel A of Table 4.2 are the descriptive statistics of
the sources of bank loans categorised by four types of banks. Most of the firms can
get loans from the Big Four and other commercial banks. Only 148 observations in
the sample gained access to loans from policy banks and 43 observations gained loans
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from foreign banks. Regarding the loan amount, on average the sample companies got
552 million yuan loans from the Big Four and 1846, 1614, and 359 million yuan from
joint stock commercial banks, policy banks, and foreign banks respectively. The mean
value of the Loan percentages from the Big Four and joint stock commercial banks
were 36 per cent and 59 per cent, however, only 4 per cent and 0.7 per cent of loans
from the sample companies were from policy banks and foreign banks.

Panel B of Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of other firm specific variables.
An average ownership of 24 per cent belongs to the government while 27 per cent of
the listed companies in my sample were in protected industries. Managerial ownership
is at 0.025 per cent on average, with a maximum value 71.4 per cent, which
demonstrates that the variance of managerial ownership across companies is quite
large.

[Insert Table 4.2 here]

The matrix of the Pearson Correlation of variables is presented in Table 4.3. It shows
that most cross correlation terms for the independent and control variables were
comparatively small, which gave little cause for concern about any multi-collinearity
in this study.

[Insert Table 4.3 here]

4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Uni-variate test

First, I compared the mean and median of characteristic firm variables to test whether
there were any significant differences between state-owned enterprises and privately
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controlled firms. The results are interpreted in Panel A of Table 4.4. There are 1698
observations controlled by the state and 811 out of 2509 observations are controlled
by individuals. The amount of bank loans from the Big Four, other commercial banks,
and policy banks and foreign banks, as well as the percentage of bank loans from
different banks are shown in Panel A. Apparently the mean amount of bank loans
from the Big Four in SOEs is 4 times that in privately controlled firms. SOEs also get
a significantly larger amount of loans from policy banks (133.456 million yuan on
average) than privately controlled firms (15.057million yuan on average), which is
evidence for Hypothesis 4.1. Loans from foreign banks to privately controlled firms
are 6 times more than SOEs. These results are the same as Brandt and Li (2003)
where state-owned banks allocate more credit to SOEs and privately controlled firms
are more prone (maybe it‘s easier) to borrow money from foreign banks.

[Insert Table 4.4 here]

The mean state ownership of privately controlled firms is 4 per cent, which is
significantly smaller than the 33.79 per cent for SOEs. State ownership of privately
controlled firms stems from at least two channels. One is that some former SOEs
become privately controlled firms by asset lease, merge and re-organisation,
introduction of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), bankruptcy recombination, and
management buy-out, etc, but they still maintain a certain level of state ownership.
The other is where privately controlled firms intend to build a political link with the
state (Firth et al., 2009) by inviting government investments. State ownership, which
is a measurement of political connection in privately controlled firms, is both a
resource and protection from government that can help overcome any shortage of
funds (Li et al., 2008).
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31.04 per cent of SOEs are in a protected industry, which is significantly larger than
the 19.9 per cent of privately controlled firms. According to the t/Z value of
Marketization and Law, privately controlled firms are located in provinces with
significantly higher institutional development than SOEs. Compared to SOEs,
privately controlled firms offer significantly more managerial ownership, which is
consistent with Ruan et al (2011) that privately controlled firms like to mitigate any
possible agency problems between management and shareholders by offering more
managerial ownership.

Panel B of Table 4.4 presents the mean and median comparison grouped by
institutional development, represented specifically by the Marketization index. If the
Marketization score of a firm‘s province is larger than the median score of all the
samples, I set it with a low institutional development. 1262 observations were taken as
located in low institutional areas and 1247 observations in high institutional areas.
Firms located in provinces with higher institutional development tend to get more
loans from foreign banks. In areas with lower institutional development, listed
companies get 371.64 million yuan loans on average, from the Big Four, while in
higher institutional development areas they only averaged 167.89 million yuan. These
results are consistent with Cull and Xu (2005) where banks appear to be sensitive to
the institutional environment when allocating credit.

Listed firms located in provinces with higher institutional development have an
average of 19.64 per cent of state ownership, while firms in lower institutional
development provinces have an average of 28.75 per cent. This means that firms
located in areas with lower institutional development have proportionally more state
ownership. Similarly, 23.77 per cent of the observations were in the protected
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industries in provinces with lower institutional development, while the proportion in
provinces with higher institutional development was 31.11 per cent. With regard to the
leverage ratio, there are no significant differences between firms located in higher and
lower institutional provinces.
4.4.2 Modelling bank loan resources in privately controlled firms

As the uni-variate test revealed, SOEs get a lot more loans from the Big Four than
privately controlled firms, or joint stock commercial banks and policy banks, which
are all state-owned banks anyway. While privately controlled firms get significantly
larger loans from foreign banks. To further investigate whether political connections
in privately controlled firms help them with loans from state-owned banks I made a
multi-variate analysis. I used the likelihood of firms‘ access to loans from the Big
Four as the repressor in a Logistic model (Eq. 4.1). The dependant variable Big_four
is defined as, if a firm can access a loan from the Big Four I set 1, otherwise it was 0.
The results of this Logistic regression are shown in Table 4.5.

Big _ Fourit
   1 Politicalit   2 Institutionalit  3 Politicalit * Institutionit   4 P erformanceit 1
 5 ManaOwnershipit 1   6 Leverageit   7 Sizeit 1  8 Pr otectedInduit

(4.1)

 ' ( Industrydummiesi )   ' (Yeardummiesi )   it

The independent variable Political is an abbreviation of political connection which
uses the proxy of the percentage of state ownership. The independent variable
Institutional refers to four different aspects of institutional development, i.e.,
marketization (Market), protection of property rights (PropertyRight), development of
the legal system (LAW), and government intervention (GOV). The results will be
presented respectively. I used three variables to measure the performance, ROA, ROS
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and CFOA. For the sake of brevity I only report the results of ROA in Table 4.5.
Industrydummies refers to dummy variables grouped by CICS industry index;
Yeardummies refers to dummy variables grouped by year.

Table 4.5 reports the Logistic regresses on 811 observations of the likelihood of
privately controlled firms accessing loans from the Big Four with political connection,
institutional and interactive variables, as well as firm specific control variables.
Excluding specification (4) with a negative sign, all the coefficients of political
connections in other specifications were positive and statistically significant at the
convention levels. This result gives sufficient support to Hypothesis 4.2 that political
connectedness has a positive effect on a firms‘ access to loans from state-owned banks.
As an example, in the first regression in Table 4.5 the coefficient of political
connectedness on the access of loans from the Big Four without the interaction of
institutional development is 1.1449 at the 5 per cent significance level.

[Insert Table 4.5 here]

In specification (2), the influence of marketization on accessing loans from the Big
Four is negative at the 5 per cent significance level. In specification (5), the
coefficient of LAW on the Big_Four at -0.0436 is also significant at the 5 per cent
level. Both index values of government intervention and property right protection are
the smaller the better. The influences of GOV and PropertyRight on access to the Big
Four have significantly negative coefficients. This is evidence for Hypothesis 4.3 that
institutional development across areas in China is a quite an essential determinant of
firms‘ access to loans, which is consistent with Li et al. (2008).
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But when the level of institutional development is considered, the influence of
political connectedness on the Big_Four became smaller. For instance, in the second
regression when the influence of political connectedness was joined by marketization,
the coefficient decreased to 0.0018. This is evidence for Hypothesis 4.4 that the
positive effect of political connection on loans from state-owned banks is reduced if
there is any inter-action by the institutional development across different provinces.

The insignificant influence of firm performance on the Big_Four dummy is evidence
that even the revised Law of the People‘s Republic of China on Commercial Banks
encouraged banks to lend to better performed companies, while political connections
and marketization still shed light on the access to loans. The results of all these
specifications also shows that access to loans from the Big Four is associated with
greater leverage ratios and lower asset scales. Firms from protected industry are also
easily to get bank loans from Big Four.
4.4.3 Endogeneity of the type of ownership control

Types of ultimate control do not occur at random but as a rational response to owners
wanting to retain ownership and control within the firm. Hence, estimating the effects
of political connectedness and type of ownership control on bank loans, either by
themselves or by their interaction with institutional development, must be able to
control the endogeneity of the type of ownership control.
I used Heckman‘s (1979) two-stage approach to estimate bank loan models where the
first stage was a Probit model of the probability that a firm is a state-controlled firm.
The second stage consists of Logistic regressions about the effects of both the
predicted control type and institutional development on the access of loans from Big
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Four. The results are shown in Table 4.6.

[Insert Table 4.6 here]
In the first stage the probability of a firms‘ control of ownership is the state, implied
and represented by the variable Pr[SOE]. Pr[SOE] is one of the main independent
variables in the second stage regressions where the overall Pr[SOE]-coefficient on
Big_Four is the sum of the Pr[SOE] coefficient and the interaction coefficient
multiplied by the mean value of the interactive variable. This explains why the
Pr[SOE] is positive in the regressions with the institution interactions, when the
product

of

institution

and

the

interaction

coefficient

is

added

to

the

Pr[SOE]-coefficient, the sum is positive for every specification in our sample, which
shows that the overall Pr[SOE]-coefficient is positive for all of the specifications in
our sample.

For example, as presented in the results of the specification (1) on the second stage in
Table 4.6, the overall Pr[SOE]-coefficient of the influence of Pr[SOE] on the access
of loans from the Big Four is:

1.424+0.093*7.812=2.151.

7.812 is from Panel B of Table 4.3, the mean of Market 7.8119. This above equation
again proves Hypothesis 4.1, the type of ownership control influences firms‘ access to
loans even if the endogeneity of ownership control is controlled. Compared to
privately controlled firms, SOEs have more access to loan from the Big Four. By the
same rule however, the overall marketization-coefficient is significant. These also
prove Hypothesis 4.3. Getting a loan from the Big Four is more common where legal
institutions are weaker and where regional government is more interventionist.
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4.5 Robustness test
4.5.1 Other measurements of firm performance

In the test of Section 4.4 I used the after tax return to calculate the profitability
variables. If operating earnings are calculated before interest payments, the effect of
leverage on the number of earnings may be reduced. So I used operating earnings
(before tax) on equity, i.e. the return on equity (hereafter ROE) as an alternative
variable of profitability. I also used earnings per share (EPS), which is the profitability
variable landing on the market aspect of listed companies. According to my test, there
are no big differences from the ROA, ROS and CFOA adopted before. For concise
purposes these results are not reported. I also used equity ownership of firms‘
controller following Li et al. (2009); the results do not disturb this study‘s conclusion.
For the sake of brevity the results are not reported but can be provided if required.
4.5.2 Other measurement of loan characteristic

I used some other measurements for bank loan characteristics. I used the proportion of
bank loans in total liability, such as the number of loans from the Big Four divided by
Total liability, the number of loans from foreign banks divided by total liability to be
the dependant variable. For the sake of brevity the results are not reported but an
provided if required.
To further distinguish firms‘ loans from state-owned banks and foreign banks, we also
used the sum of loans from the Big Four, joint stock commercial banks, and policy
banks to investigate the determinants of bank loans. The results are not biased from
the results of only using loans from the Big Four.
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4.6 Conclusions

In China, banks as financial intermediaries play a vital role in the national economy.
For the past few years, China‘s banks have maintained soaring momentum due to fast
growth in the economy and lenient monetary policy. However, empirical research in
this field is scarce. China is a country where political factors explicitly and implicitly
permeate corporate management and the national economy. The claim is that in China,
political connections and institutional development across areas abounds, the same as
fundamental factors such as firm size are the important determinants of access to bank
loan.

This study contributes to the current literature at least in the following aspects. First,
although the economic consequences of the type of ownership control are widely
documented by extant literature, whether it can be linked with bank discrimination has
not been proven. I provided such stories that suggest that access to loans by Chinese
listed firms are highly dependent on their type of ownership control. According to the
results of the uni-variate tests, SOEs have more access to loans from the Big Four and
get fewer loans from foreign banks than privately controlled firms. Even if the
endogeneity of the type ownership control is controlled by employing two-stage
regressions, the ultimate type of control is still quite essential in listed firms‘ bank
loan access in the state-owned banking system.

Second, I made a Logistic regression analysis which further supports the influence of
political connections on a firms‘ access to loans from different types of banks. The
empirical evidence strongly supports the fact that firms with more political
connectedness find it easier to access loans from the Big Four and joint stock
commercial banks. My study echoes the conclusions of Dinc (2005) that political
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influences are quite essential to the behaviour of banks in emerging markets.
Third, my research also extends the conclusion that institutions influence firms‘
external financing such as access to loans where state-owned banks dominate the
banking system. Because of the large population and differences in landscape,
resources, culture, economic growth, et al., different areas and provinces have
different institutional development in China. I used four variables to measure
institutional development, the marketization index, government intervention,
protection of property rights, and development of the legal system. I found that access
to loans by enterprises in developing and transitional economies are plagued by the
problem of standard information asymmetry (Bai et al., 2006), and especially by
institutional development. This study also combines the effect of political
connectedness and institutional development in listed firms‘ located provinces. The
political connectedness of listed company‘s plays a quite substantial role in firms‘
access to loans even if they are joined with institutional developments.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP,
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND FIRM VALUE19
5.1 Introduction

The effects of managerial ownership on firm value have been of particular research
interest in corporate finance literature (Denis & McConnell, 2003). Most
commentators concur that managers‘ and shareholders‘ interests are not fully aligned.
The conflict of interest between management and shareholders produces agency
problems that reduce firm value. Thus, an increase of managerial ownership from a
low level helps connect the interests of insiders and shareholders, and leads to better
decision making and higher firm value. However, when the equity owned by
management reaches a certain level, further increase of managerial ownership may
provide managers with sufficient shares to pursue their own benefit without fear of
decreasing firm value. When managerial ownership approaches a considerably high
level, the agency problem can be largely mitigated due to a full alignment of interests
between managers and shareholders. Therefore it is hypothesised that managerial
ownership and firm value as having a non-linear relationship (Morck et al., 1988; Cho,
1998; McConnell & Servaes, 1990).

Most of the cited literature focuses on the relationship between managerial share
holding and firm performance in the developed market. Because of the absence of
essential legal protections and appropriate governance mechanisms, agency problems
in many emerging markets are relatively more severe than those found in developed
markets (La Porta et al., 1998; Wei et al., 2005). Claessens and Djankov (1999)
19

Partial content of this chapter has been accepted by Australasian Accounting and Business Finance
Journal, forthcoming 2011.
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examined the relationship between management equity incentives and firm
performance for 706 Czech firms and found that firm profitability changes in human
capital are quite important in improving corporate performance in transition
economies. Bunkanwanicha et al. (2008) investigated the relationship between debt,
managerial behavior and firm performance in Thailand and Indonesian markets. Their
results highlight the importance of the country-specific institutional settings in
managerial ownership-related agency problems.

The Chinese securities market emerged with the establishment of the Shanghai Stock
Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991. During the first few
years after the markets opened, most listed companies came from state-owned
enterprises; later, many non-state-owned companies were also listed on the market.
Generally, China‘s firms are categorized according to the dominant ownership, for
example, a ―state-owned firm‖ means that the company is dominantly owned by the
state; a ―privately controlled firm‖ is

dominantly owned and run by civilians, rather

than by the central or local government.

One of the unique characteristics of the present Chinese stock market is the rapidly
growing number of privately controlled firms. The listed companies from
non-government background enterprises appeared since 1992 on the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange (the first, Shen Huayuan A, stockcode 000014). An average of only six
privately controlled companies acquired listing qualification each year between 1992
and 1997, but after 1998 the listing of privately controlled companies accelerated. The
proportion of privately controlled companies listed through initial public offerings
(IPOs) was 6.97 per cent by the end of 2003, and this increased to 15.38 per cent by
the end of 2005. Until 2007 the total number of privately controlled listed companies
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was 410, representing 26.53 per cent of a total of 1,545 firms on Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges.20 These data provide evidence that privately controlled
firms may represent the future trend and shape of public firms in the continuing
economic reform of China.

Although managerial ownership is one of the ways that Chinese companies adopted
Western corporate governance, the proportion of managerial ownership is quite small
among state-owned companies. The mean value of managerial ownership in
state-owned companies during 2002–2007 was just 0.0929 per cent, while the mean
value of managerial ownership of privately controlled companies was 9.31 per cent.
Compared to state-owned enterprises, privately controlled firms have much more
autonomy and profit retention, and managers are more often appointed on merit and
ability, rather than political patronage. Most privately controlled firms adopt a
managerial ownership governance approach, and their managers have more power to
choose financial policies compared to those in many other developed countries. This
situation gives managers of privately controlled firms more discretion over funding,
pricing and labor practices (Firth et al., 2006). Thus, my study of the Chinese market
may shed light on this relevant financial issue within a non-Western environment,
thereby providing new, relevant information about how to improve the efficiency of
corporate governance in an emerging, transitional economy.

By using random effect model, this study duplicates the nonlinear relationship
between managerial ownership and firm value described in the research by Morck et
al. (1988) and Cho (1998). However, I also found that the turning points of
managerial ownerships of Chinese privately controlled companies with respect to firm

20

See: http://www.chinareform.org.cn/ (in Chinese).
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value have moved upward. For example, the turning points of companies in developed
countries occurred at five per cent and 25 per cent in Morck et al. (1988) and at
seven per cent and 38 per cent in Cho (1998). In contrast, my regression results show
that they occur at 18 per cent and 64 per cent of managerial ownership when the line
of firm value has turned. I therefore argue that in the Chinese corporate governance
context, managers need more ownership to control the firm for their own benefits, and
then need much more ownership to be motivated to align their own benefit with
shareholders‘ interests. Therefore, the two turning points are greater in Chinese
privately controlled listed companies compared to those in firms of developed
markets.

While managerial ownership drives capital structure as a nonlinear shape, due to
managerial entrenchment (Friend & Lang, 1988; Berger et al. 1997), the directions of
the nonlinear shapes for managerial ownership and firm value, and for managerial
ownership and capital structure, are inversely related. This study also found that the
direct influence of managerial ownership on firm value becomes insignificant when
capital structure is taken into consideration. The results from simultaneous regressions
show that managerial shareholding significantly affects capital structure, which in turn
affects firm value. The results of simultaneous equations also show that capital
structure is endogenously determined as being in equilibrium in Chinese privately
controlled listed companies.

The remaining parts of this chapter are organised as follows. Section 5.2 contains a
literature review about the relationships between managerial ownership, debt policy
and firm value. The hypothesis development on the context of Chinese market is
processed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 explains the sample selection and interprets the
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summary statistics. Section 5.5 provides the empirical specifications and results, and
also discusses the methodology and robustness tests. Section 5.6 concludes this
research.

5.2 Literature review
5.2.1 Managerial ownership and firm value
The effects on value of ownership by management have been of particular interest in
international research (Denis and McConnell, 2003). Managerial ownership can not
only help to connect the benefits of insiders and shareholders, it can also lead to better
decisions and/or higher firm value. However, to some extent the interest of managers
and shareholders are not fully aligned. When the equity owned by insiders has some
value, this increase in managerial ownership may provide managers with more
freedom to pursue their own objectives and result in greater degree of managerial
entrenchment.

A series of papers in the public choice literature argues the relationship between
managerial ownership and firm value. Most research supported the conclusion that
there is a nonlinear relationship between these two proxies. The pioneering work is
from Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), they used piecewise linear regressions to
estimate the relationship between Tobin‘s Q and the shareholdings of the board of
directors for 371 Fortune 500 firms in 1980. They skilfully found a positive
relationship between ownership and Q in the 0 - 5 per cent board ownership range and
beyond 25 per cent, which was dominated by the convergence of interest effect of
management. While there is a negative and less pronounced relation in the 5- 25 per
cent range, in which the entrenchment effect overpasses the convergence of interest
effect.
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Thereafter, McConnell and Servaes (1990) used a regression of Tobin‘s Q and the
fraction of shares owned by corporate insiders for firms in 1976 and 1986 to find their
curvilinear relationship. Short and Keasey (1999), Miguel, Pindado and Torre (2004)
studied the association of management ownership and corporate value using the data
of UK and Spanish and found the similar conclusion respectively. Davies, Hillier and
McColgan (2005) echoed above conclusions but extended the specification of
management holdings from cubic to quintic and found the similar nonlinear
relationship between managerial ownership and firm value.

All of these above research literatures constitute a significant base for the research of
entrenchment and convergence of interest effect that arose from managerial stock
ownership. In a recent study, Faleye (2007) pointed out again that entrenching
management destroy firm value, even insulate market discipline.

But there is a minority of study found that managerial ownership and market valuation
has no relation or no significant relation, as Claessens and Djankov (1998) selected a
cross-section of 706 Czech firms to find that equity holdings by managers appear to
have no effect on corporate performance. However, they do show that firm
performance improves with the appointment of new managers, particularly if they are
chosen by private owners rather than by the government.

Himmelberg, Hubbard and

Palia (1999) used panel data and concluded that changes in managerial ownership do
not affect firm performance. In the end, they pointed out the existing results about
managerial ownership and firm performance are not robust to controls for either
endogenous induced by time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, or observed firm
characteristics and firm fixed effects. Craswell, Taylor, and Saywell (1997)
investigated for 349 publicly traded Australian firms in 1986 and 1989 and
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documented a weak curvilinear relationship between insider ownership and corporate
equity value; the relationship is neither stable over time, nor inconsistent across
different firm-size groups.
5.2.2 Managerial ownership and capital structure

Following of the discussion and definition of managerial entrenchment, entrenched
managers would have discretion over their firms' financial decision makings, while
the managers would make firm-value their maximum choice when the convergence of
interest effect exceeds the entrenchment effect because of better managerial
ownership setting.

The evidence about how managerial behaviour influences financing behaviour
directly and indirectly is just emerging in the end of last century. Zwieble (1996)
opened the research of financing choice when managers are entrenched. He
―developed a model in which managers voluntarily choose debt to credibly constrain
their own future empire-building‖. Novaes (2003) set up a managerial model to
explore how self-interested managers expropriate firm value by using leverage. Wang
(2008)

developed

a

contingent

claims

model

to

explain

the

role

that

shareholder-manager conflicts play in risk choice and financing decisions. An average
managerial entrenchment power of approximately 2.5 per cent of asset value for the
S&P 500 firms was predicted in his model.

But the empirical support for entrenchment rising from managerial ownership
affecting leverage decisions is quite limited. Friend and Lang (1988) contributed us a
test of whether managerial entrenchment induced by insiders‘ equity holding ―at least
in part‖ motivates capital structure decisions on a serious-year basis. Berger, Ofek and
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Yermack (1997) used cross-sectional analysis to find evidence that firm leverage is
affected by the degree of managerial entrenchment and entrenched managers seek to
avoid debt. Brailsford, OIiver and Pua (2002) used evidence from Australia to get a
non-linear relationship between the level of equity owned by insiders and capital
structure measured by the debt-equity ratio, and supported the effects of
convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.

Theoretical arguments and some empirical evidence thus point to the possibility that
managers may choose un-optimal leverage to require self interest because of
entrenchment incentives. These arguments do not, however, resolve whether
entrenched managers tend to take on debt discretion, and an important goal of my
research is to shed light on this issue.
5.2.3 Capital structure and firm value

Corporate governance theory predicts that financial leverage influences agency costs
and thereby affects corporate value. Since the inaugurated literature by Jensen and
Meckling (1976), the relationship between capital structure and firm performance is
always a prevalent issue in each period of finance development.

It is suggested that greater financial leverage could help to mitigate agency costs due
to the threat of acquisition and financial distress, which causes personal losses such as
managerial salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1982;
Williams, 1987) But as Jensen and Meckling (1976) pointed out, the effect of
financial leverage on total agency costs is expected to be non-monotonic. Leverage
increased from a low point produces incentives to managers and effectively reduces
agency costs. When leverage increases to some value which is close to the bankruptcy
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point, further increases in leverage will bring larger agency costs. Increased agency
costs may decrease firm performance. According to the curvilinear relationship
between leverage and agency cost, there might be a non-monotonic effect between
capital structure and firm value.

McConnell and Servaes (1995) investigated equity ownership and the effectiveness of
leverage choice to find the ―two faces‖ relation between firm value and debt. As they
conjectured, corporate value is positively correlated with the level of debt financing
for firms with few growth opportunities; while firm valuation is negatively correlated
with the debt level for those with high growth opportunities.

However, a large number of literatures regarding the determinants of capital structure
consider firm value is an important factor influencing corporate capital structure. So
the mixed results in the previous study confused us and impelled us to determine
whether there is a reverse causation from performance to capital structure.

Berger and Patti (2006) first employed a simultaneous-equation model to research the
possibility of reverse causality from firm value to capital structure in banking industry.
They used profit efficiency as an indicator of firm value and acquired satisfactory
effect which is not only economically significant and statistically significant, but hold
by a number of robustness checks.

According to the above review of present literature, it is easy to find an interesting
relationship among managerial ownership, firm value, and capital structure.

[Insert Figure 5.1 here]

As the review of 5.2.1 and description of figure 5.1, equity held by management has a
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significant influence on firm value which I sign with a solid line, while there are many
studies found insignificant or unrelated connections between managerial ownership
and firm performance, which is signed with a dotted line. Meanwhile, people found
managerial share ownership has an effect on the choice of corporate leverage, as I
presented in 5.2.2. However, the precise relationship between firm performance and
capital structure is complex, and corporate performance often has a co-influential
relationship with debt and equity decision, as I stated in 5.2.3. Therefore, I hope to
resolve the following questions:

What is the relationship between firm value, capital structure, and managerial
ownership?

Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that ownership structure is endogenously
determined in equilibrium, which is consistent with the evidence of Cho (1998). Cho
(1998) gave an indirect support of managerial ownership affects financial decision
which, in turn, influences corporate value. Therefore, this study chose to examine the
relationship between managerial ownership, capital structure, and firm value first, and
I then hope to develop some preliminary groundwork in the area of corporate
governance.

What is the function of the entrenchment effect induced by managerial ownership to
corporate leverage choice and firm performance?

Inside managers and external stockholders are two groups who can influence
decisions concerning the allocation of corporate resources. Entrenchment is where
managers fail to be disciplined by the full range of corporate governance and control
mechanisms, including monitoring by the board, the threat of dismissal or takeover,
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and stock-or compensation-based performance incentives (Berger, Ofek and Yermack,
1997). On the managerial entrenchment perspective, the capital structure decision is
not only determined by internal/external and micro-economic/macro-economic
conditions which impact on the basic concerns of risk and controls, but the goals,
preferences, values, and desires of management are also important inputs to corporate
financing behaviour. This kind of managerial discretion on capital structure would act
as a proxy for agency costs and in the end, impel an effect on firm value.

What is the difference between a developed market and an emerging market from the
above two questions?

Conflicts of interests between management and shareholders, as well as those between
controlling and minority shareholders are always the dominant issue in corporate
governance literature. This literature is largely based on the functioning of firms in
developed markets, while research on this function in undeveloped markets,
especially in some Asian countries, is limited. After examining the relationship
beween firm value, capital structure, and managerial ownership, and the effect of
managerial entrenchment, this study intends to test whether the results from
developed and capitalist markets has a universal relevance in corporations of
emerging and transition markets such as China.

5.3 Hypotheses development

One of the pioneering researches on the relationship between managerial ownership
and firm value is Morck et al. (1988). The authors used piecewise linear regressions to
estimate the relationship between Tobin‘s Q and the shareholdings of the board of
directors for 371 Fortune 500 firms in 1980. They found a positive relationship
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between ownership and Q in the 0–5 per cent board ownership range, and in the range
beyond 25 per cent, which is dominated by the convergence-of-interest effect of
management. They also found a negative and less pronounced relationship in the
5–25 per

cent

range,

where

the

entrenchment

effect

succeeds

the

convergence-of-interest effect. McConnell and Servaes (1990) used regression on
Tobin‘s Q with the fraction of shares owned by corporate insiders for firms between
1976 and 1986, and found a curvilinear relationship between managerial ownership
and firm value. Short & Keasey (1999) and Miguel et al. (2004) studied the
association between management ownership and corporate value using the data of UK
and Spanish firms respectively, and came to a similar conclusion. Davies et al. (2005)
echoes the above investigations, but that work extended the specification of
management holdings from cubic to quintic, and found a similar non-linear
relationship between managerial ownership and firm value.

These examples in the literature constitute the foundation of the research on
entrenchment and convergence-of-interest effect arising from managerial ownership
and firm valuation. However, the literature previously cited largely focuses on the
relationship between managerial share holding and firm value in developed
economies. Debate on whether such a relationship has universal relevance in
corporations within emerging markets still requires further evidence. Several recent
articles studied corporate governance in emerging (or transition economy) markets,
focusing on the relationship between ownership structure and firm value (Claessens &
Djankov, 1999; Lins, 2003; Wei et al., 2005; Bunkanwanicha et al., 2008). These
studies found a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value
in many emerging markets, revealing that management and insiders can certainly
expropriate other shareholders‘ benefits. At low levels of managerial ownership, an
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increase in management equity holding closely aligns with the interests of managers
and shareholders, thereby increasing corporate value. However, at relatively high
levels of managerial ownership, an increase in management equity shareholding
makes management more entrenched and less subject to market discipline, thereby
reducing corporate value (Cho, 1998). When managerial ownership reaches a
considerably high level, the interest between managers and shareholders are fully
aligned. Thus, management there pursues best firm performance and firm value is
increased. Thus I submit the first hypothesis in this study:
H5.1: There is a non-linear ―N‖ shape between managerial ownership and firm
value of Chinese privately controlled firms, which represents the change of the
alignment between managers‘ interests and shareholder‘s wealth, in terms of the
level of managerial ownership.

The issue of how managerial ownership affects corporate value is also important.
Brailsford et al. (2002) argued that corporate managers and external block owners are
two key groups of shareholders who have a powerful influence on the decisions in a
firm‘s resource allocation. Cho (1998) discussed the impact of managerial ownership
on firm value as a product of the way that shareholding motivates management to
make investment decisions for their own or for shareholders‘ benefit, which
consequently affects firm performance.

Leverage choice is another important financial decision in addition to investment
policy. It has various effects on firm value, and has been proven by classical corporate
financial literature (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Ross, 1977; Myers, 1977; Jensen,
1986). Ruan et al. (2009) employed a relatively recent data set that comprised S&P
500 firms. They observed that capital structure can also act as an intermediate variable
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which is affected by managerial ownership, but eventually influences firm value.
Therefore, the following discussion includes another two points that for clarification:
first, the relationship between managerial ownership and capital structure; and second,
the relationship between capital structure and firm value.

The theoretical evidence about how managerial behaviour influences financing
choices has emerged only since the middle of last decade. Zwieble (1996) developed a
model where managers chose debt for their own empire-building. Novaes (2003) set
up a managerial model to explore how self-interested managers expropriate firm value
via the tool of leverage.

The empirical support for entrenchment rising from managerial ownership affecting
leverage decisions is quite limited. Friend and Lang (1988) examined whether
managerial entrenchment induced by insiders‘ equity holding ―at least in part‖
motivates capital structure decisions on a successive-year basis. Berger et al. (1997)
used cross-sectional analysis to find evidence that firm leverage is affected by the
degree of managerial entrenchment and how much entrenched managers seek to avoid
debt. Brailsford et al. (2002) used evidence from Australia to produce a non-linear
relationship between the level of equity stake owned by insiders and capital structure
measured

by

the

debt-to-equity

ratio,

and

supported

the

effects

of

convergence-of-interest and management entrenchment.

When the level of managerial ownership is low, an increase in managerial ownership
aligns the interests of management and shareholders (Brailsford et al., 2002). The
main objective of managers is to maximise shareholders wealth and achieve higher
firm performance by using less debt to avert financial distress. Thus, a negative
relationship exists between managerial ownership and capital structure (Berger et al.,
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1997). As managers can become entrenched with significant voting power and
influence and begin to manipulate the debt ratio to achieve self-interest. For example,
they may increase debt to obtain more cash to make sub-optimum investment
decisions, or build a ―management empire‖. However, when corporate managers hold
a considerable proportion of a firm‘s shares, managers‘ own interests can be aligned
with those of shareholders. The entrenchment effect decreases, resulting in reduced
debt ratio as they seek to reduce bankruptcy risks; or alternatively, the agency-related
benefits from the use of debt are substituted through managerial ownership.

With the rapid development of privately controlled companies and the implementation
of managerial ownership governance in the Chinese market, greater focus is required
on the issue of how managerial behaviour in accordance with shareholder ownership
influences firms‘ financing behaviour. On the basis of theoretical analysis and
empirical evidence from the literature review, I propose the following hypothesis:
H5.2: A non-linear ―inversed N‖ shaped relationship exists between managerial
ownership and capital structure in Chinese privately controlled firms, which
represents the change of the managers‘ incentive motivated by their ownership.

Much of the relevant research indicates that the relationship between managers and
shareholders has the potential to influence financial decision making, which in turn
impacts on firm value (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Short &
Keasey, 1999; Miguel et al., 2004). Corporate insiders in Chinese listed companies
often gain control over a firm by swinging the votes their way, but also through
offering non-pecuniary benefits, such as company-paid consumption, building up a
―management empire‖ and so on. Thus, I argue that agency problems in Chinese
privately controlled listed companies are more severe due to the emerging market
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environment. My third hypothesis is:

H5.3: Managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm
value for Chinese privately controlled firms.

Since the seminal research by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the relationship between
capital structure and firm performance has been a prevalent issue in the financial
literature. Corporate governance theory predicts that financial leverage influences
agency costs and thereby affects corporate value. Some commentators suggest that
greater financial leverage could help to mitigate agency costs via the threat of
acquisition and financial distress (Grossman & Hart, 1982; Williams, 1987). Morck et
al. (1988) found that leverage has a negative — but insignificant — impact on
corporate value, and attribute this to the possibility that managers in highly leveraged
firms might hold a higher than average level of ownership (Davies et al. (2005).
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) interpret the negative association between leverage
and firm value as being due to the relative inflation between now and when
companies issued much of their debt. McConnell and Servaes (1995) investigated
equity ownership and the effectiveness of leverage choice to find a ―two-faced‖
relationship between firm value and debt. They conjecture that corporate value is
positively correlated with the level of debt financing for firms with few growth
opportunities, while firm valuation is negatively correlated with the debt level for
those with high growth opportunities. However, in reality, firms with good growth
opportunities are normal in a fast-growing country such as China (Wu & Yue, 2009).
Chinese privately controlled listed companies can be considered as having more
growth opportunities not only because of their GDP contribution, but also due to the
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high performance output.21 Therefore, a negative relationship should exist between
capital structure and firm value in Chinese privately controlled listed companies, and
thus my fourth hypothesis is:

H5.4: Capital structure negatively affects firm value in Chinese privately
controlled listed companies.

A large block of literature regarding the determinants of capital structure considers
firm value to be an important factor influencing corporate capital structure (Titman
and Wessels, 1988; Ozkan, 2001; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). These mixed results in
previous studies have impelled academics to develop studies to test whether a reverse
causation exists between performance and capital structure which reflects the
endogeneity of capital structure. Berger and Patti (2006) used a simultaneous equation
model to research the possibility of reverse causality from firm value to capital
structure in the banking industry. They used profit efficiency as an indicator of firm
value and acquired satisfactory effect, which is not only economically significant and
statistically significant, but also confirmed by a number of robustness checks. This
study also examined the endogeneity of capital structure when researching managerial
ownership, capital structure, and firm valuation.

5.4 Data and statistics

This study defined privately controlled listed enterprises as companies ultimately
controlled by an individual or a legal person rather than a central or local government,
as compared to the state or a government-related legal person or other type of
21

For example, in every year between 2000 and 2008, privately controlled (both publicly and
non-publicly traded firms) companies‘ gross industrial output was more than 20 per cent of the value of
all Chinese companies‘ outputs. However, the proportion contributed by state-owned enterprises (both
publicly and non-publicly traded firms) made up less than 10 per cent of total output (computed by the
relevant data from http://www.stats.gov.cn/ (in Chinese))
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ownership. Sample selection starts from all the Chinese privately controlled listed
firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between
2002 and 2007. The sample period started from 2002 because 2001 was when Chinese
companies implemented the New Accounting Standards and Policies. The sample
time ends before 2008, which was when the global financial crisis emerged and the
Chinese stock market fell sharply. Therefore the sample period was selected to
mitigate the influences of shifting accounting standards and financial crises.

In 2005 the China Securities Regulatory Commission launched its reform of
non-tradable shares, which influenced the ownership structure of listed firms. This
study investigated the mean percentage of tradable shares in listed companies
increased from 41.53 per cent in 2005 to 47.61 per cent in 2006 to 52.88 per cent in
2007 and 59.01 per cent in 2008. At the same time, the mean managerial ownership in
privately controlled listed firms was almost the same: at 9.88 per cent in 2005,
10.21 per cent in 2006, 10.07 per cent in 2007 and 10.09 per cent in 2008. Therefore I
consider the reform of non-tradable shares from 2005 cannot alter my evidence by
data from 2002 to 2007.
I excluded ST and PT22 firms, firms in financial and insurance industry and firms
with incomplete dataset from my modelling. The final sample consists of 197
privately controlled firms listed between 2002 and 2007; which is an unbalanced
panel dataset with 723 firm-year observations. All the data were extracted from the
CCER (China Centre for Economic Research) database developed by the Beijing
Sinofin Information Service Limited Company. However, I made some necessary
22

Chinese listed firms with financial distress are classified by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) as ―special treatment‖ (ST) or ―particular transfer‖ (PT) firms for the purpose of
protecting investors‘ benefits. If a listed firm has negative profits for two consecutive years, it is
designated as an ST firm. If it continues to achieve losses for one more year, it is designated as a PT
firm. A PT firm is delisted if it cannot turn profitable within another year (Bai et al., 2002).
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enhancements of the data from the annual reports from the Shanghai Stock Exchange
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange websites.

Managerial ownership is articulated in the investigation by Holderness (2003) of US
equity ownership by insiders and block holders, where insiders are defined as the
officers and directors of a firm. Cho (1998) defines ―insider ownership as the fraction
of shares, not including options, held by officers and directors of the board‖ (p. 106).
Davies et al. (2005) takes managerial ownership as having a stake in all board
members‘ shareholdings. Corporate boards have the power to make, or at least ratify,
all important financial policies, and therefore it is plausible that board members with
appropriate stock ownership have the incentive to provide effective monitoring and
oversight of important corporate decisions (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). Therefore, this
study uses the ownership stake of all board members as a proxy of managerial
ownership. I also used the leverage ratio (total debt divided by total asset) as a
measurement of capital structure. Tobin‘s Q defines a ratio of the market value of a
company‘s stock divided by the value of a company‘s equity book value, and can help
to capture whether the value of a firm as an operational business is greater than the
cost of the assets required to generate its cash flow (Hovey et al., 2003). This study
used Tobin‘s Q as a proxy of firm value, following the finance and accounting
literature (see for example, Morck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; 1995;
Hovey et al., 2003; Davies et al., 2005).
Table 5.1 describes managerial ownership, Tobin‘s Q and capital structure for the
sample of 197 privately controlled enterprises listed between 2002 and 2007. The
mean combined ownership of all board members is 9.31 per cent, which is almost
double that of 4.6 per cent among the S&P 500 firms in 2005 (Ruan et al., 2009), but
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still much smaller than the 12.14 per cent of mean insider ownership found in the
Fortune 500 firms in 1991 (Cho, 1998). The Tobin‘s Q values for data between 2002
and 2007 ranges from 0.326 to 10.207, with a mean of 1.413. The leverage ratio
measuring capital structure ranges from zero to as large as 0.953. The mean leverage
ratio is 0.481, which is almost the same as the median of 0.497. The skewing of three
variables shows that both managerial ownership and Tobin‘s Q are right-skewed,
while leverage ratio is skewed negatively. The values of kurtosis indicate that the
distribution of Tobin‘s Q is much steeper than that of the other two variables.

[Insert Table 5.1 here]
Table 5.2 reports the distribution of the number of observations, Tobin‘s Q and
leverage ratio, classified by different ranges of managerial ownership. Here, MANA
indicates the proportion of managerial ownership, which is the stake owned by all
board members. The distribution of firm numbers in the sample is skewed towards
low levels of managerial ownership. In the six years between 2002 and 2007, five
hundred and five out of 723 firm-year observations (comprising 70 per cent of the
sample observations) show that board members have less than five per cent ownership
of the firms. In the second range of 5–15 per cent of ownership, 54 firm-year
observations are evident, which is a small proportion — about seven per cent of the
sample. The left-hand observations are allocated evenly within the ranges of
15–25 per cent, 25–35 per cent and 35–45 per cent of stock ownership; each range
comprises approximately six per cent of the total observations. Twenty-five firm-year
observations have a managerial ownership of 45–55 per cent. However, the
managerial holdings do span a wide range in the remaining 20 observations, which
have managerial ownership over 55 per cent. This distribution of observations is
102

consistent with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck et al. (1988),
―suggesting the prevalence of significant management ownership‖ (Cho, 1998, pp.
108).

[Insert Table 5.2 here]

The data in Table 5.2 also suggests that a non-linear relationship exists between levels
of managerial ownership and Tobin‘s Q. The mean Tobin‘s Q increases from 1.332 in
the first range of managerial ownership to 1.473 in the second range of managerial
ownership, until it reaches 1.818, when managerial ownership is between 25–35 per
cent. The mean Tobin‘s Q falls to 1.308 in the range of 35–45 per cent of managerial
ownership, until it reaches 1.096 in the range when managerial ownership is over
55 per cent. This distribution constitutes an accurate, non-monotonic result from the
descriptive statistics; but the shape of Tobin‘s Q profile just has one turning point,
rather than two as I proposed in H1. The insufficiency of observations in the last of
range of managerial ownership (over 55 per cent) might be the main reason for this
result.

The association between the levels of equity stake owned by board members and
capital structure measured by leverage ratio is also non-monotonic, as shown in Table
5.2. At a low level of managerial ownership below five per cent, the mean leverage
ratio is 0.514. The leverage ratios decreased to 0.413 and 0.397 in the following two
ranges of managerial ownership. The leverage ratio then increases to 0.472 in the
range 25–35 per cent of managerial ownership. Thereafter, the leverage ratio fell
again to 0.405, which is between 35–45 per cent managerial ownership. Interestingly,
the mean leverage ratio repeats another increase to 0.465 and a decrease to 0.374 once
each, which might be due to the finer classification used in my sample. At the very
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least, a cubic curve exists between managerial ownership and leverage ratio, as
derived from the results of the summary statistics in Table 2.

5.5 Model specifications and results

In this section I explored the relationship between managerial ownership and firm
value, and the relationship between managerial ownership and capital structure by
using two regression models. Then I used simultaneous equations to investigate the
intermediate role of capital structure and conducted some robustness tests in the end.
5.5.1 Managerial ownership and firm value
In order to model the relationship between Tobin‘s Q and managerial ownership and
determine two extremum turning points of managerial ownership when Tobin‘s Q
changes directions, I specify a cubic function23 as follows:
Q = a + 1 MANA +  2 MANA2 +  3 MANA3 + control variables + ε (5.1)
Where MANA stands for the proportion of managers‘ stock ownership; Q stands for
Tobin‘s Q measuring firm value. Control variables24 include leverage ratio and firm
size, which are often the most important factors for Tobin‘s Q (Hovey et al., 2003;
Firth et al., 2006).

23

Regarding the number of turning points of managerial ownership to firm value, Morck et al. (1988)
found two points; McConnell and Servaes (1990) modelled it as a quadratic function, which had only
one turning point; Cho (1998) and Miguel et al. (2004) found two points, following Morck et al. (1988);
while Davies et al. (2005) used a quintic equation and found four turning points. This paper does not
believe that the number of points matter; rather, that the most important thing is how to explain the
significance of each turning point. After considering the theoretical predictions and results of the
descriptive statistics employed in this study, we decided to use a cubic model, which means using two
extremum points and three intervals of managerial share ownership, as we predicted.
24

Following Cho (1998), we do not put a lot of effort on control variables in Eq.5.1 and 5.2 in this
study. The calculation for turning points shown next does not consider the influence of control
variables following Morck et al. (1988), Cho (1998) etc.
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The regression results with and without control variables between managerial
ownership and Tobin‘s Q are in Table 5.3. After the insignificant result of the
Hausman test, I adopted the period random effect model with unbalanced panel data
of my sample.

[Insert Table 5.3 here]

Table 5.3 shows the results of regressions of managerial ownership and other firm
characteristics on Tobin‘s Q. The intercept coefficients, which are the estimation of
Tobin‘s Q in firms without managerial holdings, are 1.23 and 2.97 in the equations
with and without control variables. Each coefficient concerning managerial ownership
is of the expected sign, but the significance is not as satisfactory as found in other
research (for example, Morck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Cho, 1998;
Himmelberg et al., 1999; Davies et al., 2005). MANA is significant at five per cent
levels in the equations with and without control variables. The squared managerial
ownership (MANA2) has a significant negative effect on Tobin‘s Q at the 10 per cent
level in the equation without control variables, but the coefficient is not significant in
the equation with control variables. The R2 is relatively larger in the equation with
control variables compared to that in the equation without control variables. These R
squares are similar to those found in other relevant papers (for example, McConnell &
Servaes, 1990; Cho, 1998; Davies et al., 2005). I then calculated turning points by
deriving Tobin‘s Q with respect to managerial ownership. The two turning points of
equation without control variables are:

MANA = 17.5 per cent

MANA = 64.3 per cent
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As I predicted, Tobin‘s Q first increases when managerial ownership is less than
17.5 per cent; it then declines until managerial shareholding reaches 64.3 per cent.
Finally, Tobin‘s Q rises again slightly as managerial ownership reached over 64.3 per
cent. This result validates Hypothesis 5.1.

As an N shape, this non-linear tendency is consistent with the results of Morck et al.
(1988) and Cho (1998); however, the turning points are different. Morck et al. (1988)
used a piecewise regression on a sample of Fortune 500 firms and found two extreme
values of managerial ownership at five and 25 per cent. Cho (1998) also used a grid
searching technology with a sample of Fortune 500 firms and found turning points of
managerial ownership at seven and 38 per cent. Miguel et al. (2004) used unbalanced
panel data of 135 Spanish companies and found two turning points at 35 and 70 per
cent.

The sample differences in firms and study period may explain the variation in the
pairs of turning points. However, I suggest that the sample differences in market
background are the main explanations for the differing turning points. Under the
developed market institution, the studies by Morck et al. (1988), Cho (1998) and
Davies et al. (2005) presented evidence from the American market. In the Chinese
market, and because of weak legal protection, management must have a larger
ownership, in order to have a convergence-of-interest effect with other shareholders.
Also, the sample time period in this study is closer to the present situation compared
to studies of American companies. Therefore, I argue that due to the evolution of
corporate governances and regulations, both in developed and emerging markets, the
thresholds of managerial ownership for either self-interested decision making or
interest alignment between managers and shareholders, have moved up. In other
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words, managers need more ownership to obtain sufficient voting power to make
decisions that are in their own interests (Ruan et al., 2009), and therefore, more
managerial ownership is required for a full interest alignment between managers and
shareholders in Chinese privately controlled listed firms.
5.5.2 Managerial ownership and capital structure

Based on the analysis of the theoretical predictions, I here examine the relationship
between managerial ownership and capital structure. For the convenience of a further
comparison, and according to the summary description in Table 5.2, I present Model
5.2 below by modifying Model 5.1. According to the insignificant result of Hausman
test, I adopt the random effect model, which is the same as I did in Model 5.1. The
regression results are in Table 5.4.
CS = a + 1 MANA +  2 MANA2 +  3 MANA3 +Control variables +ε

(5.2)

[Insert Table 5.4 here]

In Model 5.2 and Table 5.4, MANA stands for the proportion of managerial ownership,
CS stands for capital structure, which is defined as total debt divided by total assets.
Control variables include ownership concentration (CR5) and return on assets (ROA).
The ownership is highly concentrated in Chinese listed companies (Hovey et al., 2003;
Huang & Song, 2006; Firth et al., 2006). I use the sum of squared ownership hold by
the largest five shareholders to measure the extent of ownership concentration. Return
on asset is often the quite important determinant on capital structure of Chinese listed
companies (Chen, 2004; Huang & Song, 2006).

The results in Table 5.4 show that all the coefficients are of the expected signs and
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statistically significant at the one per cent level. I then calculated points of extremum
and intersection via derivation. The two turning points of equations without control
variables are:

MANA = 17.8 per cent

MANA = 46.4 per cent

The results of Model 5.2 show negative relationships between managerial ownership
and leverage ratios when managerial ownership is in the range from 0–17.8 per cent
or beyond 46.4 per cent; while a positive relationship between managerial ownership
and leverage ratios exists when managerial ownership is in the range 17.8–46.4 per
cent. This result validates my predictions and Hypothesis 5.2, and simultaneously
supplements the evidence from Brailsford et al. (2002), in which a nonlinear inverted
U-shaped relationship exists between the level of managerial ownership and leverage
ratios in top 500 companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.

The regression results of Models 5.1 and 5.2 and the estimated turning points are
shown in Figure 5.1. The track generated by Model 5.1 displays a nonlinear
relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin‘s Q, indicating that firm value
increases as managerial ownership rises from zero to 18 per cent of P1 at point A.
Firm value then falls as board ownership increases, until another value of 64 per cent
of P3 at point D is reached. Finally, firm value increases slightly again for managerial
ownership levels above 64 per cent. The relationship between capital structure and
managerial ownership is also non-monotonic, as described by the track generated by
Model 5.2. The value of the leverage ratio measuring capital structure decreases to
point B in managerial ownership of less than 18 per cent. The value of debt ratio then
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increases to point C, until managerial shareholding reaches point P2, which occurs at
46 per cent of managerial ownership. The value of leverage goes down again when
the stake of managerial ownership is over 46 per cent. The coincidence of 64 per cent
and 46 per cent of managerial ownership may be due to the limited sample of
observations in the ranges over 45 per cent compared to the multitude of sample
observations in the ranges with less managerial ownership. Conversely, however, this
may reflect the institutional environment and corporate governance background China,
where the relationship between managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value
is more complicated than in developed markets.

[Insert Figure 5.2 here]

Figure 5.2 shows the three levels of managerial ownership. At a low level (less than
18 per cent), external discipline and internal controls or incentives dominate
managers‘ behavior (Fama, 1980; Davies et al., 2005). Managerial labor markets
operate on the principal that poorly performing managers can be removed and
appropriately disciplined (Davies et al., 2005). Managers there have sufficient
incentive to adopt financial policies, such as debt decisions that avert financial distress
and achieve better firm performance. As the level of managerial equity ownership
rises beyond a certain level (approximately 18 per cent), managerial objectives begin
to be entrenched. Internal mentoring and external discipline becomes weak. This lack
of disciplinary control over management may strengthen managers‘ ability to pursue
their own benefits at the cost of decreasing firm value by using suboptimal corporate
policies. As the level of managerial ownership reaches a considerably high value (in
this study, at 46 and 64 per cent), managers align their interests with those of other
owners, which leads to value maximization management behavior, as predicted by
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Jensen and Meckling (1976), for example, when managers use less debt to avoid
being purchased or increase financial risk.

The above results of regressions validate Hypothesis 5.1 and 5.2. Hypothesis 5.3
conjectures that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects
firm value in Chinese privately controlled listed firms. However, I could not confirm
this transmitting association without a stricter test, so I estimated a simultaneous
equations model to test this relationship.
5.5.3 Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value
To capture potential multiple relationships between managerial ownership, capital
structure and firm performance, I applied a set of simultaneous equations using the
three-stage least square method.

Managerial ownership = f (firm value, capital structure, ROA)

(5.3)

Firm value = g (managerial ownership, capital structure, size)

(5.4)

Capital structure = h (managerial ownership, firm value, ROA, CR5)

(5.5)

I estimated the simultaneous equations with control variables. ROA is return on assets
calculated as net income divided by the total assets at the year end. CR5 is the
ownership of top five large shareholders, which is a proxy of ownership concentration.
Size is the logarithm of total assets.

The selection of control variables were mainly based on the recent body of literature
concerning corporate governance issues (Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Hovey et al.,
2003; Huang & Song, 2006; Firth et al., 2006). This study also advanced dummy
variables representing the industry effect, based on both China Securities Regulatory
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Commission (CSRC) industry codes and Global Industry Classification Standard
(GICS) industry codes, but the coefficients of industry variables are not significant;
and therefore, for simplification purposes, I eliminated them in the final results.

Table 5.5 reports the regression results of the simultaneous equations. I use lagged
variables (managerial ownership t-1, Tobin‘s Q t-1, leverage ratio t-1) and all of control
variables as instrument variables. According to the results for the multiple
relationships between managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value, as Cho
(1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) document, once endogeneity is controlled, the
perceived impact of managerial ownership on corporate value disappears. The results
of the firm performance equation of Model 5.4 in Table 5.5 suggests that the levels of
managerial shareholding (MANA, MANA2 and MANA3) do not influence firm value
significantly, which contrasts with the regression results of Model 5.1. This evidence
reflects the complicated causality between firm value and managerial ownership:
other variables may act as intermediates to assist managerial ownership, in turn
imposing effects on firm performance. Capital structure measured by debt ratio has a
negative influence on firm value, as described by the results of Equation 5.4; this
proves Hypothesis 5.3 and supports the objective condition for capital structure being
the intermediate variable between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial
ownership also has significant effects on capital structure, as shown in the result of
capital structure Equation 5.5 in the last column of Table 5.5. Therefore, these results
address the influence of managerial shareholding on capital structure, which in turn
affects firm value.

[Insert Table 5.5 here]

The results of Equation 5.3 in Table 5.5 also suggest that the ownership of board
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directors is significantly affected by Tobin‘s Q: that managerial ownership is
endogenously determined, (which is consistent with the results found by Cho, 1998,
Kole, 1995 and Davies et al., 2005, but different from that in Demsetz & Villalonga,
2001). In Equation 5.3, ROA has an insignificant coefficient, which suggests that
earnings have a low influence on managerial ownership. Cho (1998) and Davies et al.
(2005) used volatility to measure firm performance in their managerial ownership
equations and obtained similar results. Furthermore, the negative and significant
coefficient of capital structure in Model 5.3 suggests that board directors in firms with
lower debt hold a larger fraction of their firm‘s shares.

The second column of Table 5.5 represents the coefficients of Model 5.4. Relevantly,
asset size is quite a significant determination of firm performance. Therefore, I also
used company size measured by logarithm of assets as a control variable in Equation
5.4. As shown in Table 5.5, a negative function emerges regarding company size to
firm value, which echoes the findings of McConnell and Servaes (1990), Miguel et al.
(2004), and Berger and Patti (2006), but the coefficient is insignificant, which is
different from McConnell and Servaes (1995).

The significant negative coefficient of leverage ratio in Equation 5.4 warrants more
discussion. Leverage is one way of imposing external discipline on management and,
if effective, leads to increased corporate value. However, as Huang and Song (2006)
explain, a higher Tobin‘s Q means good growth opportunity for Chinese firms. Firms
with brighter growth opportunities tend to have lower leverage and aim to avert the
wealth transfer from shareholders to creditors. In this study, the negative association
between leverage ratio and Tobin‘s Q also meets the requirement of being an
intermediate variable of managerial ownership on firm performance. Thus, I can take
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this negative relationship as evidence of Hypothesis 5.4.
ROA measures a firm‘s efficiency in generating profits from every dollar of assets,
and shows how well a company uses investment dollars to generate earnings growth.
ROA was found to be negative and significant related to the level of debt ratio for the
results of Model 5.5. Noticeably, some of the literature uses the accounting profit rate
to measure firm performance, such as ROE in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and
profitability in Chaessens and Djankov (1999). However, some critics argue that the
accounting profit rate is backward-looking and Tobin‘s Q is forward-looking
(Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). In this study the Tobin‘s Q influence on debt ratio is as
significant as ROA (-0.059 of Tobin‘s Q and -0.046 of ROA on debt ratio). Therefore,
both Tobin‘s Q and ROA do have a similar relationship with capital structure in
Chinese privately controlled firms.

I also viewed another important result from the simultaneous equations as being the
endogenous character of capital structure. The significant influence from firm
performance variables on capital structure is consistent with the results of Titman and
Wessels (1988), Ozkan (2001) and others. Taken together, the capital structure is an
intermediate variable of influence between managerial ownership and firm value, but
is also an endogenous variable which should not be neglected in Chinese privately
controlled companies.
5.5.4 Robustness test

This section uses piecewise regression with simultaneous equations to explore
whether considering different ranges of managerial ownership provides results with a
significant difference from those estimated via Models 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. The models
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are as follows and the estimations are reported in Table 5.6.

Managerial ownership = f (firm value, capital structure, ROA)

(5.6)

Firm value = g (piecewise managerial ownership, capital structure, size)

(5.7)

Capital structure = h (piecewise managerial ownership, firm value, ROA, CR5) (5.8)

The piecewise managerial ownership (MANA) in firm value (Model 5.7) and capital
structure (Model 5.8) are defined by the results of turning points (18 per cent, 64 per
cent) from Equation 5.1 and turning points (18 per cent, 46 per cent) from Equation
5.2, respectively:

MANA ≤ 18% = managerial ownership if managerial ownership < 0.18,
= 0.18 if managerial ownership of firm ≥0.18.

MANA 18–64% = 0 if managerial ownership < 0.18,
= managerial ownership −0.18 if 0.18 ≤ managerial ownership < 0.64,
= 0.64 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.64.

MANA > 64% = 0 if managerial ownership of firm < 0.64,
= managerial ownership −0.64 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.64.

MANA 18–64% = 0 if managerial ownership < 0.18,
= managerial ownership −0.18 if 0.18 ≤ managerial ownership < 0.46,
= 0.46 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.46.
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MANA > 46% = 0 if managerial ownership of firm < 0.46,
= managerial ownership −0.46 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.46.

[Insert Table 5.6 here]

In Table 5.6, two piecewise variables of managerial ownership (MANA
MANA

18–64%)

≤ 18%

and

in Equation 5.7 remain insignificant influences on firm performance,

which are consistent with the nonexistence of direct effect from managerial ownership
on firm performance shown in Table 5.5. Concerning the results of Model 5.8,
managerial ownership up to 18 per cent influences capital structure insignificantly.
While managerial ownership in the range 18–46 per cent, and over 46 per cent have
significant effects on capital structure at the five per cent level. Most control variables
have similar coefficients signs and significance to the results of Models 5.3, 5.4 and
5.5, including firm size in Model 5.7. The results of robustness test echo Hypotheses
5.3 and 5.4.

5.6 Conclusions

This paper extends the previous research (Morck et al., 1988; Cho, 1998; Short &
Keasey, 1999; Davies et al., 2005) from at least two aspects. First, I introduced capital
structure as an intermediate variable between managerial ownership and corporate
value. By using simultaneous equations, I detected the inter-relationship between
managerial ownership, firm value and capital structure and found the intermediate
role of capital structure. Second, I extended the research from developed markets to
the emerging Chinese market — a necessary development on previous studies.

Through an examination of a sample of 197 privately controlled listed firms between
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2002 and 2007, I found a non-linear relationship between Tobin‘s Q and the fraction
of shares owned by boards of directors, which is consistent with the results of Morck
et al. (1988), Cho (1998), Short and Keasey (1999) and Miguel et al. (2004). Tobin‘s
Q, which is a proxy of firm performance, increases as managerial ownership grows
until it reaches 18 per cent. Thereafter, Tobin‘s Q declines with the increase in
managerial ownership until it reaches 64 per cent. Tobin‘s Q rose again slightly as
managerial ownership increased from 64 per cent. These two turning points are higher
than those detected by Morck et al. (1988) and Cho (1998), using earlier period data
from the Fortune 500. I argue that, due to the evolution of corporate governance and
changes of regulation in China‘s market environment, the managerial control for
pursuing self-interest and alignment of interests between managers and other
shareholders can only be approached by management holding more ownership than is
the case in other developed countries.

The association between managerial ownership and capital structure is also
non-monotonic. A negative relationship exists between managerial ownership and
leverage ratios when managerial ownership is below 18 per cent or higher than 46 per
cent. Within the managerial ownership range 18–46 per cent, the leverage ratio
increases as managerial ownership increases.

At a low level of managerial ownership (less than 18 per cent for Chinese privately
controlled listed companies), managers‘ behaviour is dominated by external discipline
and internal controls. For example, managers can be removed because of poor
performance. Therefore there are sufficient incentives for managers to adopt financial
policies, such as debt decisions that avert financial distress and achieve better firm
performance. As the level of managerial equity ownership rises beyond a certain level
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(approximately 18 per cent), managerial objectives begin to be entrenched. Internal
mentoring and external discipline become weak. This lack of disciplinary control over
management may strengthen managers‘ ability to pursue their own benefits at the cost
of decreasing firm value by using sub-optimal corporate policies. As the level of
managerial ownership reached a considerably high value (in this study, at 46 and
64 per cent), managers aligned their interests with those of other shareholders, for
example, to use less debt in order to avoid the firm being purchased.

By using a simultaneous equation regression, I found that managerial ownership does
not influence firm value significantly when capital structure is added into the equation.
Managerial ownership significantly affects capital structure, and capital structure
directly affects corporate performance. These results address the influence of
managerial shareholding on capital structure, which in turn affects firm value.
Furthermore, capital structure is endogenously determined by both firm value and
managerial ownership in Chinese privately controlled listed companies between 2002
and 2007. This inspires us to focus on the financing issue of China‘s privately
controlled firms.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
According to the pecking order hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984), firm ﬁnancing
adheres to the following sequence, internal capital, debt, and then external equity.
Firms that perform well initially tend to raise funds from internal profits, a fact proven
by the significantly negative association between profitability variables and leverage
ratio. Alternatively, leverage is one way of imposing external discipline on
management, and if it is effective, will increase corporate value (Davies, Hillier and
McColgan, 2005).

Despite having an imperfect legal system and an under developed financial market,
China‘s economy has still been growing at high speed (Allen et al., 2005; Zheng and
Zhu, 2009). However, research on developing nations and the financial growth nexus
strongly suggests that these high growth rates cannot continue indefinitely without
significant reform of the banking system and the legal/financial infrastructure (Berger
et al., 2009). Loan financing is the predominant source of external funds for China‘s
corporations, but the Chinese debt market is embodied with an undeveloped corporate
bond market and state controlled banks that dominate the banking sector.

This study chose the issue of financing decisions in Chinese listed companies with the
expectation of developing some preliminary groundwork in the area of corporate
finance.

6.1 State-owned bank lending environment

Financing resources in emerging markets are usually limited to demand and a lending
system like the banking sector is often manipulated by the government. This
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state-owned lending environment is discriminatory in that state-owned commercial
banks prefer to lend funds to State-owned Enterprises. However, private entrepreneurs
are playing a key role in the emerging economics of China even though the private
sector has apparently been hampered by the state-owned bank lending environment.

In light of my empirical results in Chapter 3, the type of ownership control is quite an
important factor in determining the structure of debt maturity of listed companies.
Firms controlled by the government have larger leverage ratios and have more access
to long-term debt and acquire less short-term debt. But firms controlled by individuals,
have a much lower access to long-term debt so short-term debt is an economically
important source of financing for them.

With regard to the main resources of firm debts, I further investigated their detailed
construction, that is, bank loan decisions, because the bond market is quite thin and
bank loans represent almost all corporate debt financing. The results revealed that
access to bank loans by Chinese listed firms have been highly dependent on their
political connections, but less dependent on their selection of risk and return. The
empirical evidence strongly supports the evidence that firms with political
connections are easily able to access bank loans from the Big Four and other
state-owned commercial banks.
6.2 Firms’ political connection and regions’ institutional development

Political connections in China are notorious for helping some firms access favours
from the state, such as privileged treatment, protection in market competition, and
political rent in the allocation of resources. The findings of this study reflect the
importance of political connection in these aspects. This study used the state
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ownership of privately controlled listed companies to measure the level of political
connectedness. In Chapter 4, the empirical evidence strongly supports privately
controlled firms with larger political connectedness having easy access to loans from
the Big Four banks. However, the influence of political connectedness is still
connected by the institutional development of where in the provinces these firms are
located.

Because of its broad territories and historically uneven distribution of wealth, China is
currently confronted with various levels of institutional development across different
provinces. In Chapter 3 I found institutional development to be one of the key factors
influencing access by listed companies to long-term loans. In Chapter 4 I investigated
the function of institutional development from four dimensions, the marketization
index, government intervention, protection of property rights and legal development
where the marketization index is a combination of other institutional profiles. The
empirical evidence supports the institutional influence of Chinese firms‘ external
financing through access to loans from state-owned banks.

6.3 Intermediate role of leverage ratio

Leverage choice is an important financial decision which has various effects on firm
value. Entrenched managers would have discretion over their firms' financing
decisions, but they would only choose to maximise firm-value when the convergence
of interest exceeded the entrenchment effect because the managerial ownership setting
was better. Modigliani and Miller (1963) noted that high levels of debt leads to greater
corporate value because of the effect of valuable tax shields. This was proved by Ross
(1977) and Myers (1977) with respect to a signalling hypothesis and Jensen‘s (1986)
free cash flow hypothesis. So leverage can be regarded as one way of imposing
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external discipline on management and if it is effective, will increase corporate value
(Davies, Hillier and McColgan, 2005).

This paper expands on previous research by extending the intermediary financial
decision from investment to leverage ratio and discovered a new path whereby
managerial ownership impacts on firm value. The evidence reflects the complicated
causality between firm value and managerial ownership, although other variables may
act as intermediaries to assist managerial ownership, which in turn imposes effects on
firm performance. Capital structure measured by the debt ratio has a negative
influence on firm value, which supports the prediction that capital structure is an
intermediate variable between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial
ownership also has a significant effect on capital structure, and these results address
the influence of managerial shareholding on leverage ratio, which in turn affects firm
value.

6.4 Effect of managerial ownership

The ultimate effect of managerial share ownership on firm value depends on the
trade-off between the interest convergence and entrenchment effects (Denis and
McConnell, 2003). According to these two effects, equity held by managers could
motivate them to make financial decisions based on their entrenched or aligned
interests which may well raise or lower firm value. Cho (1998) used a cross section of
Fortune 500 manufacturing firms in 1991 to explore the relationship among
ownership structure, investment, and corporate value. He found that insider share
ownership affects investment, which in turn, influences corporate value. However,
literature regarding the effect that managerial behaviour and shareholder ownership
has on financial policies is limited, including this paper.
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I hypothesised that insider ownership would influence the choice of debt because of
managerial entrenchment and Interest Convergence. In Chapter 5 I used China‘s
privately controlled firms as samples and found a non-linear relationship between
managerial ownership and leverage ratio. The empirical results show the three levels
of managerial ownership. At a low level (less than 18 per cent), external discipline
and internal controls dominate managers‘ behaviour (Fama, 1980; Davies et al., 2005).
Managerial labor markets operate on the principal that poorly performing managers
can be removed and appropriately disciplined (Davies et al., 2005). Managers there
have sufficient incentive to adopt financial policies such as debt decisions, to avert
financial distress and achieve better firm performance. As the level of equity
ownership rises beyond a certain level (approximately 18 per cent), managerial
objectives begin to be entrenched. Internal mentoring and external discipline become
weak. This lack of disciplinary control over management may strengthen managers‘
ability to pursue their own interests at the cost of decreasing firm value by using
sub-optimal corporate policies. As the level of managerial ownership reaches a
considerably high value (in this study, at 46 and 64 per cent), managers align their
interests with those of other owners, which leads to value maximisation management
behaviour, as predicted by Jensen and Meckling (1976).

I summarize the research questions and the hypotheses addressing these questions, as
well as the equations/ models responding to the hypotheses in Table 6.1.

[Insert Table 6.1 here]

6.5 Policy implications

The empirical results and analytical solutions in this study can be possible reference
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for the policy maker in further economic reform. First, the introduction of joint-stock
banks, city banks and foreign banks has brought competition to China‘s banking
industry. Accordingly state-owned banks become to take important concern with
firms‘ profitability in offering loans. However, due to the historical links between the
state-owned banks and state-owned enterprise, the state-owned banks still use double
criteria in making loan decisions to state-owned enterprises and non state-owned
enterprises. The discriminated policy is either an obstacle for the companies to reach
optimal capital structure or an impediment for the state-owned banks to maximize
competition power. Thus, the state-owned banks should give up the double criteria
while the movement maintains a competition environment by further opening the
financial market.

Second, this study gives a new perspective to corporate governance and financing
decisions concerning institutional development and political economy in Chinese
listed firms. The investigation about the debt maturity decisions in the listed
companies also found that political connections play critical roles in firms‘ financing
decisions. State-owned enterprises get larger access of long-term debt. Without
support from the government, privately controlled firms mainly use short-term debt in
their financing constitutions. Because of political intervention, overall the market is
not economically efficient and optimal. These above findings reflect the urgency of
state ownership reform in the enterprises and the necessity of future reform of China‘s
banking sector.

Third, this study investigates the function of managerial ownership in mitigating
agency problem in Chinese listed companies. Although there are not a lot of Chinese
listed firms incentive management by offering share ownership, firms adopted
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managerial ownership are

found a nonlinear relationship between managerial

ownership and firm value. The conclusions provide some clues to professionals and
practitioners through such policy implications as developing managerial market in the
economy, reforming ownership structure and mitigating government intervention in
the enterprises etc.

6.6 Limitations and prospects for future research

There are still some limitations in my studies. First, regarding the detailed
characteristics of firms‘ debt, I did not explore the type of credit used with each loan.
Second, because of a shortage of data, the interest rates for each loan in this study
were not considered. Third, this research only focussed on the ―first level‖ agency
issue in Chinese listed companies without concerning ―second level‖ ones regarding
the conflict of interest between minority investors and controlling shareholders. An
ex-empirical test should be carried out because of this. Fourth, in newer, faster
growing firms, more and more factors probably play a more important signalling or
compensatory role in their financing decisions than they did before. For instance,
most Chinese listed firms are in their life cycle of growth, so the results of an
empirical examination would be more convincing if the type of growth cycle could be
considered.

However, I believe that any research into the financing decisions of Chinese listed
companies has more broad and interesting aspects that need further investigation. In
the future it could be extended by the type of credit loans, the level of risk, and the
match between risk and return of loans. Regarding the intermediate role of leverage
ratio, some other financial ratios may act as an intermediary between managerial
ownership and firm valuation in real world financial practices. This could also favour
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further research interests.
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Tables
Table 2.1 Summary of banks non-performing loans and assets in 2006
Year-end
Non-performing
loan ratio

Bank Name

Total Loans Total Assets
(billion yuan) (billion yuan)

Policy banks
CHINA DEVELOPMENT BANK

0.72

1990

2310

THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF CHINA

3.47

229

258

7.65

875

933

4.04

2340

5330

3.29

2800

5450

3.79

3530

7510

23.43

3100

5340

INDUSTRIAL BANK CO., LTD.

1.53

318

618

BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS CO., LTD.

2.01

910

1720

1.83

448

689

SHENZHEN DEVELOPMENT BANK CO., LTD.

7.98

175

261

CHINA MINSHENG BANKING CO., LTD.

1.23

441

700

CHINA MERCHANTS BANK CO., LTD.

2.12

549

934

HUAXIA BANK CO., LTD.

2.73

254

445

BANK OF SHANGHAI CO., LTD.

3.48

125

270

CHINA EVERBRIGHT BANK CO., LTD.

7.58

334

593

2.91

73.4

136

5.8

205

374

81.06

18.7

32.6

4.05

13.3

22.4

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF
CHINA
Big Four (State-owned commercial banks)
BANK OF CHINA LTD.
CHINA
CONSTRUCTION
BANK
CORPORATION
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF
CHINA CO., LTD.
AGRICULTURAL BANK OF CHINA
Joint stock commercial banks

SHANGHAI PUDONG DEVELOPMENT BANK
CO., LTD.

SHANGHAI RURAL COMMERCIAL BANK
CO., LTD.
GUANGDONG
DEVELOPMENT
BANK
CO.,LTD.
Urban commercial bank
CHONGQING COMMERCIAL BANK CO.,LTD.
others
NINGBO YINZHOU RURAL COOPERATIVE
BANK

Note: This is the summary of the non-performing loan ratio of banks and banks‘ loan amount and asset
scale in 2006. Data are sort out according to raw data in CSMAR database: bank information.xlx.
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Table 3.1 Definition of main variables
Variables

Measurement
Dependant Variables

Long term debt dummy
(LTD dummy)

equal to one if the firm has long-term liabilities due in more
than one year in a specific year, and zero otherwise

Short term debt ratio (STD)

(Short-Term Borrowings+ Non-Current Liabilities Due
within One Year)/ total liabilities

Leverage ratio (LEV)

total debtt/total assett
Independent and Control Variables

Ultimate controller (STATE)

1 if the company’s ultimate controlling shareholder is the
State in year 2001 to 2008; 0 if its legal or nature person
without government involvement in year 2001 to 2008.

Profitability:
ROA

Operating earnings /average book value of total assets

ROS

Operating earnings /net sales

CFOA

Operating cash flows /average book value of total assets

Financial risk (PreLEV)

total debtt-1/total assett-1

Managerial ownership (MANA)

Ownership stake of all top managers including board
members, supervisors and senior executives

Growth (Q)

Tobin’s Q, market value of assets /book value of total assets

Tax shield effects (DEPR)

Depreciation/total asset

Asset structure (TANG)

(Fixed asset + inventories)/total asset

Institution (MARK)

Marketization Index developed by Fan et al. (2010)

SIZE

Logarithm of total asset

Non-tradable reform (Reform)

1 if the year is 2006, 2007, 2008; 0 otherwise.

YEAR

Dummy variables grouped by year.

INDUSTRY

Dummy variables grouped by GICS industry index. Indus1
coded 1 if the GICS index is below 100000, 0 otherwise;
Indus2 coded 1 if the GICS index is between 200000 and
300000, 0 otherwise; Indus3 coded 1 if the GICS index is
between 300000 and 400000, 0 otherwise; Indus4 coded 1 if
the GICS index is between 400000 and 500000, 0 otherwise.
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Table 3.2 Summary statistic and correlation between 2001 and 2008
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for 5924 firm-year observations
Minimum

25th
Percentile

LTD
dummy

75th Percentile

Mean

Maximum

0.8087

Std. Dev.
0.3933

STD

0

0.1618

0.3371

0.4970

0.9686

0.2172

LEV

0.0147

0.3102

0.4493

0.5657

0.9664

0.1732

STATE

0.7843

0.4114

ROA

0

0.011

0.0384

0.0528

0.3400

0.0388

ROS

0.0001

0.0001

0.0631

0.0862

2.7118

0.1071

CFOA

-0.5973

0.0221

0.0652

0.1099

0.7238

0.0873

MANA

0

0

0.0253

0.0003

0.7791

0.1004

DEPR

0

0.0315

0.1084

0.1831

1.37

0.1329

TANG

0.0223

0.3422

0.4715

0.5914

0.96

0.1714

Q

0.0001

0.8073

1.2007

1.3054

9.8726

0.6976

SIZE

8.1579

9.0138

9.3372

9.5946

12.0773

0.4694

MARK

0.33

6.06

7.7492

9.45

11.71

2.1812

Panel B: Pearson Correlation for 5924 observations
LTD
STD STATE ROA ROS CFOA LEV MANA DEPR TANG
dummy
LTD
dummy

1

STD

.024

1

ROA

.009 -.209** -.034**

ROS

.011 -.058** .046** .534**

LEV

1
1

.005 -.210** .077** .267** .106**

1

.260** .173** .072** -.293** -.288** -.075**

1

MANA -.127** -.027* -.457** .053** -.045** -.059** -.099**

1

DEPR .089** -.032* .261** .180** .093** .236** -.133** -.171**

1

TANG .137** .070** .177** -.025 .002 .118** .203** -.150** .319**
Q
SIZE

SIZE MARK

1

STATE .153** -.123**

CFOA

Q

1

-.113** .016 -.105** -.099** -.135** .029* -.046** .116** -.314** -.152**

1

.258** -.161** .269** -.059** -.011 .108** .317** -.189** .141** .271** -.132**

1

MARK -.085** -.019 -.233** -.136** -.144** -.036** .106** .200** -.146** -.034** .026* .118**
Notes: ** and * reflect the correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 3.3 Comparison of means and medians of debt variables between SOEs and privately controlled firms
Obs
SOEs

Private

SOEs

LEV
Private

t/Z

SOEs

LTD dummy
Private

t/Z

SOEs

STD
Private

3.049***
3.098***
1.773*
2.893***
4.304***
2.819***
5.738***
6.466***
11.910***

.3547
.3322
.3407
.3359
.3227
.3032
.3127
.2940
.3231

.4383
.4134
.4195
.4013
.4105
.3758
.3741
.3612
.3881

-3.087***
-3.067***
-3.231***
-3.265***
-4.377***
-4.121***
-4.053***
-4.360***
-9.548***

0.3771
0.3298
0.3421
0.3312
0.3134
0.2947
0.3109
0.2755
0.3192

0.4773
0.4246
0.4191
0.3513
0.4367
0.3912
0.3706
0.3878
0.4009

-2.828***
-2.891***
-3.155***
-3.199***
-4.155***
-4.001***
-3.808***
-4.077***
-9.072***

t/Z

Panel A: Value of Means, Difference significance from T-test in Means, Sig. (2-tailed)
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total

484
521
549
599
573
622
694
604
4646

73
77
100
145
142
182
270
289
1278

.3933
.4101
.4287
.4536
.4729
.4915
.4927
.4874
.4572

.3800
.4010
.4175
.4279
.4518
.4479
.4265
.3966
.4209

.667
.507
.612
1.610
1.289
3.041***
5.474***
7.210***
6.803***

.8120
.8234
.8506
.8514
.8709
.8875
.8213
.8013
.8403

.6575
.6753
.7800
.7517
.7254
.8077
.6519
.6021
.6941

Panel B: Value of Medians, Difference significance from Mann-Whitney U-test in Medians, Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total

484
521
549
599
573
622
694
604
4646

73
77
100
145
142
182
270
289
1278

0.3852
0.4176
0.4316
0.4671
0.4925
0.5183
0.5088
0.5037
0.4667

0.3941
0.4129
0.4044
0.4612
0.4682
0.4583
0.4348
0.4067
0.4245

-.570
.569
.582
1.689*
1.539
3.364***
5.453***
6.951***
6.765***

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Notes: *** and * represent significance at 1% and 10% levels respectively (2-tailed).
Private in the table implies to privately controlled firms.
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1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

3.027***
3.055***
1.770*
2.879***
4.252***
2.807***
5.645***
6.323***
11.771***

Table 3.4 Mean/ median comparison grouped by profitability
LEV
25%
lowest

25%
highest

LTD dummy
t/Z

STD

25%
lowest

25%
highest

t/Z

25%
lowest

25%
highest.

0.8028

0.000

0.3768

0.2721 13.165***

1

0.000

0.3857

0.2447 13.273***

t/Z

Panel A: Grouped by ROA
Mean

0.5065

0.3663 23.012*** 0.8028

Median

0.5309

0.3666 21.270***

1

Panel B: Grouped by ROS
Mean

0.4575

0.3571 16.142*** 0.7468

Median

0.4669

0.3469 15.633***

0.8001 -3.474*** 0.3264

1

1

-3.467*** 0.3270

0.3069

2.338**

0.2912

2.993***

Panel C: Grouped by CFOA
Mean

0.4793

0.4276

8.285***

0.8008

0.8089

-0.556

0.3880

0.2698 15.103***

Median

0.4950

0.4272

8.324***

1

1

-0.556

0.4000

0.2452 14.716***

Notes: *** and ** represent significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively (2-tailed).
25% lowest refers to the sub-samples consisting with firms with the value of profitability lower than
the value of 25th percentile of the whole 5924 observations; 25% highest refers to the sub-samples
consisting with firms with the value of profitability lower than the value of 75th percentile of the whole
5924 observations.
The t values for the mean comparison; Z values for the median comparison.
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Table 3.5 Results of panel regressions on debt characteristics between 2001 and 2008
Dependent
Variable
Constant
STATE
ROA
STATE*ROA

Panel A: LEV
.456***
(0.000)
.060***
(0.000)
-.854***
(0.000)
-.689***
(0.000)

.120***
(0.000)
-.378***
(0.000)
-.760***
(0.000)
.494***
(0.000)

ROS
STATE*ROS

.444***
(0.000)
.042***
(0.000)

.126***
(0.000)
-.381***
(0.000)

-.464***
(0.000)
.002
(0.971)

-.474***
(0.000)
.393***
(0.000)

Panel B: LTD dummy
.431***
(0.006)
.042***
(0.000)

.073**
(0.015)
-.366***
(0.000)

.698***
(0.000)
.972***
(0.000)
3.050**
(0.037)
-3.313*
(0.067)

-12.398***
(0.000)
.318***
(0.008)
4.433***
(0.008)
-2.756
(0.156)

.720***
(0.000)
.951***
(0.000)

-12.257***
(0.000)
.265**
(0.021)

1.905**
(0.040)
-2.063**
(0.037)

1.851*
(0.086)
-1.078
(0.319)

Panel C: STD
.850***
(0.000)
.813***
(0.000)

-12.614***
(0.000)
.227**
(0.038)

.426***
(0.000)
-.054***
(0.000)
-.931***
(0.000)
-.369**
(0.019)

1.095***
(0.000)
-.081***
(0.000)
-1.204***
(0.000)
-.176
(0.242)

0.389***
(0.000)
-.060***
(0.000)

1.227***
(0.000)
-.083***
(0.000)

-.043
(0.612)
-.070
(0.434)

-.081
(0.351)
.086
(0.329)

.405***
(0.000)
-.043***
(0.000)

1.142***
(0.000)
-.070***
(0.000)

CFOA

-.202***
(0.000)

-.195***
(0.000)

-.586
(0.387)

-.255
(0.743)

-.315*
(0.067)

-.313***
(0.000)

STATE*CFOA

-.035
(0.561)

.098***
(0.005)
.847***
(0.000)
-.072***
(0.000)
-.011***
(0.000)
-.079***
(0.000)
.070***
(0.000)
.001
(0.658)
.040***
(0.000)
-.003
(0.318)

.548
(0.505)

-.242***
(0.000)
.231***
(0.000)
-.162***
(0.002)
-.001
(0.770)
-.016
(0.538)
.104***
(0.000)
.005***
(0.001)
-.095***
(0.000)

.312***
(0.000)
-.212***
(0.000)
-.015***
(0.002)
-.023
(0.389)
.109***
(0.000)
.005***
(0.002)
-.112***
(0.000)

-.209***
(0.003)
.292***
(0.000)
-.212***
(0.000)
-.004
(0.422)
.056**
(0.038)
.102***
(0.000)
.005***
(0.001)
-.101***
(0.000)

PreLEV

.839***
(0.000)
-.055***
(0.000)
-.014***
(0.000)
-.068***
(0.000)
.020*
(0.065)
-.001
(0.461)
.038***
(0.000)
-.002
(0.476)

MANA
Q
DEPR
TANG
MARK
SIZE
REFORM
YEAR
INDUSTRY
Obs.
Adj R2/Pseudo
R2

.839***
(0.000)
-.082***
(0.000)
-.016***
(0.000)
-.080***
(0.000)
.068***
(0.000)
-.001*
(0.075)
.038***
(0.000)
-.002
(0.360)

Yes
5924
0.103

5924
0.683

Yes
5924
0.089

5924
0.683

Yes
5924
0.020

5924
0.677

5924
0.023

3.579***
(0.000)
.039
(0.906)
-.107*
(0.067)
.754*
(0.085)
.384*
(0.098)
-.106***
(0.000)
1.378***
(0.000)

3.614***
(0.000)
.135
(.674)
-.091
(0.112)
.772*
(0.078)
.348
(0.133)
-.103***
(0.000)
1.361***
(0.000)

-.518
(0.582)
3.417***
(0.000)
.148
(0.644)
-.075
(0.199)
.789*
(0.074)
.353
(0.128)
-.104***
(0.000)
1.417***
(0.000)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

5924
0.163

5924
0.023

5924
0.163

Notes: P values in parenthesis; ***, ** and * are signs for significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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5924
0.022

5924
0.162

5924
0.062

5924
0.141

5924
0.020

5924
0.125

5924
0.057

5924
0.158

Table 3.6 Results of panel regressions on debt characteristics grouped by ownership control type
Panel A: OLS Regression, dependant variable is LEV

IAROA

SOEs

Private

Diff.

-.254***
（0.000）

-.147***
（0.006）

-0.107*
(0.086)

IAROS

SOEs

Private

Diff.

-.062***
(0.000)

-.067*
(0.061)

0.005
(0.880)

SOEs

Private

Diff.

-.124***
(0.000)
.815***
(0.000)
-.004
(0.172)
-.007***
(0.007)
.100***
(0.008)
.036***
(0.007)
-.001
(0.680)
.043***
(.000)

0.051*
(0.064)
0.069***
(0.000)
-0.161**
(0.046)
-0.001
(0.860)
-0.144***
(0.000)
-0.020
(0.179)
0.008
(0.619)
-0.044***
(0.000)

.872***
(0.000)
-.131
(0.101)
-.009***
(0.000)
-.039***
(0.000)
.014*
(0.054)
-.001***
(0.009)
.016***
(0.000)

.813***
(0.000)
.002
(0.877)
-.010***
(0.000)
.106***
(0.008)
.037***
(0.005)
-.001
(0.411)
.041***
(0.000)

0.059***
(0.000)
-0.133*
(0.099)
0.001
(0.859)
-0.145***
(0.000)
-0.023
(0.112)
0
(0.647)
-0.025***
(0.001)

.874***
(0.000)
-.172**
(0.031)
-.011***
(0.000)
-.053***
(0.000)
.016**
(0.022)
-.001**
(0.032)
.015***
(0.000)

.814***
(0.000)
-.002
(0.845)
-.010***
(0.000)
.096**
(0.017)
.038***
(0.004)
-.001
(0.253)
.041***
(0.000)

0.060***
(0.000)
-0.170**
(0.035)
-0.001
(0.756)
-0.149***
(0.000)
-0.022
(0.143)
0
(0.936)
-0.026***
(0.000)

-.073***
(0.000)
.884***
(0.000)
-.165**
(0.039)
-.008***
(0.000)
-.044***
(0.000)
.016**
(0.027)
.007
(0.172)
-.001*
(0.057)

Obs.

4646

1278

5924

4646

1278

5924

4646

1278

5924

Adj R2

0.816

0.793

0.976

0.815

0.792

0.976

0.815

0.796

0.976

IACFOA
PreLEV
MANA
Q
DEPR
TANG
MARK
SIZE
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Panel B: Logistic Regression, dependant variable is LTD dummy

IAROA

SOEs

Private

Diff.

2.480*
（0.051）

6.538***
（0.000）

-4.058*
(0.060)

IAROS

SOEs

Private

Diff.

.811*
(0.077)

3.235***
(0.007)

-2.424*
(0.060)

SOEs

Private

Diff.

-.328
(0.666)
3.225***
(0.000)
-.122
(0.713)
-.197**
(0.015)
2.662**
(0.030)
.075
(0.857)
-.060*
(0.072)
.957***
(0.000)

-0.620
(0.507)
0.333
(0.541)
6.074**
(0.019)
0.138
(0.175)
-0.689
(0.595)
0.457
(0.357)
-0.079**
(0.042)
0.546**
(0.032)

3.715***
(0.000)
5.381**
(0.037)
-.084
(0.164)
1.622***
(0.000)
.580**
(0.034)
-.134***
(0.000)
1.457***
(0.000)

3.534***
(0.000)
-.280
(0.407)
-.183**
(0.023)
.589
(0.648)
.282
(0.502)
-.058*
(0.083)
.990***
(0.000)

0.181
(0.745)
5.661**
(0.030)
0.099
(0.328)
1.033
(0.446)
0.298
(0.551)
-0.076*
(0.052)
0.467*
(0.067)

3.750***
(0.000)
5.691**
(0.027)
-.067
(0.268)
1.722***
(0.000)
.538**
(0.048)
-.136***
(0.000)
1.447***
(0.000)

3.470***
(0.000)
-.140
(0.673)
-.171**
(0.035)
1.034
(0.431)
.240
(0.568)
-.036
(0.302)
.965***
(0.000)

0.280
(0.618)
5.831**
(0.025)
0.104
(0.306)
0.688
(0.617)
0.298
(0.552)
-0.100**
(0.013)
0.482*
(0.058)

-.948*
(0.083)
3.558***
(0.000)
5.952**
(0.021)
-.059
(0.341)
1.973***
(0.000)
.532**
(0.050)
-.139***
(0.000)
1.503***
(0.000)

Obs.

4646

1278

5924

4646

1278

5924

4646

1278

5924

Pseudo R2

0.137

0.112

0.149

0.137

0.108

0.148

0.137

0.103

0.146

IACFOA
PreLEV
MANA
Q
DEPR
TANG
MARK
SIZE
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Panel C: OLS Regression, dependant variable is STD

IAROA

SOEs

Private

Diff.

-1.081***
（0.000）

-1.120***
（0.000）

0.039
(0.819)

IAROS

SOEs

Private

Diff.

.010
(0.707)

-.278***
(0.004)

0.288***
(0.005)

SOEs

Private

Diff.

-.310***
(0.000)
.282***
(0.000)
-.137***
(0.000)
.002
(0.776)
.287***
(0.004)
.123***
(0.001)
-.013***
(0.000)
-.058***
(0.001)

-0.179**
(0.015)
-0.006
(0.892)
-0.537**
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.768)
-0.201*
(0.053)
-0.019
(0.633)
0.015***
(0.000)
-0.05***
(0.009)

.232***
(0.000)
-.550***
(0.010)
-.010**
(0.048)
.077***
(0.002)
.096***
(0.000)
-.001
(0.921)
-.114***
(0.000)

.245***
(0.000)
-.101***
(0.001)
-.006
(0.414)
.504***
(0.000)
.111***
(0.002)
-.015***
(0.000)
-.068***
(0.000)

-0.013
(0.774)
-0.449**
(0.038)
-0.004
(0.663)
-0.427***
(0.000)
-0.015
(0.782)
0.014***
(0.005)
-0.046**
(0.015)

.296***
(0.000)
-.729***
(0.001)
-.012**
(0.020)
.006
(0.804)
.105***
(0.000)
.002
(0.165)
-.122***
(0.000)

.272***
(0.000)
-.132***
(0.000)
-.005
(0.491)
.324***
(0.003)
.125***
(0.001)
-.016***
(0.000)
-.064***
(0.001)

0.024
(0.594)
-0.597***
(0.007)
-0.007
(0.462)
-0.318***
(0.005)
-0.02
(0.626)
0.018***
(0.000)
-0.058***
(0.003)

-.489***
(0.000)
.276***
(0.000)
-.674***
(0.002)
-.001
(0.915)
.086***
(0.000)
.104***
(0.000)
.002
(0.253)
-.108***
(0.000)

Obs.

4646

1278

5924

4646

1278

5924

4646

1278

5924

Adj R2

0.130

0.130

0.749

0.100

0.100

0.740

0.136

0.108

0.748

IACFOA
PreLEV
MANA
Q
DEPR
TANG
MARK
SIZE

Notes: P values in parenthesis; ***, ** and * are signs for significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Differences of coefficient are by chow-test. All of the constant in the separate regressions ahead of chow test are omitted to report for the sake of brevity.
Private in the table implies to privately controlled firms.
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Table 3.7 Statistics about firms changed from SOEs into privately controlled firms and from privately controlled firms into SOEs
Panel A: number of observations change their debt characteristic variables
LEV

LTD

STD

Obs.
increase

decrease

no change

increase

decrease

no change

increase

decrease

no change

83 (3)

52 (4)

1 (18)

44 (9)

54 (11)

38 (5)

70 (11)

58 (7)

8 (7)

80 (8)

48 (7)

46 (7)

52 (7)

52 (9)

70 (7)

0-3

69 (5)

43 (5)

50 (5)

39 (4)

51 (5)

56 (5)

0-4

56 (7)

30 (1)

37 (4)

33 (3)

37 (3)

47 (4)

0-1
0-2
136 (25)

Panel B: mean of the percentage change of debt characteristic variables
LEV
Obs.

LTD

STD

Δ% of increase

Δ% of decrease

Δ% of increase

Δ% of decrease

Δ% of increase

Δ% of decrease

3.92 (3.03)

-8.12 (4.79)

5.94 (3.36)

-3.03 (-7.43)

12.66 (10.13)

-13.28 (-11.68)

11.81 (08.43)

-12.11 (-11.43)

8.51 (8.41)

-5.03 (-6.96)

16.44 (9.87)

-17.38 (-18.71)

0-3

14.41 (7.92)

-10.07 (-5.60)

6.82 (9.15)

-5.42 (-7.01)

15.77 (3.59)

-20.15 (-15.91)

0-4

16.09 (8.49)

-11.97 (-4.89)

6.93 (10.78)

-5.23 (-8.17)

16.18 (3.80)

-20.91 (-27.54)

0-1
0-2
136 (25)

Notes: Panel A is the number of firms changed their debt variables according to the transfer of ownership control type. “0-1” depicts the transfer of ownership control type
in the first year. “0-2”, “0-3” and “0-4” depicts the transferring of ownership control type in the second, third and fourth year.
Panel B is the mean value of the accumulative percentage increase/ decrease of debt variables each year. The numbers outside (inside) the parenthesis are the relevant values
for firms from SOEs into privately controlled firms (from privately controlled firms into SOEs).
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Table 4.1 Definition of institution and profitability variables
Variables

Measurement
Institutional development

marketization
(Market)

Summarize of five categories of market development (marketization)
indexes: Government and Market; Development of Non-state Sector;
Development of Product Market; banking sector marketization; and
legal environment. The larger number of marketization index, the better.

property right protection
(PropertyRight)

Reduce firms‘ burden out of tax, the less the better.

government intervention
(GOV)

The economic resource allocation according to market，the smaller the
better.

legal system
(LAW)

The development of intermediary organization and the environment of
legal system，the larger the better.
Profitability

ROA

Operating earnings /average book value of total assets

ROS

Operating earnings/net sales

CFOA

Operating cash flows /average book value of total assets

Notes: These measurements of institutional development are from Fan et al. (2010): NERI (National
Economic Research Institute) INDEX of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2009 Report.
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Table 4.2 Sample characteristics and descriptive statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of bank loan source
Observations

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Median

Loan from Big Four

1228

3

255208

552

115

Loan from Joint stock
commercial banks

1816

1.5

2580700

1846

115

Loan from Policy banks

148

5

68316

1614

200

Loan from Foreign banks

43

4

10000

359

80

Loan amount: million yuan

Mean value of loan percentage
Loan from Big Four

Loan from Joint stock
commercial banks

Loan from Policy banks

Loan from Foreign banks

0.3558

0.5917

0.0400

0.0074
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of other sample characters

Stateownership (%)

Minimum

25%

50%

75%

Maximum

Mean

Std.Dev.

0

0

17.90%

46.33%

84.95%

24.17%

24.81%

0

0

1

0.2742

0.4462

ProtectedIndustry
Market

0.6300

6.1100

7.6600

9.5500

11.7100

7.8119

2.2389

GOV

-16.4000

7.2500

8.1000

9.2900

13.4500

7.9116

2.4385

PropertyRight

0

10.1800

14.5900

15.2233

16.3700

12.6908

3.6716

LAW

1

4.4133

6.4100

9.5833

16.6100

7.1199

3.4930

ROA

-0.2850

0.0104

0.0309

0.0549

0.3739

0.0191

0.1891

MANA (%)

0

0

0.01%

0.03%

71.64%

2.52%

11.82%

LEV

0.0091

0.4186

0.5452

0.6591

0.9740

0.5474

0.2615

Size

7.9328

9.0109

9.2959

9.6344

11.4921

9.3401

0.5103

Notes: ProtectedIndustry refers to the dummy variable to measure if the industry is protected or not. The definition of protected industry is: according to industry category of
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), if the company’s industry is monopolistic, or national key protected, or highly regulated industry, such as electricity power,
telecommunication, petroleum, exploitation, agriculture, construction of civil engineering, development and operation etc.
Market is the short of marketization; GOV is the abbreviation of government intervention; PropertyRight is the abbreviation of the level of property right protection. LAW is
the abbreviation of the level of legal system development. These profiles of institutional development are from Fan et al. (2010): NERI (National Economic Research
Institute) INDEX of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2009 Report.
ROA is return on asset; LEV is the short of leverage ratio. MANA is the short of the percentage of managerial ownership.
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Table 4.3 Pearson correlation for 2509 observations over year 2002 to 2009
Big_Four

ROA

State
ownership

MANA

LEV

Tobin‘ s
Q

Market

Property
Right

GOV

LAW

Big_Four

1

ROA

-.006

1

Stateownership

.046*

.029

1

MANA

-.030

.038

-.187**

1

LEV

.018

-.663**

-.063**

-.050*

1

Tobin‘s Q

-.042*

.036

-.220**

.025

-.060**

1

Market

-.112**

.034

-.245**

.164**

.039

.046*

1

PropertyRright

.053**

.003

.022

-.008

.027

-.014

.013

1

GOV

.018

.001

.012

-.005

.024

-.006

.013

.981**

1

-.013

*

-.003

-.001

1

.147

**

-.022

.011

.137**

.205

**

*

.014

**

LAW
ProtectedIndustry
Size

-.035
-.724

**

-.036

.006
.029
.128

**

.000
-.069
.057

**

**

-.010
.029
-.068

**

.016
-.006
.069

**

.028
-.218

**

.041

.039

.099

Protected
Industry

Size

1
.113**

1

Notes: Sig. (2-tailed); N=2509; * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
ProtectedIndustry refers to the dummy variable to measure if the industry is protected or not. The definition of protected industry is: according to industry category of China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), if the company’s industry is monopolistic, or national key protected, or highly regulated industry, such as electricity power,
telecommunication, petroleum, exploitation, agriculture, construction of civil engineering, development and operation etc.
Market is the short of marketization; GOV is the abbreviation of government intervention; PropertyRight is the abbreviation of the level of property right protection. LAW is
the abbreviation of the level of legal system development. These profiles of institutional development are from Fan et al. (2010): NERI (National Economic Research
Institute) INDEX of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2009 Report.
ROA is return on asset; LEV is the short of leverage ratio. MANA is the short of the percentage of managerial ownership.
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Table 4.4 Results of uni-variate test for main variables over year 2002 to 2009
Panel A: Mean and median comparison grouped by ownership control type
Mean comparison

Median comparison

SOEs
(1698 obs.)

Private
(811obs.)

t

SOEs
(1698 obs.)

Private
(811obs.)

Z

loan amount from Big Four
(million yuan)

352

99

1.654*

0

0

1.826*

loan amount from joint stock
commercial banks (million yuan)

1876

206

1.098

585

500

.087

loan amount from policy banks
(million yuan)

133

15

2.494**

0

0

2.082**

2

14

-1.407

0

0

1.992**

.3655

.3355

1.667*

0

0

1.316

.5753

.6258

-2.736***

0.7487

0.8779

2.258**

Stateownership

.0467
.0060
.3379

.0261
.0101
.0400

2.986***
-1.245
43.389***

0
0
0.3615

0
0
0

2.026**
1.997**
28.425***

ProtectedIndustry
Market
PropertyRight
GOV
LAW
ROA
MANA
LEV
Tobin’s Q
Size

.3104
7.5409
12.2698
7.8073
6.7548
.0207
.0035
.5457
1.4951
9.3952

.1990
8.3800
13.5720
8.1300
7.8840
.0160
.0710
.5510
1.7980
9.2250

6.227***
-8.912***
-9.155***
-3.105***
-7.661***
.624
-13.805***
-.486
-7.349***
8.586***

0
7.405
14.1061
7.9700
5.6744
0.0292
0.00001245
0.5512
1.2821
9.3533

0
8.6
14.7933
9.05
6.92
0.03544
0.0000869
0.5313
1.4474
9.1652

5.872***
8.985***
7.801***
6.276***
7.570***
4.698***
9.446***
1.753*
7.200***
8.456***

loan amount from foreign banks
(million yuan)
loan proportion from Big Four
loan proportion from joint stock
commercial banks
loan proportion from policy banks
loan proportion from foreign banks
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Panel B: Mean and median comparison grouped by institution development
Mean comparison
Low institution
(1262 obs.)

Median comparison

High institution
(1247obs.)

t

Low institution
(1262 obs.)

High institution
(1247obs.)

Z

loan amount from Big Four
372
168
.989
0
16
3.351***
(million yuan)
loan amount from other joint stock
2422
235
1.071
77
40
6.737***
commercial banks (million yuan)
loan amount from policy banks
157
33
1.946
0
0
.326
(million yuan)
loan amount from foreign banks
4
8
-.574
0
0
4.115***
(million yuan)
loan proportion from Big Four
.3095
.4027
-5.499
0
0.1471
5.303***
loan proportion from joint stock
.6374
.5454
5.276
0.9386
0.6333
5.099***
commercial banks
loan proportion from policy banks
.0381
.0420
-.539
0
0
.426
loan proportion from foreign banks
.0103
.0044
1.930*
0
0
4.098***
Stateownership
.1964
.2875
-9.356***
0.0664
0.2784
9.362***
ProtectedIndustry
.2377
.3111
-4.135***
0
0
4.121***
ROA
.0204
.0178
.353
0.0337
0.0278
4.171***
MANA
.0390
.0113
5.920***
0.0000518
0.0000102
6.997***
LEV
.5547
.5401
1.402
0.5496
3
2.033**
Tobin‘s Q
1.6024
1.5836
.482
1.3206
1.3436
.760
Size
9.4182
9.2610
7.815***
9.3982
9.2002
8.615***
Notes: *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
ProtectedIndustry refers to the dummy variable to measure if the industry is protected or not. The definition of protected industry is: according to industry category of China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), if the company‘s industry is monopolistic, or national key protected, or highly regulated industry, such as electricity power,
telecommunication, petroleum, exploitation, agriculture, construction of civil engineering, development and operation etc.
Market is the short of marketization; GOV is the abbreviation of government intervention; PropertyRight is the abbreviation of the level of property right protection. LAW is
the abbreviation of the level of legal system development. These profiles of institutional development are from Fan et al. (2010): NERI (National Economic Research
Institute) INDEX of Marketization of China‘s Provinces 2009 Report.
ROA is return on asset; LEV is the short of leverage ratio. MANA is the short of the percentage of managerial ownership.
Private in the table implies to privately controlled firms.
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Table 4.5 Results of Logistic regression on Big_Four over year 2002 to 2009

Intercept
Political

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-.7973
(0.612)
1.1449**
(0.016)

.5541*
(0.082)
.8068**
(0.031)
-.0771**
(0.037)
.0018*
(0.095)

-.6908*
(0.063)
.6156*
(0.052)

-1.0201
(0.518)
-.9465**
(0.024)

-1.1239
(0.478)
1.2968*
(0.093)

Market
Political*Market

.0431**
(0.025)
.0581
(0.800)

GOV
Political*GOV

.0586**
(0.041)
.1601*
(0.083)

PropertyRight
Political*PropertyRight

.0706
( 0.846)
-.4268
(0.302)
.0684
(0.102)
.0708**
( 0.022)
.0615
( 0.612)

.0343
(0.288)
-.2562
(0.508)
.3637
(0.106)
-.0863**
(0.030)
.0042
(0.964)

.0643
(0.360)
-.3566
(0.377)
.0628
(0.127)
.0975*
(0.073)
.0632
(0.723)

.0727
(0.342)
-.2647
(0.508)
.0526*
(0.055)
.1820**
(0.013)
.0705
(0.692)

-.0436**
(0.047)
-.0539 *
(0.086)
.0424
(0.316)
-.2657
(0.416)
.0528
(0.051)
.1444
(0.023)
.0481
(0.787)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

811

811

811

811

811

0.0044

0.0110

0.0052

0.0144

0.0097

LAW
Political*LAW
ROA
MANA
LEV
Size
ProtectedIndustry
Year
obs.
2

Pseudo R

Notes: P values in parenthesis; ***, ** and * are signs for significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Dependent variable is a dummy variable named Big Four, which equals to 1 if specific company in
specific year only have bank loan from Big Four, otherwise 0.
ProtectedIndustry refers to the dummy variable to measure if the industry is protected or not. The
definition of protected industry is: according to industry category of China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC), if the company‘s industry is monopolistic, or national key protected, or highly
regulated industry, such as electricity power, telecommunication, petroleum, exploitation, agriculture,
construction of civil engineering, development and operation etc.
Market is the short of marketization; GOV is the abbreviation of government intervention;
PropertyRight is the abbreviation of the level of property right protection. LAW is the abbreviation of
the level of legal system development. These profiles of institutional development are from Fan et al.
(2010): NERI (National Economic Research Institute) INDEX of Marketization of China‘s Provinces
2009 Report.
ROA is return on asset; LEV is the short of leverage ratio. MANA is the short of the percentage of
managerial ownership.
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Table 4.6 Results for Two-stage approach on Big_Four over year 2002 to 2009
First Stage:
SOE
Intercept

8.7245***
(0.000)

Pr[SOE]
Market
Pr[SOE]*Market

Second Stage [Big_Four]
(1)
2.5050***
(0.009)
1.4238**
(0.040)
-.1193***
(0.000)
.0925
(0.157)

(2)
2.6474***
(0.006)
-.5331
(0.415)

(3)
2.3880**
(0.012)
-1.7512***
(0.010)

-.0291
(0.293)
-.0155
(0.811)

GOV
Pr[SOE]*GOV

.0939***
(0.000)
.0707*
(0.088)

PropertyRight
Pr[SOE]*PropertyRight

-8.2410***
(0.000)
.3804
( 0.276)
10.6891***
(0.000)
.2746
(0.329)
-.9087***
( 0.000)
-.4580***
( 0.001)
Yes

-.5309
(0.173)
.3403
(0.254)
.1167
(0.778)
.3552
(0.109)
-.1573*
(0.095)
-.0378
(0.687)
Yes

-.3089
(0.413)
.3198
(0.283)
.0742
(0.857)
.3208
(0.144)
-.2520***
(0.007)
-.0059
(0.950)
Yes

-.8013**
(0.040)
.4376
(0.146)
.1906
(0.649)
.4422**
(0.050)
-.1114
(0.236)
.0072
(0.938)
Yes

-.0721***
(0.000)
.0683*
(0.085)
-.5029
(0.193)
.3094
(0.298)
.0817
(0.843)
.3224
(0.142)
-.1793**
(0.057)
-.0294
(0.753)
Yes

2509

2509

2509

2509

2509

0.3891

0.0117

0.0061

0.0163

0.0103

LAW
Pr[SOE]*LAW
Political
ROA
MANA
LEV
Size
ProtectedIndustry
Year
obs.
2

Pseudo R

(4)
2.3097**
(0.015)
-1.2113**
(0.015)

Notes: P values in parenthesis; ***, ** and * are signs for significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
In the first stage, dependant variable is SOE, which set 0 if the firm‘s ultimate controller is the state, o
otherwise. Pr[SOE] is predicted ownership control type according to Probit model; in the second stage,
dependant variable is the Big_Four dummy variable, which is the access of bank loan from Big Four.
One of the independent variables Pr[SOE] in the second stage is from the predicted number of Probit
model in the first stage.
ProtectedIndustry refers to the dummy variable to measure if the industry is protected or not. The
definition of protected industry is: according to industry category of China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC), if the company‘s industry is monopolistic, or national key protected, or highly
regulated industry, such as electricity power, telecommunication, petroleum, exploitation, agriculture,
construction of civil engineering, development and operation etc.
Market is the short of marketization; GOV is the abbreviation of government intervention;
PropertyRight is the abbreviation of the level of property right protection. LAW is the abbreviation of
the level of legal system development. These profiles of institutional development are from Fan et al.
(2010): NERI (National Economic Research Institute) INDEX of Marketization of China‘s Provinces
2009 Report. ROA is return on asset; LEV is the short of leverage ratio. MANA is the short of the
percentage of managerial ownership.
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Table 5.1 Summary of main statistics
Mean

Median Maximum Minimum Std. dev Skewness

Kurtosis Observations

Managerial
ownership

0.0931

0.0009

0.7481

0.0000

0.1657

1.8290

5.4023

723

Tobin‘s Q

1.4125

1.0347

10.2065

0.3263

1.0056

3.4387

21.5381

723

Leverage ratio

0.4807

0.4972

0.9528

0.0000

0.1688

-0.3159

2.6444

723

Notes: Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total shares
outstanding.
Tobin‘s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets; this is extracted from
the CCER database.
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets, which is the measurement of capital structure.
The sample comprises 197 privately controlled Chinese firms listed between 2002 and 2007 on the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange. There are 723 firm-year observations in
total.
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Table 5.2 Mean values of Tobin’s Q and capital structure by managerial ownership levels
Managerial ownership

Number of observations

Mean Tobin‘s Q

Std. dev of Tobin‘s Q

Mean leverage ratio

Std. dev of capital structure

0 ≤ MANA < 5%

505

1.3323

0.8711

0.5140

0.1665

5% ≤ MANA < 15%

54

1.4733

1.1183

0.4126

0.1311

15% ≤ MANA < 25%

40

1.7733

1.5906

0.3973

0.1296

25% ≤ MANA < 35%

40

1.8180

1.3831

0.4718

0.1607

35% ≤ MANA < 45%

39

1.3076

0.7108

0.4048

0.1433

45% ≤ MANA < 55%

25

1.2996

0.5526

0.4650

0.2468

55% ≤ MANA

20

1.0961

0.5145

0.3739

0.2155

Notes: MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total shares outstanding.
Tobin‘s Q is derived from the CCER database.
Leverage ratio is calculated by total debt to total assets.
The sample comprises 723 firm-year privately controlled observations listed between 2002 and 2007.
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Table 5.3 Results of regression on Tobin’s Q with managerial ownership between 2002 and 2007
Constant

MANA

MANA2

MANA3

1.2346***
(5.27)

2.3664**
(2.07)

-8.6090*
(-1.77)

7.0211
(1.38)

2.9666***
(3.84)

2.7402**
(2.35)

-7.3924
(-1.50)

3.0382
(0.59)

Leverage ratio

-0.4586**
(-2.64)

Size

-0.1497*
(-1.72)

Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel observations are unbalanced between 2002 and 2007.
Tobin‘s Q is the dependant variable.
MANA stands for managerial ownership.
MANA2 and MANA3 are the quadratic and cubic terms of MANA.
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Industry
dummy

yes

R2

F-statistic

0.008

1.982

723

0.032

4.658

723

Panel observations

Table 5.4 Results of regression on capital structure with managerial ownership between 2002 and 2007
Constant

MANA

MANA2

MANA3

0.5117***
(69.40)

-1.5120***
(-6.22)

5.8719***
(5.65)

-6.0928***
(-5.61)

0.5799***
(25.75)

-1.3733***
(-5.67)

5.4140***
(5.24)

-5.6118***
(-5.19)

CR5

ROA

-0.1376***
(-3.07)

Notes: *** represents significance at 1% level.
Panel observations are unbalanced between 2002 and 2007.
Leverage ratio is the dependant variable.
MANA stands for managerial ownership.
MANA2 and MANA3 are the quadratic and cubic terms of MANA.
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-0.0608***
(-3.18)

Industry
dummy

yes

panel
observations

R2

F-statistic

0.086

22.511

723

0.112

18.153

723

Table 5.5 Simultaneous regression analysis using three-stage least squares
method
Variable
Constant term
Tobin‘s Q
ROA

Managerial ownership
(Eq.5.3)
0.1728*** (7.85)

Firm value
(Eq.5.4)
1.8284** (2.03)

Capital structure
(Eq.5.5)
0.3273*** (11.47)

-0.0308*** (-4.64)

-0.0593*** (-6.41)

-0.0072 (0.58)

-0.0460*** (-4.02)

Managerial ownership t-1

0.7948*** (29.60)

Capital structure

-0.1937*** (-5.62)

-1.9818*** (-4.01)

MANA

11.0050 (1.90)

-0.1758*** (-2.27)

MANA2

-40.1280 (-1.71)

0.8002*** (3.31)

MANA3

3.0382 (0.44)

SIZE

-1.5000 (-1.58)

-0.0652 (-0.67)

Tobin‘s Q t-1

1.3352*** (14.21)

CR5

-0.0434 (1.48)

Leverage ratio t-1

0.5547*** (17.63)

R2

0.616

0.242

0.453

Number of observations

587

587

587

Notes: The dependant variable of Model 3, Managerial ownership, is managerial shareholding in year t.
The dependant variable of Model 4, Firm value, is Tobin‘s Q in year t.
The dependant variable of Model 5, Capital structure, is leverage ratio in year t.
Tobin‘s Q is market value of assets divided by book value of total assets.
ROA is the net income divided by the total assets at the year end.
CR5 is the ownership sum of the first five-largest shareholders.
Capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by all board
members to total shares outstanding.
The quadratic and cubic terms of MANA are MANA2 and MANA3.
Size is the logarithm of total assets.
Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total shares outstanding.
Capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
The sample comprises 197 privately controlled Chinese firms listed between 2002 and 2007.
The unbalanced panel data construct 723 observations, but there are only 587 effective observations in
simultaneous equations.
All independent variables refer to the values in year t, except those with the subscript t-1.
*** and ** represent significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively.
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Table 5.6 Robustness test using simultaneous regression with three-stage least
squares method
Variable

Constant term
Tobin‘s Q
ROA

Managerial ownership t
(Eq.5.6)
0.1716*** (7.79)

1.9165** (2.11)

0.0080 (0.64)

-0.0459*** (-3.54)

Capital structure

-0.1922*** (-5.58)

-2.3168*** (-5.08)
5.6044 (1.02)

18%

MANA 18–64%

-1.7382*** (-3.08)

MANA > 64%

-8.5673 (-1.07)

SIZE

-0.0525 (-0.53)

Tobin‘s Q t-1
MANA

0.3201*** (9.80)
-0.0576*** (-5.58)

0.7944*** (29.64)

≤

Capital structure t
(Eq.5.8)

-0.0305*** (-4.60)

Managerial ownership t-1

MANA

Firm value t
(Eq.5.7)

1.3511*** (14.33)
-0.6663 (-0.892)

≤18%

MANA 18–46%

-0.1667** (-2.03)

MANA > 46%

-0.6966** (-2.31)

CR5

0.0722** (2.05)

Leverage ratio t-1

0.5484*** (15.98)

R2

0.617

0.253

0.446

Number of observations

587

587

587

Notes: The dependant variable of Model 3, Managerial ownership, is managerial shareholding in year t;
the dependant variable of Model 4, Firm value, is Tobin‘s Q in year t; the dependant variable of Model
5, Capital structure, is leverage ratio in year t.
Tobin‘s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets.
ROA is the net income divided by the total assets at the year end.
CR5 is the ownership sum of the first five-largest shareholders.
Capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by all board
members to total shares outstanding.
The quadratic and cubic terms of MANA are MANA2 and MANA3.
Size is the logarithm of total assets.
Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total shares outstanding.
Capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
The sample comprises 197 privately controlled Chinese firms listed between 2002 and 2007.
The unbalanced panel data construct 723 observations, but there are only 587 effective observations in
simultaneous equations.
All independent variables refer to the values in year t, except those with the subscript t-1.
*** and ** represent significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively.
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Table 6. 1 Summary of research questions, hypotheses and models
Research questions

Hypotheses

Models

H3.1

Eq. 3.1

H3.2

Eq. 3.1

H3.3

Eq. 3.1; Eq. 3.2

H4.1

Uni-variate test; Eq. 4.1

H4.2

Eq. 4.1

H4.3

Eq. 4.1

H4.4

Eq. 4.1

What is the relationship between
firm value and managerial
ownership?

H 5.1

Eq 5.1

What is the relationship between
capital structure and managerial
ownership?

H 5.2

Eq. 5.2

H 5.3; H5.4

Eq 5.3; Eq 5.4; Eq 5.5;
Eq 5.6; Eq 5.7; Eq 5.8

what are main concerns of the debt
maturity structure decisions in
Chinese listed companies?

What are the main determinants of
bank loan decisions of Chinese listed
companies?

What is the function of the
entrenchment effect induced by
managerial ownership to corporate
leverage choice and firm
performance?
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Figure 1.1 Relationship between convergence of interest, managerial
entrenchment and managerial ownership25

25

Han, Liangliang., Li, Kai., Song, Li. (2006) Managerial Ownership and Firm Value: Empirical Evidence based
on the Convergence of Interest Effects and the Entrenchment Effects. Nankai Business Review 9 (4). 35-41 [in
Chinese]
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Figure 1.2 Relationship between corporation value and managerial ownership26

26

Han, Liangliang., Li, Kai., Song, Li. (2006) Managerial Ownership and Firm Value: Empirical Evidence based
on the Convergence of Interest Effects and the Entrenchment Effects. Nankai Business Review 9 (4). 35-41 [in
Chinese]
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Firm Value
Managerial
Ownership

Capital Structure

Figure 5.1 Relationships between managerial ownership, firm value and capital
structure
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Tobin‘s Q/capital structure

A

C

Tobin‘s Q

P1 = 0.18
P2 = 0.46
P3 = 0.64

D
B
Capital structure
P1
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Figure 5.2 Relationships between firm value, capital structure and managerial
ownership
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